Rosenberg v. Falling Water, Inc.

HUNSTEIN, Chief Justice,

dissenting.

The unworkable rule the majority creates, distinguishing between cases in which injury occurs and the claim accrues during the repose period of the improvement to real property statute of repose, OCGA § 9-3-51, and those in which the injury occurs thereafter yields irrational results. Neither logic nor the general nature or function of statutes of repose compel, much less support, the conclusion that equitable estoppel is unavailable because Rosenberg’s deck collapsed and he suffered bodily injury outside of the repose period, and the effect of the majority’s opinion is to countenance fraud. Because I cannot agree that the application of equitable estoppel is automatically foreclosed in this case, I respectfully dissent.

1. In concluding that equitable estoppel is unavailable to Rosenberg, the majority establishes a dichotomy between cases in which the injury occurs and the claim accrues during the repose period and those in which the injury sued upon occurs after the repose period has expired, holding that equitable estoppel is available only in the former category of cases. Absent from the majority’s analysis is a *63discussion of the incongruous results its rule will produce in cases asserting claims governed by OCGA § 9-3-51. Specifically, inconsistent results will occur by virtue of the early accrual date of a property owner’s claim for damage to real property based on defects in construction.

A building owner’s tort claims based upon defects in construction typically accrue upon substantial completion of the project “because damages usually become immediately ascertainable to the [owner] at that time.” Colormatch Exteriors, Inc. v. Hickey, 275 Ga. 249 (1) (569 SE2d 495) (2002).4 Where, as here, a property owner files an action against a builder based on negligent construction and fraudulent concealment of construction defects, the plaintiffs allegations, assuming their truth, will almost always establish the existence of an actionable injury within the repose period, i.e., damage to the owner’s real property. Thus, if Rosenberg’s allegations here are true, the initial homeowners, the Nowickis, could have asserted negligence or fraud claims well within the applicable statute of limitation, OCGA § 9-3-30, and the statute of repose in OCGA § 9-3-51. To the extent that Falling Water fraudulently concealed such claims from the Nowickis and their successors-in-interest, the statute of limitation would be tolled. See OCGA § 9-3-96; compare U-Haul Co. of W. Ga., 247 Ga. at 567 (if statute of limitation expired on claims held by original owner for damage to building, claims are not revived when building is sold to subsequent purchaser).

Facts sufficient to toll the statute of limitation would also permit a homeowner to assert that the builder should be equitably estopped from relying on the statute of repose in OCGA § 9-3-51. The majority does not dispute that, so long as a claim accrues before the repose period expires, a plaintiff in a suit alleging defects in construction, like a plaintiff in a medical malpractice case, may invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel to bar a defendant from asserting a statute of repose defense if the plaintiff shows fraud “by offering evidence of a known failure to reveal negligence.” Craven v. Lowndes County Hosp. Auth., 263 Ga. 657 (3) (437 SE2d 308) (1993). Thus, applying the majority’s rule, Rosenberg might be entitled to invoke the *64doctrine of equitable estoppel to the extent he was pursuing an action for damages for real property subsequent to the deck’s collapse because injury occurred and a claim accrued before the repose period expired. The collapse of the deck did not represent a new claim for damage to real property but rather resulted in accrual of additional damages on an existing claim. But, as the majority would have it, even if Falling Water engaged in fraud, Rosenberg is automatically foreclosed from invoking the doctrine of equitable estoppel when seeking damages for personal injury occurring during the very same incident because the personal injury claim arose only when Rosenberg took the fateful step out onto the deck and it collapsed. See U-Haul Co. of W. Ga., 247 Ga. at 567 (claim for personal injury resulting from defective construction accrues when injury occurs).

2. Despite the irrational results it yields, the majority insists that logic and the very nature of statutes of repose compel it to draw a distinction between cases in which the claim accrues within the repose period and those in which the injury sued upon occurs later. I disagree. In concluding that a claim’s accrual date is dispositive, the majority relies on Hill v. Fordham, 186 Ga. App. 354 (367 SE2d 128) (1988), one of the first Georgia appellate decisions to hold that equitable estoppel may be applied to defeat the statute of repose applicable in medical malpractice cases, OCGA § 9-3-71 (b). In Hill, the Court of Appeals stated:

There is a distinction between a statute of limitation and a statute of ultimate repose. A statute of limitation is a procedural rule limiting the time in which a party may bring an action for a right which has already accrued. A statute of ultimate repose delineates a time period in which a right may accrue. If the injury occurs outside that period, it is not actionable.

