dissenting.
Because I believe that the trial court erroneously granted Renzulli's motion to suppress all evidence derived from the investigatory stop of Renzulli's vehicle and that the State timely filed the instant appeal, I respectfully dissent.
I. The Trial Court Erroneously Granted Renzulli's Motion to Suppress
I believe that the trial court erroneously granted Renzulli's motion to suppress because I would conclude that police officers had ample reasonable suspicion to stop Renzulli's vehicle. On appeal, the State argues that the trial court erred in suppressing the evidence that was recovered during the investigative traffic stop of Renzulli's vehicle because the police officers involved had reasonable suspicion to make the stop. "In the appellate review of a trial court's motion to suppress, the reviewing court determines whether the ree-ord discloses 'substantial evidence of probative value that supports the trial court's decision'" State v. Washington, 898 N.E.2d 1200, 1203 (Ind.2008) (quoting State v. Quirk, 842 N.E.2d 334, 340 (Ind.2006)). We do not reweigh the evidence. Id. The State, appealing from a negative judgment, must show that the trial court's ruling on the suppression motion was contrary to law. Id.
It is well-established that even a brief stop of an automobile and detention of its oceupants constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. State v. Smith, 638 N.E.2d 1353, 1355 (Ind.Ct.App.1994). However, a brief investigative stop may be justified by reasonable suspicion that the person detained is involved in eriminal activity. Finger v. State, 799 N.E.2d 528, 532 (Ind.2003) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 31, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). "The reasonable suspicion standard is less demanding than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than a preponderance of the evidence, but it still requires at least a minimal level of objective justification and more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch of criminal activity." Teague v. State, 891 N.E.2d 1121, 1128 (Ind.Ct.App.2008). In order to justify an investigatory stop, the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, when considered together with the rational inferences drawn from those facts, create a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct on the part of the vehicle's occupants. Smith, 638 N.E.2d at 1355. The determination of reasonable suspicion is reviewed de novo. Teague, 891 N.E.2d at 1128.
A police officer may make an investigatory stop of an automobile based upon information from a police dispatcher that a *208concerned citizen had reported that the automobile was being driven erratically. Smith, 638 N.E.2d at 1855. Generally, a concerned citizen includes the victim of a crime or a person who personally witnesses a crime. Pawloski v. State, 269 Ind. 350, 354, 380 N.E.2d 1230, 1232 (1978). Concerned citizens are usually one-time informants such that no basis exists from prior dealings to determine their reliability. Id. However, concerned citizens who provide law enforcement officials with identifying information are generally considered reliable because "a known or identified informant's reputation can be assessed and ... [he may] be held responsible if [his] allegations turn out to be fabricated...." Washburn v. State, 868 N.E.2d 594, 599 (Ind.Ct.App.2007) (quotation omitted), trans. denied.
Here, I believe that the record establishes that the officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop of Renzulli's vehicle. The record establishes that a concerned citizen alerted officers to erratic driving by an individual driving a blue Volkswagen. This concerned citizen provided law enforcement officials with his identity and his phone number. He described the erratic driving as being "all over the road" and running over a eurb. Tr. p. 16. The concerned citizen notified law enforcement officials of both his location and the location of the blue Volkswagen. In light of these facts coupled with the rational inferences that officers could draw from these facts, I believe that the police officers had reasonable suspicion to believe that the driver of the blue Volkswagen, who was later determined to be Renzulli, was operating a vehicle while intoxicated in violation of Indiana law. I would therefore reverse the trial court's order granting Renzulli's motion to suppress.
II. Timeliness is Not an Issue of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
As an initial matter, I would note that Renzulli did not challenge the timeliness of the State's notice of appeal before this court. Therefore, I believe that any challenge to the timeliness of the State's notice of appeal has been waived. See Timberlake v. State, 753 N.E.2d 591, 597 (Ind.2001) (providing generally that if an issue was known and available, but not raised on direct appeal, it is waived). While I agree with Judge Mathias that the "timely filing of a notice of appeal is a jurisdictional prerequisite, and failure to conform to the applicable time limits results in forfeiture of an appeal," Bohlander v. Bohlander, 875 N.E.2d 299, 301 (Ind.Ct.App.2007), trans. denied, I do not believe that timeliness is a question of subject matter jurisdiction.
Subject matter jurisdiction is "[JJurisdiction over the nature of the case and the type of relief sought." Buack's Law DictioNary 870 (8th ed. 2004). Indiana Appellate Rule 5(A) explicitly defines the "nature of cases and types of relief sought" over which this court has subject matter jurisdiction. Appellate Rule 5(A) provides as follows: "Except as provided in Rule 4,[8] the Court of Appeals shall have jurisdic*209tion in all appeals from Final Judgments of Cireuit, Superior, Probate, and County Courts, notwithstanding any law, statute or rule providing for appeal directly to the Supreme Court of Indiana."
