Corey Keaton appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for new trial following his conviction on charges of rape, aggravated assault, burglary, aggravated stalking and kidnapping in connection with an incident involving his estranged wife.1 For the reasons set forth below, we reverse Keaton’s aggravated stalking conviction, but otherwise affirm.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence showed that Keaton was employed as a police officer with the Waycross Police Department. The victim filed for divorce from Keaton in April 1998, and a rule nisi issued at that time forbidding Keaton from having any contact with her “[p] ending the interlocutory hearing.” The subsequent interlocutory order did not enjoin Keaton from having contact with the victim, but enjoined him from going to the marital residence except to retrieve or return the children for visitation. The record supports a finding that Keaton violated this order on a number of occasions, including one occasion when he entered the victim’s house without her permission and demanded sex. After the victim reported this and other violations to police, Keaton’s supervisor at the Waycross Police Department issued a written order on May 29, 1998, directing him to obey the trial court’s April 1998 order or risk a charge of insubordination under department regulations.
On September 12, 1998, the victim was home alone, when Keaton knocked on her door and asked to come inside. The victim refused. She said that Keaton then disabled the phone and entered the house through a back window. The victim said that when she tried to run away, Keaton attacked her and a protracted struggle ensued during which he raped her. After Keaton left, the victim reported the attack to the Ware County Sheriffs office.
Several witnesses testified in Keaton’s defense that the victim and he were attempting to reconcile prior to the incident. And Keaton testified that the victim and he had sex on various occasions after they separated and that he previously had spent the night at her house. He said that on the day at issue, the victim and he had consensual sex, but later began to quarrel, and the struggle ensued *15after the victim hit him with her shoe.
1. Keaton first asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated stalking2 because the State failed to prove that his actions were in violation of an order contemplated by the aggravated stalking statute, OCGA § 16-5-91. He asserts the interim order relied upon by the prosecution was directed toward preserving the victim’s right to occupy the marital residence and preventing his interference with that right, but it was not a personal protective order or an order otherwise preventing stalking behavior as required under the statute. We agree.
(a) A person commits the offense of aggravated stalking when he or she, in violation of an order, a peace bond, an injunction or a probation, parole or bond condition “in effect prohibiting the behavior described in this subsection, follows, places under surveillance, or contacts another person at or about a place or places without the consent of the other person for the purpose of harassing and intimidating the other person.” (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 16-5-91 (a). From the time of its enactment, this statute has consistently been interpreted as requiring that the underlying bond, order, injunction or probation, parole or bond condition prohibits stalking behavior.3 See, e.g., Ochandarena, “Crimes Against the Person: Prohibit Stalking of an Intended Victim,” 10 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 95 (1993) (“Aggravated stalking occurs when the [stalking conduct] occurs subsequent to a judicial order issued to prohibit stalking, such as a temporary restraining order or a condition of parole or probation.”) (footnote omitted). The dissent’s analysis places undue emphasis upon the grammatical structure of the statute, while ignoring the legislative purpose behind it, to conclude otherwise.4 Moreover, the dissent’s analysis has abso*16lutely no support in the case law or commentary; no cases have drawn any distinction in how the orders in the list are considered under the aggravated stalking statute based upon grammatical placement or otherwise.5
Putting aside the orders clearly intended for personal protection, the dissent’s analysis would define the crime of aggravated stalking to include the violation of any temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, or permanent injunction, whatever the subject matter and regardless of any connection to the victim, if the other statutory elements are met; but conditions of pretrial release, probation or parole must prohibit stalking behavior in order to serve as the basis for an aggravated stalking conviction. Thus, if a defendant were enjoined from entering a property due to a labor dispute, for example, and crossed the subject property while engaged in stalking behavior, the dissent would find him guilty of aggravated stalking. But if he committed the same actions in violation of a probation condition unrelated to stalking behavior, he would not have committed aggravated stalking. We do not believe that the General Assembly intended such a result in enacting the crime of “aggravated stalking.” Rather, the statute more logically should be read as requiring a prohibition against stalking behavior in any of the underlying orders, injunctions, bonds or conditions listed in the statute.
(b) The interim order relied upon by the State in this case provides, in pertinent part, that “the [victim] is awarded the exclusive use and possession of the marital home of the parties and [Keaton] is enjoined from going to the home except to exercise his visitation rights with the children of the parties.” This order keeps Keaton away from a place, not a person, but Georgia’s stalking laws *17were drafted to protect people not places. The trial court previously had issued an order that prohibited “contact” with the victim, and that order in effect prohibited the behavior proscribed under the stalking laws, but it had expired. Although the interim order may have incidentally kept Keaton from face-to-face contact with the victim while she was at home, except for periods connected to visitation, it imposed no further limitations on Keaton’s contact with the victim. So long as he did not physically go to the marital home, Keaton could call the victim at any time, could be anywhere near or in sight of the marital home, or could use any other method to harass and intimidate the victim inside the home or outside the home without violating the order. And significantly, Keaton would violate the order even if he went to the home when his wife was not there. We cannot say that an order that limits Keaton’s presence at the marital home, but otherwise allows unfettered contact with the victim, “in effect” prohibits him from engaging in the behavior prohibited by the statute.
