In Re Ortman

NAHMIAS, Justice,

concurring.

I concur fully in the Court’s opinion. I write separately to discuss a “mitigating” factor that, although not mentioned by the Court, was considered in Ortman’s favor by the Special Master in making his recommendation to us. The Special Master’s report states that “[a]nother mitigating factor is that [Ortman] has already been punished for his conduct,” noting that, as a result of his criminal conviction for aggravated battery, Ortman was sentenced to a 12-month probated sentence, fined $1,000, and ordered to undergo an anger/violence program. I do not believe that the law or logic supports the conclusion that punishment imposed in the criminal justice system, for violations of the criminal law, should reduce the discipline imposed in the State Bar system, for violations of the professional conduct rules. Some of our cases, however, say that it does; I believe the Court needs to decide how it will treat this factor and needs to be consistent in that treatment.

In support of his finding, the Special Master cited only Standard 9.32 (k) of the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1992), which does list “imposition of other penalties or sanctions” as a mitigating circumstance. To the extent that the ABA standards are relevant to our disciplinary decisions, however, it appears that we have properly interpreted this standard to apply to other penalties *132arising during the disciplinary process itself, rather than penalties imposed in separate criminal proceedings. See In the Matter of Suttle, 288 Ga. 14, 15-16 (701 SE2d 154) (2010) (in a case arising from Suttle’s felony conviction, not mentioning his punishment for that crime as mitigating but noting his argument, accepted by the Special Master but rejected by the Court, that the lengthy delay in his disciplinary case caused by delays in his criminal case, during which he was effectively suspended from the practice of law, “disadvantaged and punished him” and therefore should be considered in mitigation, citing Standard 9.32 (k)). See also In the Matter of Bailey, 267 Ga. 370, 370-371 (478 SE2d 131) (1996) (listing Bailey’s suspension from the practice of law before our disciplinary decision as a mitigating factor under Standard 9.32).

The Special Master did not cite any cases, but he could have, because this Court has previously mentioned imposition of other criminal sanctions as a mitigating factor in (as best I can tell) about seven disciplinary cases over the past dozen years. See In the Matter of Quay, 281 Ga. 549, 550 (640 SE2d 290) (2007); In the Matter of Paine, 280 Ga. 208, 209-210 (625 SE2d 768) (2006); In the Matter of Skandalakis, 279 Ga. 865, 866-867 (621 SE2d 750) (2005); In the Matter of Haugabrook, 278 Ga. 721, 722 (606 SE2d 257) (2004); In the Matter of Stewart, 275 Ga. 199, 200 (563 SE2d 859) (2002); In the Matter of Silver, 273 Ga. 727, 728 (545 SE2d 886) (2001); In the Matter of Calhoun, 268 Ga. 877, 878 (494 SE2d 335) (1998).

However, in none of those cases has the Court explained why penalties imposed in the criminal justice system for violations of the criminal law should mitigate the discipline imposed in the State Bar system for violations of the professional conduct rules. Simply saying it over and over does not make it so. Indeed, by the logic of these statements, the more serious the criminal punishment, the more mitigating it should be on the disciplinary sanction, which seems exactly backward and is contrary to how the factor has been used in our cases, where it appears to be mentioned only when the criminal punishment was relatively light. For example, in this case, Ortman’s criminal punishment was on the lowest end for a violent felony — First Offender treatment with just a year on probation, a small fine, and conditions. As done by the Special Master in this case, the Court tends to cite this factor when deciding to impose reduced discipline for an attorney convicted of a crime that normally warrants disbarment 0Skandalakis and Quay being the exceptions).

Moreover, the Court has not invoked this supposed mitigating factor consistently; nor, as a result, have the Special Masters, Review Panels, and State Bar Counsel who rely on our decisions in making recommendations to us. The factor would apply in every disciplinary case in which the Court sanctions a lawyer as a result of his or her *133conviction of a crime — yet, as noted above, it is rarely pulled out of the “mitigating factor” toolbox. For example, in a decision the Court cites today in explaining that disbarment is the typical level of discipline in cases involving violent felonies, see In the Matter of Collins, 263 Ga. 185 (429 SE2d 908) (1993), the Court’s opinion did not even mention Collins’ sentence for aggravated assault, much less say that his criminal punishment was a mitigating factor. See id. at 185-186. Other recent examples of cases in which this purported mitigating factor was not mentioned include In the Matter of Cunningham, 284 Ga. 449, 450 (669 SE2d 93) (2008) (listing two other mitigating factors); In the Matter of Waldrop, 283 Ga. 80, 80-82 (656 SE2d 529) (2008) (listing at least seven mitigating factors, but with neither the majority nor the dissent mentioning Waldrop’s criminal punishment as mitigating); In the Matter of David, 282 Ga. 517, 519 (651 SE2d 743) (2007) (listing three mitigating factors); In the Matter of Hickey, 280 Ga. 535, 535 (630 SE2d 395) (2006) (disbarring Hickey solely on the basis of his child sexual exploitation convictions, without mentioning his sentence or any other mitigating factor); In the Matter of Porges-Dodson, 280 Ga. 433, 434 (627 SE2d 545) (2006) (finding “no mitigating factors” despite PorgesDodson’s criminal sentence). If we are to recognize criminal punishment imposed on lawyers as “mitigating” of the disciplinary sanction imposed on them based on their criminal convictions, then at least we should be consistent.

Decided April 18, 2011. Paula J. Frederick, General Counsel State Bar, Jonathan W. Hewett, Assistant General Counsel State Bar, for State Bar of ' Georgia.

Given the unusual circumstances of Ortman’s criminal conduct and the other mitigating factors he presents, I agree with the Special Master’s recommendation and the Court’s decision to impose a 12-month suspension. However, I believe that the Court should take this opportunity to hold that the fact that a lawyer “has already been punished for his conduct” in the criminal justice system should not be considered as a mitigating factor that reduces the seriousness of or the sanctions to be imposed for the lawyer’s professional misconduct.