dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. For the reasons that follow, I would reverse the decisions of the circuit court and the board and remand with directions that the petitioner’s name be placed on the ballot for the November 2, 2010, general election.
I cannot agree with the majority that the General Assembly, when amending section 7 — 61 of the Code, intended to require the filing of a resolution to fill a vacancy in nomination in a case such as this one, as opposed to one created after a primary election resulting in a certified nominee. To the contrary, the amended portion of section 7 — 61 sets forth a separate and distinct procedure for situations such as we have here and specifically substitutes a “notice of appointment” for the filing of a resolution.
In support of her contention that a resolution was required, the objector relies upon paragraph three of section 7 — 61 of the Code, which states as follows:
“Any vacancy in nomination under the provisions of this Article 7 occurring on or after the primary and prior to certification of candidates by the certifying board or officer! 1 must be filled prior to the date of certification. Any vacancy in nomination occurring after certification but prior to 15 days before the general election shall be filled within 8 days after the event creating the vacancy. The resolution filling the vacancy shall be sent by U.S. mail or personal delivery to the certifying officer or board within 3 days of the action by which the vacancy was filled; provided, if such resolution is sent by mail and the U.S. postmark on the envelope containing such resolution is dated prior to the expiration of such 3[-]day limit, the resolution shall be deemed filed within such 3[-]day limit. Failure to so transmit the resolution within the time specified in this Section shall authorize the certifying officer or board to certify the original candidate. Vacancies shall be filled by the officers of a local municipal or township political party as specified in subsection (h) of Section 7 — 8, other than a statewide political party, that is established only within a municipality or township and the managing committee (or legislative committee in case of a candidate for State Senator or representative committee in the case of a candidate for State Representative in the General Assembly or State central committee in the case of a candidate for statewide office, including but not limited to the office of United States Senator) of the respective political party for the territorial area in which such vacancy occurs.” 10 ILCS 5/7 — 61 (West Supp. 2009).
To determine whether paragraph three is in fact applicable to the present case, we must construe the statute as written by the General Assembly. I agree with the majority that a statute must be evaluated as a whole, with each provision construed in connection with every other section, and so that no term is rendered superfluous or meaningless. See 403 Ill. App. 3d at 1082, quoting Bonaguro v. County Officers Electoral Board, 158 Ill. 2d 391, 397 (1994). However, unlike the majority, I conclude that when paragraph three is read in light of the other provisions of section 7 — 61, it is clear that the section as a whole contemplates two distinct types of vacancies in nomination that may occur, and it provides the means for filling the vacancies in each situation.1 Paragraph eight of the section states, “A vacancy in nomination occurs when a candidate who has been nominated under the provisions of this Article 7 dies before the election *** or declines the nomination; provided that nominations may become vacant for other reasons.” 10 ILCS 5/7 — 61 (West Supp. 2009). It is in the above-described situation, which for ease of discussion I shall deem “Situation A,” that paragraphs three and four apply, for each paragraph clearly and unequivocally references the “original” candidate or nominee. 10 ILCS 5/7 — 61 (West Supp. 2009). This is supported by the fact that paragraph three provides, “Failure to so transmit the resolution within the time specified in this Section shall authorize the certifying officer or board to certify the original candidate.” 10 ILCS 5/7 — 61 (West Supp. 2009). Thus, paragraph three clearly contemplates the situation where there was an original candidate and that person either dies before the election or declines the nomination. It does not, and by definition could not, apply to a situation where there was no “original candidate,” a fact the majority plainly and inexplicably fails to address. In that situation, which exists in the case at bar, only paragraph nine applies.
Paragraph nine, which was amended by Public Act 96 — 809 and Public Act 96 — 848 and became effective in its present form on January 1, 2010, states, “If the name of no established political party candidate was printed on the consolidated primary ballot for a particular office and if no person was nominated as a write-in candidate for such office, a vacancy in nomination shall be created which may be filled in accordance with the requirements of this Section.” 10 ILCS 5/7 — 61 (West Supp. 2009). In that situation, which I shall deem “Situation B,” paragraph nine provides that the vacancy in nomination may be filled only when the following three conditions are met: (1) the person to fill the vacancy in nomination has been “designated by the appropriate committee of the political party” in question, (2) the designated person obtains nominating petitions with the number of signatures required for an established party candidate for that office, with the circulation period to begin “on the day the appropriate committee designates that person,” and (3) the designated person has filed, together, the following required documents, within 75 days after the day of the general primary: “his or her nominating petitions, statements of candidacy, notice of appointment by the appropriate committee, and receipt of filing his or her statement of economic interests.” 10 ILCS 5/7 — 61 (West Supp. 2009). Paragraph nine does not require the filing of a resolution in Situation B; indeed, paragraph nine never uses the word “resolution” at all. In a situation such as this one, where the General Assembly has clearly and unequivocally stated what documents must be filed, I decline to read into that statement an additional, unlisted requirement found in an entirely unrelated paragraph.
This is further supported by the amendments the legislature made to paragraph nine of section 7 — 61. Previously, that section provided as follows:
“If the name of no established political party candidate was printed on the general primary ballot for a particular office and if no person was nominated as a write-in candidate for such office, a vacancy in nomination shall be created, but no candidate of the party for the office shall be listed on the ballot at the general election unless such vacancy is filled in accordance with the requirements of this Section within 60 days after the date of the general primary.” 10 ILCS 5/7 — 61 (West 2008).