Id. at 357 (2). The Court of Appeals then reasoned that since “[a] statute of ultimate repose sets an ultimate limit on which injuries shall be actionable ... by definition, a statute of ultimate repose cannot be ‘tolled’ to permit actions to be brought for injuries which did not occur until after the statutory period had expired.” Id. The Court of Appeals concluded, however, that a different result obtains when the injury sued upon occurs within the repose period:

[T]he statute of ultimate repose should not be applied to relieve a defendant of liability for injuries which occurred during the period of liability, but which were concealed from the patient by the defendant’s own fraud. The statute of ultimate repose should not provide an incentive for a doctor *65or other medical professional to conceal his or her negligence with the assurance that after five years such fraudulent conduct will insulate him or her from liability. The sun never sets on fraud.

Id. Hill did not involve a medical malpractice case in which the plaintiff suffered no injuries until after the repose period expired, and its discussion of the availability of equitable estoppel under those circumstances is dicta.5

Contrary to the dicta in Hill and the majority’s conclusion here, nothing about the definition or function of a statute of repose such as OCGA § 9-3-51 leads logically or inexorably to the conclusion that equitable estoppel cannot apply when the injury underlying a plaintiffs claim occurs outside of the repose period. As the majority points out, Maj. Op., p. 59, we have stated previously that “[a] statute of repose stands as an unyielding barrier to a plaintiff s right of action.” Wright v. Robinson, 262 Ga. 844 (1) (426 SE2d 870) (1993). But this is equally true whether or not the plaintiffs injury occurs before or after the repose period expires. Thus, if the injury necessary to complete a tort claim occurs after the repose period ends, the injury is not actionable. See Craven, supra, 263 Ga. at 660 (2). The statute of repose, in that situation, acts to “abolish a claim before its accrual.” Id.; see also Mullis v. Southern Co. Svcs., 250 Ga. 90 (1) (296 SE2d 579) (1982). In addition, when a claim accrues during the repose period, the expiration of the period before a lawsuit is commenced “destroys . . . previously existing rights so that . .. [any existing] cause of action no longer exists.” Wright, supra, 262 Ga. at 845 (1); Simmons v. Sonyika, 279 Ga. 378, 379 (614 SE2d 27) (2005).

Our pronouncements about the absolute nature of statutes of repose, however, do not foreclose an equitable estoppel from arising when the requisite elements are established under OCGA § 24-4-27.6 I would conclude that this is true regardless of when an injury occurs. When an estoppel results from the estopped party’s fraudulent conduct, that party may be foreclosed from invoking the protection of an otherwise applicable legal rule or statute. As our *66Court of Appeals has explained:

The principle of equitable estoppel is based on the ground of promoting the equity and justice of the individual case by preventing a party from asserting his rights under a general technical rule of law, when he has so conducted himself that it would be contrary to equity and good conscience for him to allege and prove the truth.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hewett v. Carter, 215 Ga. App. 429, 430 (1) (450 SE2d 843) (1994); see also Eiberger v. West, 247 Ga. 767 (1) (a) (281 SE2d 148) (1981) (obligor under promissory note estopped by conduct from asserting defense under usury statute). When it applies to preclude reliance on a statute of repose, equitable estoppel does not purport to toll, modify, or otherwise alter the repose period. Rather, “[ejquitable estoppel is a way of saying that. . . the statute of repose [is] valid and would be [an] absolute defense [ ] to this action but because of your conduct. . ., you . .. will not be permitted to raise [the defense].” Robinson v. Shah, 936 P.2d 784, 796 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997).7

In Craven, supra, we concluded without hesitation that equitable estoppel applies with full force when a plaintiff in a medical malpractice case has been injured but fails to file suit within the repose period because the defendant knowingly conceals his or her negligence. 263 Ga. at 660 (3). As the Court of Appeals recognized in Hill, supra, to hold otherwise would subvert the purpose of the equitable estoppel doctrine by incentivizing fraud. 186 Ga. App. at 357.

“Equity mandates that wrongdoers should be estopped from enjoying the fruits of their fraud.” Windham v. Latco of Miss., Inc., 972 So.2d 608, 612 (Miss. 2008) (equitable estoppel available to bar reliance on improvement to real property statute of repose); Canton Lutheran Church v. Sovik, Mathre, Sathrum & Quanbeck, 507 FSupp 873, 879-880 (S.D. 1981) (same).8 Yet, by arbitrarily limiting the availability of equitable estoppel based on the date of the *67plaintiffs injury, the majority sanctions the very result that the doctrine of equitable estoppel is intended to prevent. One who fraudulently conceals his or her negligence and thereby deters another from preventing or avoiding an injury in the first place is, if anything, more culpable than one who fraudulently conceals the cause of an injury after the injury occurs. Likewise, the rationale for equitable estoppel applies with equal if not greater force when both the delayed but preventable injury and the resultant late filing of an action are attributable to the defendant’s alleged misconduct.