The dissent, however, construes the phrase “in effect” to encompass the violation of any order that happens to provide some incidental protection to a stalking victim, no matter how fleeting. Criminal statutes, however, must be strictly construed. Even if the dissent’s analysis proposed a valid alternate interpretation of the phrase “in effect,” “[w]hen a criminal statute fairly and reasonably is subject to two constructions, one which would render an act criminal, the other which would not, the statute must be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused.” (Punctuation and footnotes omitted; emphasis in original.) Jackson v. State, 309 Ga. App. 24, 28-29 (1) (a) (709 SE2d 44) (2011). We apply a strict construction to hold that the order in this case, which merely prohibits the defendant’s presence at a particular place, does not “in effect prohibit! ] the behavior described in the subsection” as required by OCGA § 16-5-91 (a). Accordingly, we find that the State failed to establish an essential element of the crime of aggravated stalking: the existence of a prior order that in effect proscribed stalking behavior. Keaton’s conviction on that count, therefore, necessarily must be reversed.6 Compare Bray v. State, 294 Ga. App. 562, 562-563 (1) (669 SE2d 509) (2008) (upholding aggravated stalking conviction where special bond condition required defendant to “ ‘stay away, absolutely, directly or indirectly’ ” from ex-wife); Ford v. State, 283 Ga. App. 460, 461 (1) (641 SE2d 671) (2007) (same *18where temporary protective order “ ‘restrained and enjoined [defendant] from approaching within 100 yards of (his wife) . . . , except during exercise of visitation.’ ”).
2. Keaton next argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial after the State improperly placed his character into issue during its rebuttal examination of the victim about a conversation in which Keaton’s mother asked her to drop the charges against Keaton.7 The victim stated:
She told me that [Keaton] had [seen] his father do her like that on several occasions and that she understood what I was going through and that she was sorry for it. She told me — she asked me if I could, if any chance at all possible for me to drop the charges because she couldn’t have another son of hers going to jail.
At that point, Keaton’s counsel moved for a mistrial on the ground that the prosecutor was trying to “impugn the integrity of the whole family”; the trial court denied the motion. Keaton argues on appeal that the trial court erroneously denied the mistrial because the State had introduced “improper evidence of the bad character of [his] father and brother.”
Assuming, without deciding, that evidence of a relative’s bad character somehow equates with evidence of a defendant’s bad character, we find no error. Keaton’s mother and other witnesses testified that the victim contacted Keaton at his mother’s house and elsewhere after their separation.8 The prosecutor stated that he was questioning the victim about her visits to Keaton’s mother’s house to “answer[ ]” that testimony, apparently by attempting to show other reasons for the visits. It was during this examination, in response to a question about whether Keaton’s mother had ever talked about the case, that the victim gave the noted testimony. We cannot say under these circumstances that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the mistrial.9
A witness may be impeached by disproving facts to which he has testified. Even evidence that would be inadmissible if *19offered to impeach the defendant’s character may be admissible to impeach the veracity of a witness. What is forbidden is the State’s introduction in the first instance of evidence whose sole probative value is that it tends to show a defendant’s bad character.
(Punctuation and footnotes omitted; emphasis in original.) Arnold v. State, 305 Ga. App. 45, 52 (4) (699 SE2d 77) (2010). In any event, the testimony with regard to Keaton’s relatives was not directly responsive to the question, and “when a witness gives a non-responsive answer to a question impacting negatively on the defendant’s character, this does not place the defendant’s character in issue. ...” (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Mathis v. State, 299 Ga. App. 831, 835 (1) (c) (i) (684 SE2d 6) (2009) (apparently decided under the prior version of OCGA § 24-9-20 (b), which expressly excluded the admission of evidence of a defendant’s bad character “unless and until the defendant shall have first put his character in issue”). See also Walker v. State, 282 Ga. 703, 705 (2) (653 SE2d 468) (2007).
3. Keaton next asserts that the trial court erred in allowing a prosecution police witness to read from a written report during his testimony. He asserts that the State was improperly attempting to bolster the victim’s testimony regarding why she had not sought warrants against him for earlier violations.
The witness, Waycross Police Officer Robert Murray, testified that he had responded to two calls at the victim’s house reporting that Keaton was there in violation of the Interlocutory Order. Murray testified as to both incidents and stated on direct that when he asked the victim after the second incident if she was going to prosecute, she replied that she was going to consult her attorney for advice. When the prosecution broached the subject again on re-direct and Murray repeated this answer, the prosecutor directed him to his written report of the second incident, which indicated that the victim said she did not want to swear out a warrant because she did not want Keaton to lose his job and thus his ability to provide financial support for his children. Keaton’s trial counsel interposed an objection but was only able to state that “[the officer] was responding to the question, and ...” before the trial judge ruled that he would allow Murray to read from his report.