That section now, however, sets forth more specifically the requirements the candidate must complete. See 10 ILCS 5/7 — 61 (West Supp. 2009). In the situation where there is no original candidate on the ballot and no write-in, the candidate must now show “grassroots” support by complying with the requirements in paragraph nine that were not previously included in paragraph nine prior to the amendment. To hold otherwise would be clearly against the legislative intent in making this amendment and against this state’s position in favor of ballot access for candidates running for public office. See Hossfeld v. Illinois State Board of Elections, 398 Ill. App. 3d 737, 743 (2010), appeal allowed, 236 Ill. 2d 504 (2010); In re Objection of McSparin, 352 Ill. App. 3d 352, 357 (2004); Zerante v. Bloom Township Electoral Board, 287 Ill. App. 3d 976, 980 (1997).
A second glaring problem with the majority’s misguided attempt to graft the content of paragraph three into the requirements of paragraph nine is that when setting out the requirement that a resolution pursuant to that paragraph be filed within three days of the action taken to fill the vacancy, paragraph three specifically refers to the resolution as a “resolution filling the vacancy.” 10 ILCS 5/7 — 61 (West Supp. 2009). In Situation A, to which paragraph three applies, that would be true: the resolution would in fact fill the vacancy. In Situation B, however, the vacancy is not filled by the resolution, even under the scenario put forward by the majority: by the plain language of paragraph nine, the vacancy is filled when the three conditions described above are met. This contradiction, which renders the phrase “resolution filling the vacancy” in paragraph three superfluous, meaningless, and in fact contradictory when applied to paragraph nine, is left unexplained by the majority. Indeed, the resolution requirement itself is superfluous and meaningless when applied to Situation B, because, as noted above, Situation B requires the “grassroots” work of collecting petition signatures. It defies logic that in a situation where the candidate has already received from the committee a notice of appointment and has gone on to collect signatures, the committee would also be required to file a resolution. What, one might rightfully ask, would be the point of that resolution? To the extent an argument could be made that the filing of the resolution somehow provided “notice” to the public of the committee’s selection, that notice would provide no protection to the public, as it would not prevent others from circulating petitions as well. Only the notice of appointment, which is clearly and unequivocally required by paragraph nine to be filed, would provide that protection and prevent unauthorized petitioners from appearing on the ballot, which is probably why it, and not the resolution, is required by the amended Code.
In the case at bar, it was clearly Situation B, not Situation A, that occurred: as related above, at the February 2, 2010, general primary election, no candidate’s name was printed on the Republican Party ballot in St. Clair County for the office of board of review member, and no candidate was nominated as a write-in for that office. Accordingly, on March 25, 2010, the committee held a meeting at which it passed a motion designating the petitioner as the appointee for candidacy for the office of board of review member. Although on April 1, 2010, the committee filed a “resolution/certificate of appointment” with the clerk, stating that the committee had designated the petitioner as its appointee, there was no requirement that such a resolution be filed.2 Accordingly, an objection to the timeliness of the resolution does not provide a legal basis by which to challenge the petitioner’s candidacy, and the decisions of the circuit court and the board should be reversed.
The majority relies upon judicial dictum found in this court’s decision in Forcade-Osborn v. Madison County Electoral Board, 334 Ill. App. 3d 756, 759 (2002). However, Forcade-Osborn was decided prior to the amendment of paragraph nine, and whatever persuasiveness our dicta might have once had is now eviscerated. Moreover, neither Forcade-Osborn nor any other of the preamendment cases upon which the majority relies dealt with the issue of whether a resolution was required in a situation such as this one, and I question the relevance of any of the cases cited by the majority to the issue at hand. However, although not controlling, two recent decisions from the Illinois State Board of Elections do address the exact issue before us, and both decisions support my position rather than the position taken by the majority. Jenkins, Ill. St. Officers Electoral Bd. No. 10SOEBGE 500 (June 7, 2010); Marquardt, Ill. St. Officers Electoral Bd. No. 10SOEBGE 101 (June 9, 2010).
Finally, although the majority finds “no indication” in the legislative debates that the General Assembly “intended to remove the resolution and three-day filing requirements” (403 Ill. App. 3d at 1088), I would note that there is also no indication that the General Assembly intended to apply the paragraph three requirements to paragraph nine. In fact, the issue did not arise in the debates, and the substance of the debates revolved around the number of signatures required. No other requirements were debated. Representative Fortner’s comments, quoted by the majority (403 Ill. App. 3d at 1088-89), must be considered, if at all, in their proper context.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
Paragraph seven of the section contemplates a third type of vacancy in nomination: one that occurs “15 days or less” before the election; however, paragraph seven states that in those situations, the vacancy in nomination shall not be filled and “the certification of the original candidate shall stand,” a situation clearly not relevant to the case at bar. 10 ILCS 5/7 — 61 (West Supp. 2009).
The majority wonders why, if no resolution was required, the committee filed one. 403 Ill. App. 3d at 1087. The answer, I suspect, is that the committee was acting out of an abundance of caution, which is not surprising given the General Assembly’s dubious record when it comes to providing candidates and the voting public with an election code that is simple, straightforward, and user-friendly.