Decided March 18, 2011 Reconsideration denied April 12, 2011. Michael J. Warshauer, Lyle G. Warshauer, for appellant. Carlock, Copeland & Stair, David F. Root, Cheryl H. Shaw, for appellee.

3. For the reasons set forth above, I would hold that the trial court and Court of Appeals erred in concluding that, based on the date of his personal injury, Rosenberg is automatically foreclosed from arguing that equitable estoppel bars Falling Water’s reliance on the statute of repose. I would remand the case to the Court of Appeals to consider whether Rosenberg offered evidence sufficient to raise an issue of fact as to whether Falling Water should be equitably estopped because it fraudulently concealed its negligent conduct.

I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Carley and Justice Benham join in this dissent.

See also U-Haul Co. of W. Ga. v. Abreu & Robeson, Inc., 247 Ga. 565, 566 (277 SE2d 497) (1981) (legal injury from negligent design occurs at the time of construction because building is damaged at that time); Heffernan v. Johnson, 209 Ga. App. 139 (1) (433 SE2d 108) (1993) (fraud claim for damage to home accrued upon substantial completion); Millard Matthews Builders, Inc. v. Plant Improvement Co., Inc., 167 Ga. App. 855 (307 SE2d 739) (1983) (negligent design or construction of building “in and of itself constitute[s] a legal injury to the plaintiff”) (citation and punctuation omitted). In Colormatch Exteriors, we established an exception to this rule, holding that when a builder retains ownership of the residence and contracts to sell it after substantial completion, the purchaser’s claim against the builder accrues upon the initial sale of the property. 275 Ga. at 251-252 (2).

The dicta in Hill have been repeated in several Court of Appeals opinions, but, as in Hill, the underlying cases have not involved an injury first occurring after the expiration of the statute of repose. See, e.g., Osburn v. Goldman, 269 Ga. App. 303 (1) (a) (603 SE2d 695) (2004); Esener v. Kinsey, 240 Ga. App. 21, 22-23 (522 SE2d 522) (1999); Bynum v. Gregory, 215 Ga. App. 431 (2) (450 SE2d 840) (1994).

OCGA § 24-4-27 states: “In order for an equitable estoppel to arise, there must generally he some intended deception in the conduct or declarations of the party to be estopped, or such gross negligence as to amount to constructive fraud, by which another has been misled to his injury.”

See also Sovereign Camp, W. O.W. v. Heflin, 59 Ga. App. 299, 305 (200 SE 489) (1938) (“Estoppel means ‘that a party is precluded by his own acts from asserting a right to the detriment of another who, entitled to rely on such conduct, has acted thereon.’ ”) (citation omitted); Bomba v. Belvidere, Inc., 579 F2d 1067, 1070 (7th Cir. 1978) (“[B]ecause equitable estoppel operates directly on the defendant without abrogating the running of the limitations period as provided by statute, it might apply no matter how unequivocally the applicable limitations period is expressed.”); Black’s Law Dictionary at 570 (7th ed. 1999) (“ ‘Estoppe,’ says Lord Coke, ‘cometh of the French word estoupe, from whence the English word stopped; and it is called an estoppel or conclusion, because a man’s own act or acceptance stoppeth or closeth up his mouth to allege or plead the truth.’ ”) (citation omitted).

The majority’s attempt to distinguish Canton Lutheran on the ground that it did not *67involve an improvement to real property statute of repose is unavailing, as the operation of the statute at issue there was not distinguishable from OCGA § 9-3-51 in any meaningful way. Canton Lutheran is different from this case in that it involved a claim for damage to real property, which arguably accrued as soon as the education building addition to the church was completed even though the obviously more substantial damages accrued when cracks in the structure occurred almost 14 years later. 507 FSupp at 874-875; see also Mark W. Peacock, An Equitable Approach to Products Liability Statutes of Repose, 14 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 223, 236, n. 63 (1993) (citing Canton Lutheran as an example of a case acknowledging that equitable principles apply when injury has occurred within the repose period). As discussed at length in this dissent, I do not believe such a distinction is controlling here.