"There are three types of jurisdiction: (1) jurisdiction of the subject matter; (2) jurisdiction of the person, and (8) jurisdiction over the particular case." Kondamuri v. Kondamuri, 799 N.E.2d 1153, 1156 (Ind.Ct.App.2003). The issue of subject matter jurisdiction is resolved by determining whether the claim involved falls within the general scope of authority conferred on the court by the Indiana Constitution or by statute. Id. When a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, its actions are void ab imitio and may be attacked at any time. Id. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the particular case refers to a court's right, authority, and power to hear and decide a specific case within the class of cases over which it has subject matter jurisdiction. Id. A judgment rendered by a court that lacks jurisdiction over the particular class is voidable and requires a timely objection or the lack of jurisdiction over the particular case is waived. Id. at 1156-57.
I believe that the issue of timeliness refers to this court's right, authority, and power to hear and decide a specific case within the class of cases over which this court has subject matter jurisdiction. See id. at 1156. Therefore, I believe that timeliness is a question of jurisdiction over the particular case. See id. Moreover, because I believe that timeliness is a question of jurisdiction over the particular case, I believe that a challenge to the timeliness of an appeal is waived if not challenged by either party. See Kondamuri, 799 N.E.2d at 1156; Timberlake, 753 N.E.2d at 597 (again providing generally that if an issue was known and available, but not raised on direct appeal, it is waived). Therefore, I believe that the question of timeliness has been waived. Waiver notwithstanding, I believe that the State's notice of appeal was timely filed.
III. The State Timely Filed the Instant Appeal
In the instant matter, the State appeals the trial court's order granting Renzulli's motion to suppress. It is well-established that the State may appeal from criminal proceedings only when authorized by statute. State v. Gradison, 758 N.E.2d 1008, 1010 (Ind.Ct.App.2001) (citing State v. Aynes, 715 N.E.2d 945, 948 (Ind.Ct.App.1999)). Further, because the State's statutory right to appeal in criminal cases is in contravention of common-law principles, this statutory right is strictly construed. State v. Pease, 531 N.E.2d 1207, 1208 (Ind.Ct.App.1988).
Indiana Code section 35-88-4-2 (2008) establishes when the State may appeal from eriminal proceedings. Indiana Code section 35-38-4-2 provides as follows:
Appeals to the supreme court or to the court of appeals, if the court rules so provide, may be taken by the state in the following cases:
(1) From an order granting a motion to dismiss an indictment or information.
(2) From an order or judgment for the defendant, upon his motion for discharge because of delay of his trial not caused by his act, or upon his plea of former jeopardy, presented and ruled upon prior to trial.
(3) From an order granting a motion to correct errors.
(4) Upon a question reserved by the state, if the defendant is acquitted.
(5) From an order granting a motion to suppress evidence, if the ultimate effect of the order is to preclude further prosecution.
*210(6) From any interlocutory order if the trial court certifies and the court on appeal or a judge thereof finds on petition that:
(A) the appellant will suffer substantial expense, damage, or injury if the order is erroneous and the determination thereof is withheld until after judgment;
(B) the order involves a substantial question of law, the early determination of which will promote a more orderly disposition of the case; or
(C) the remedy by appeal after judgment is otherwise inadequate.
The ultimate effect of an order granting a motion to suppress is to preclude further prosecution when, as here, the suppression order precludes the State from using principal items of evidence which are vital to the prosecution of the defendant. See State v. Williams, 445 N.E.2d 582, 584 (Ind.Ct.App.1983) (providing that the suppression order amounted to a dismissal of the action because the order precluded the State from using principle items of evi-denee which were vital to the State's case). Such an order is appealable as a final judgment under subsection (5) of Indiana Code section 35-88-4-2. State v. Hunter, 904 N.E.2d 371, 373 (Ind.Ct.App.2009).
Here, Renzulli filed a motion to suppress certain evidence at trial. The trial court granted Renzulli's motion on October 16, 2009. The trial court's order granting Renzulli's motion to suppress amounted to a final judgment because it precluded the State from using principal items of evidence which were vital to its prosecution of Renzulli. See Williams, 445 N.E.2d at 584. The State filed a motion to reconsider on November 5, 2009, which Judge Mathias correctly treats as a motion to correct error because it was effectively filed after the entry of a final judgment. See Hubbard v. Hubbard, 690 N.E.2d 1219, 1221 (Ind.Ct.App.1998) (providing that because motions to reconsider and to correct error are effectively the same motion, a motion to reconsider filed after the entry of final judgment should be treated as a motion to correct error). The trial court denied the State's motion to correct error on November 12, 2009. The State subsequently initiated an appeal on December 14, 2009.9
Trial Rule 59 provides that generally, a motion to correct error is not a prerequisite for appeal. However, there are limited circumstances, none of which apply to the instant matter, when a party is required to file a motion to correct error before initiating an appeal.10 See Tr. R. 59(A). If a party chooses or is required to file a motion to correct error, it "shall be filed no later than thirty (80) days after the entry of a final judgment or an appeal-*211able final order." Tr. R. 59(C). A motion to correct error is deemed denied if the trial court fails to set the motion for a hearing within forty-five days after the motion was filed or fails to rule on the motion within thirty days after it was heard. Tr. R. 58.3(A).
