dissenting to denial of appellee’s motion for rehearing.
I dissent from the denial of appellee’s motion for rehearing. Because I previously joined the Court’s opinion on original submission, I write separately to explain my reasons for believing that we should grant appellee’s motion for rehearing.
In retrospect, I should have been shown (as Judge Mansfield was) as concurring only in the judgment. On original submission, the outcome of Brabson was clearly correct. That is, there were at least two good reasons for holding that the District Attorney was not collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of probable cause for arrest, even though the Department of Public Safety had previously received an adverse ruling on this same issue in a prior administrative license revocation proceeding. First, the controlling statute did not authorize the administrative law judge to make a finding on probable cause; it then follows that such an unauthorized finding should not preclude relitigation of the issue. Brabson v. State, 976 S.W.2d 182, 184 (Tex.Crim.App.1998); see also Reynolds v. State, 967 S.W.2d 493, 496 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. filed) (Cohen, J., dissenting). Also, because the issue of probable cause for arrest was not an ultimate fact before the administrative law judge, such a finding did not preclude relit-igation of the issue. Brabson, 976 S.W.2d at 185; see also Reynolds, 967 S.W.2d at 497 (Cohen, J., dissenting).
However, after some reflection, I now believe the Court’s proposition that the District Attorney and the Department of Public Safety are not the same parties (Brabson, 976 S.W.2d at 184) is highly problematic, and equally important, completely unnecessary to a resolution of the matter.1
*207I will not belabor what has already been more than adequately pointed out — the flaws of the argument that the District Attorney and the Department of Public Safety are not the same parties.2 Clearly, as each was acting solely as an agent or representative of the State of Texas, it was the State of Texas who was the real party in interest in each proceeding. Once that is understood, it is obvious that the State of Texas is the same party as the State of Texas. This is no different than understanding that when there are two different attorneys acting to represent the same client, the real parties in interest (the client) are the same.
The concurrence argues that the “parties” argument of Brabson is sound, primarily on the basis of public policy — i.e., issues such as “probable cause to arrest” are better addressed in the criminal justice system. See ante, at 201.3 However, this proves too much, for the cure does not fit the ailment. That is, such a justification would better support the position that in situations such as the instant case, the doctrine of collateral estoppel will simply not be used as a bar to relitigation of these types of issues. Such a principle is far more sound than the bare and illogical assertion that the State of Texas is not the same party as the State of Texas; it also has the additional benefit of limiting itself to situations such as the instant case, and not threatening to cause problems in different but related areas, as Judge Meyer’s dissent points out so well, ante at 206-207.
Finally, of course, as I have noted above, there were two very sound reasons for the result reached in this case on original submission. Thus, we need never even have reached the “parties” issues. Therefore, I believe it is imperative that we grant appel-lee’s motion for rehearing, in order to narrow the holding and scope of our original opinion. Such action would be in keeping with the tradition of judicial self-restraint.
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent from the denial of appellee’s motion for rehearing.
. Already, several of our intermediate appellate courts have cited Brabson as authority for just this proposition. See State v. Montgomery, 972 S.W.2d 872, 873-874 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1998, no pet. h.); Ex parte Richards, 968 S.W.2d 567, 570 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1998, no pet. h.); State v. Anderson, 974 S.W.2d 193, 194 — 95 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet. h.); Ex parte Yates, 966 S.W.2d 743, 744 n. 1 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet. h.); Ex parte Keeler, No. 04-97-00812-CR, 1998 WL 429631, at *1 n. 1 (Tex.App.-San Antonio July 31, 1998, no pet. h.) (not designated for publication); Ex parte *207Abrams, No. 04-97-01028-CR, 1998 WL 422274, at *1 n. 1 (Tex.App.-San Antonio July 29, 1998, no pet. h.) (not designated for publication); Ex parte Ozuna, No. 04-97-00976-CR, 1998 WL 201466, at *2 n. 1 (Tex.App.-San Antonio April 22, 1998, no pet. h.) (not designated for publication); Ex parte Biddy, No. 05-98-00070-CR, 1998 WL 191837, at *2 (Tex.App.Dallas March 19, 1998, no pet. h.) (not designated for publication).
. See Judge Meyer’s dissent to the denial of appellee's motion for rehearing, ante at 203-206; Brabson, 976 S.W.2d at 202-203 (Baird, J., dissenting); Reynolds, 967 S.W.2d at 497 (Cohen, J., dissenting).
. It is notable that this “public policy" justification for the "parties" argument was never made (or even implied) in the Court’s opinion on original submission. See Brabson, 976 S.W.2d at 184.