dissenting.
I dissent. Judge Bradley Smith had no power to act in this case after his plenary power expired on October 4, 1989.
On July 11,1989, after a jury trial, Judge Bradley Smith sitting as a visiting judge on the 234th Judicial District Court, entered a final judgment in favor of plaintiff, Sam Houston, the real parties in interest, against defendant, Dr. William E. O’Con-nor,1 the relator, for damages resulting from an unpaid loan and breach of a lease. The judgment in that case became final on October 30, 1989.2
Typical orders of assignment for a visiting judge contain the directive that the assignment is to continue until the visiting judge completes the trial of any cases begun during the period of assignment, pass*347es on motions for new trial, and “all other matters growing out of cases tried by the visiting judge.” That directive is the same one in the assignment of Judge Smith, and the same one used in four cases that have addressed the issue of the continuing authority of a visiting judge. See Ex parte Holland, 807 S.W.2d 827, 828 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1991, orig. proceeding); Starnes v. Chapman, 793 S.W.2d 104, 105 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1990, orig. proceeding); First City Bank v. Salinas, 754 S.W.2d 497, 498 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1988, orig. proceeding); Roberts v. Ernst, 668 S.W.2d 843, 844 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, orig. proceeding).3
In Holland, the court held the visiting judge’s power expired when the plenary power expired, that is, when the judgment became final. 807 S.W.2d at 829. The visiting judge in Holland, could not hear a motion for contempt filed after a divorce case unless he was reappointed. Id. at 828. In Starnes, the court held the visiting judge’s power lapsed when the appeal was perfected. 793 S.W.2d at 106. The visiting judge in Starnes could not rehear a case that was reversed and remanded unless he was reappointed. Id. In Salinas, the court held the visiting judge’s power lapsed upon the loss of his plenary power. 754 S.W.2d at 498. The visiting judge in Salinas could not take any action with regard to a trust established by the judgment. Id. In Roberts, the court held that a visiting judge’s appointment lapsed when he granted a new trial. 668 S.W.2d at 846. The visiting judge in Roberts could not set aside a motion for continuance granted by another judge in the same case after he granted the motion for new trial. Id.
Of the four cases, the facts in Holland and Salinas are closest to the ones in this case. In Holland and Salinas, the court distinguished matters that grow out of the case from those that grow out of the judgment. When a matter arises as a result of the judgment, the Holland court said it is ancillary and a visiting judgment may not hear the matter. 807 S.W.2d at 829-30. When a matter arises as a result of the case, that court said it is not ancillary and a visiting judgment may hear the matter. Id. In Salinas, the court held that a trust matter that grew out of the judgment, not the case, was an ancillary matter that the visiting judge could not decide. 754 S.W.2d at 498. In Holland, the court held that a motion for contempt grew out of the judgment, not the case. 807 S.W.2d at 829.
The Holland opinion is particularly important to the resolution of this case. In Holland, the wife argued that the Family Code, which vests continuing jurisdiction in the court, vested the visiting judge with continuing authority to rule. 807 S.W.2d at 828. The Dallas Court of Appeals rejected the argument, and held the trial court’s continuing jurisdiction in family law matters did not vest the visiting judge with continuing authority to act. Id. at 830. For the same reason the Holland court rejected the argument of the continuing authority of the visiting judge under the Family Code, we should reject the argument that Tex.R.Civ.P. 621a vests the visiting judge with continuing authority to act after the loss of plenary power.
If we apply the rationale of Holland and Salinas, the post-judgment discovery is a matter that grew out of the judgment, not the case, and thus was an ancillary matter that the visiting judge could not decide. If we apply the specific rationale of Holland, rule 621a does not extend the authority of a visiting judge beyond the loss of plenary power.
The judgment in this case became final on October 30, 1989. If we follow Holland, Starnes, Salinas, and Roberts, we should hold that Judge Smith’s authority to rule as a visiting judge in this case ended *348that day. Any order entered after that date by Judge Smith was void. See Ex parte Eastland, 811 S.W.2d 571 (Tex.1991).
The rule that a visiting judge looses the authority to act when he looses plenary power over the case has practical reasons to support it. Ancillary matters continue years after the judgement is rendered. If the majority is correct, a visiting judge could be involved in a case until all ancillary matters are completely resolved, or the visiting judge dies, whichever occurs first.4 If there is a need to have the visiting judge hear the ancillary matters, it would be a simple thing to have the judge be re-appointed.
. I am not related in any degree, by any method of computing degrees, with William E. O’Con-nor. Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 5996h (Vernon Supp.1991).
. After the trial of this case by Judge Smith, Judge Sondock, the sitting judge of the 234th Judicial District Court, made a post-trial ruling on a motion. Judge Smith then continued to make other rulings.
. Slightly different language was contained in the appointment in Ex parte Eastland, 811 S.W.2d 571 (Tex.1991), where the judge’s assignment was to continue as long as it was necessary for him to complete the trial of any case "begun during this period and to pass on any motions for new trial.” The assignment did not contain the "all other matters” language. In Eastland the supreme court said the visiting judge’s power expired thirty days after judgment because no motion for new trial was filed. The Eastland court cited Holland, Starnes, Salinas, and Roberts with approval. Id. 811 S.W.2d at 572.
. The cases on recusal do not directly address the issue, but most assume as an unstated premise that only one judge has the power to control a case. If so, and if the majority is correct, the visiting judge will be called back again and again, perhaps for years, to resolve ancillary issues in the case.