Indiana Appellate Rule 9(A) provides that a "party initiates an appeal by filing a Notice of Appeal with the trial court clerk within thirty (80) days after the entry of a Final Judgment." However, Indiana Appellate Rule 9(A) further provides that if a "party files a timely motion to correct error, a Notice of Appeal must be filed within thirty (80) days after the court's ruling on such motion, or thirty (80) days after the motion is deemed denied under Trial Rule 58.8, whichever comes first." Thus, Appellate Rule 9(A) allows the party to file a timely appeal following a ruling on a motion to correct error, and ensures that a party who chooses to first file a motion to correct error does not relinquish his right to appeal the judgment.
Judge Mathias recognizes that under normal cireumstances, the State's appeal was timely filed. However, I believe that the instant matter falls squarely under these "normal cireumstances" because the State seemingly acted in accordance with the trial and appellate rules by first timely filing a motion to correct error pursuant to Trial Rule 59 and then initiating a timely appeal pursuant to Appellate Rule 9(A).
The State's appeal was filed in accordance with Indiana Code 35-38-4-2(5), which, as previously mentioned, provides that the State may appeal from an "order granting a motion to suppress evidence, if the ultimate effect of the order is to preclude further prosecution." Nothing in section 5 or any other relevant portion of the statute precludes the State from exercising its option to file a motion to correct error in accordance with Trial Rule 59 as recognized by Appellate Rule 9(A). To the extent that Judge Mathias's opinion suggests that Indiana Code 35-38-4-2(8) acts to bar the State from appealing the instant matter pursuant to Indiana Code 35-88-4-2(5) merely because the motion to correct error that was filed by the State in response to a trial court's suppression ruling was denied, I believe that Indiana Code section 35-38-4-2(8) does not apply to the instant matter because, as Judge Mathias correctly asserts, Indiana Code section 35-38-4-2(3) presupposes that the motion to correct error would have been filed by the defendant, as it is unlikely that the State would appeal an order granting its own motion. Therefore, I do not believe that Indiana Code section 85-38-4-2(8) has any effect on the State's right to appeal an order granting a motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Indiana Code section 85-38-4-2(5).
Moreover, I believe that the General Assembly intends for statutes to be read in harmony with the trial and appellate rules absent an explicit statement to the contrary. The Indiana Supreme Court has held that where a statute is in conflict with the procedural trial and appellate rules which govern the conduct of litigation, the rules take precedent over the conflicting statutes. State ex rel. Gaston v. Gibson Circuit Court, 462 N.E.2d 1049, 1051 (Ind.1984). Therefore, to the extent that Judge Mathias's opinion provides that Indiana Code section 35-38-4-2 precludes the State from exercising its option to file a motion to correct error in accordance with Trial Rule 59 and Appellate Rule 9(A), I believe that the trial and appellate rules should take precedent over Indiana Code section 35-38-4-2. Accordingly, where, as here, the State timely filed a motion to correct error and subsequently initiated its appeal in accordance with Trial Rule 59 *212and Appellate Rule 9(A), I believe its appeal should be considered timely.
8. Indiana Appellate Rule 4(A) provides that the Indiana Supreme Court shall have mandatory and exclusive jurisdiction over the following cases:
(a) Criminal Appeals in which a sentence of death or life imprisonment without parole is imposed under Ind.Code § 35-50-2-9 and Criminal Appeals in post conviction relief cases in which the sentence was death.
(b) Appeals of Final Judgments declaring a state or federal statute unconstitutional in whole or in part. |
(c) Appeals involving waiver of parental consent to abortion under Rule 62.
(d) Appeals involving mandate of funds under Trial Rule 60.5(B) and Rule 61.
. The trial court denied the State's motion to reconsider on November 12, 2009, and thirty days after this date is December 12, 2009. December 12, 2009, however, fell on a Saturday, giving the State until the following Monday, December 14, 2009, to timely file a notice of appeal.
. It seems illogical that the General Assembly could have intended to require the State to forfeit its right to appeal if it first filed a motion to correct error because the State could, at least in theory, be required to file a motion to correct error as a prerequisite to initiating an appeal in some instances. See Tr. R. 59(A). Further, it seems exceedingly unlikely, if not impossible, that in these situations the State would be able to file a motion to correct error, receive a ruling, and initiate an appeal within the thirty day time period set forth in Appellate Rule 9(A). Therefore, a seemingly unintended result of Judge Mathias's opinion is that the State, in some situations, could find itself in a "Catch 22" situation where it could be precluded from following the procedural requirement that it file a motion to correct error prior to its notice of appeal if it wished to appeal the ruling of the trial court.