Keaton’s trial attorney did not further explain or otherwise perfect the record as to the ground for his objection. Certainly at no time did he raise the issue of improper bolstering. “In order to raise on appeal an impropriety regarding the admissibility of evidence, the specific ground of objection must be made at the time the evidence is offered, and the failure to do so amounts to a waiver of that specific ground.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Sanchez v. State, 285 *20Ga. 749, 751 (3) (684 SE2d 251) (2009). See also Powell v. State, 308 Ga. App. 489, 490 (1) (707 SE2d 877) (2011).
4. Keaton argues that the trial court also erred in allowing, over his objection, a juror accused of misconduct to return to the jury room with other jurors while the Court considered his motion to excuse that juror. The record, however, contains no motion by Keaton to excuse the juror and no objection to her return to the jury room.
During the trial, a bailiff reported to the Court that he had heard a juror discussing evidence from the case with a couple at a restaurant the night before. The Court brought the matter to the attorneys’ attention and asked whether they wished to pursue it. Keaton’s counsel indicated that he did. The juror was brought in for questioning and denied discussing the case with anyone. Keaton’s trial counsel did not object when the judge sent her back to the jury room after she was questioned. The bailiff was then questioned about what he overheard. After his questioning, Keaton’s counsel stated, “I’d just ask the Court to make sure she’s not back in the jury room right now telling them what’s going on right now.” At that point, the judge asked the jury to return and, following a bench conference, excused the juror in question.
We find no error. Keaton argues that the juror should not have been sent back with the other jurors, but his counsel did not object when the trial court directed her back to the jury room. Accordingly, Keaton waived this issue on appeal. “A party may not complain on appeal of a ruling that he contributed to or acquiesced in by his own action, trial strategy, or conduct.” (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Lee v. State, 284 Ga. App. 435, 439 (3) (644 SE2d 196) (2007). “Moreover, to the extent that [the] actions [of Keaton’s counsel somehow could] be construed as an objection, he failed to elicit a ruling thereon and has therefore waived this claim.” (Footnote omitted.) Green v. State, 298 Ga. App. 301, 303 (2) (680 SE2d 156) (2009).
Later when Keaton’s counsel asked that the court make sure that the offending juror was not telling the other jurors what had occurred, the judge responded immediately by calling the jury back in and removing the offending juror from the panel. Although
[t]here is a presumption of prejudice to the defendant when an irregularity in the conduct of a juror is shown and the burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that no harm has occurred[,] we have also recognized that some irregularities are inconsequential. The decision whether to remove a juror from a panel lies within the *21sound discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned absent an abuse of that discretion.
(Citation omitted.) Tolbert v. State, 300 Ga. App. 51, 53-54 (2) (684 SE2d 120) (2009). Here, there is no indication of any improper conduct by the offending juror in connection with the other jurors. Rather the only misconduct of record occurred between the juror and third parties. We cannot say under these circumstances that the misconduct “was so prejudicial that the verdict is inherently lacking in due process.” (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Gresham v. State, 303 Ga. App. 682, 684 (695 SE2d 73) (2010). And we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in deciding to resolve the issue by removing the juror from the panel.
5. Keaton also contends that the trial court erred in allowing prior consistent statements to bolster the victim’s testimony. In making this argument, Keaton does not point to any particular testimony or to any objection. Rather, he references a bench conference during which he told the judge that it was his understanding that the court would overrule “any of my objections to hearsay,” specifically with regard to what the victim told others about her relationship with Keaton. The trial judge then replied that because Keaton’s defense had questioned the victim’s credibility and because the victim had testified and was available for cross-examination, any of her prior consistent statements would be admissible under Gibbons v. State, 248 Ga. 858 (286 SE2d 717) (1982).
Pretermitting whether the trial judge’s statement was a proper application of the rule set out in Gibbons, Keaton fails to cite us to a single instance where he objected to the introduction of any prior consistent statements and where such objection was overruled. In fact, the trial court’s discussion of Gibbons was not made in response to any specific objection or to a motion in limine but rather was a reply to counsel’s assumption regarding the trial court’s intent. See Sanders v. State, 179 Ga. App. 168, 169 (2) (345 SE2d 677) (1986) (appellate courts exist to review asserted error but where a defendant makes no objection and obtains no ruling, there is nothing for the Court to review). Even if we were to interpret the trial court’s generalized statements as a ruling and even though Keaton contends that the statements effectively “hand cuffed” the defense and made objections “pointless,” Keaton has failed to identify any prior consistent statements that he contends were admitted improperly. See Court of Appeals Rule 25 (c) (2) (i). (“Each enumerated error shall be supported in the brief by specific reference to the record or transcript. In the absence of such reference, the Court will not search for or consider such enumeration.”). Accordingly, Keaton has given this Court nothing to review under this enumeration.
*226. Keaton also contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial on the ground that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney failed: (a) to object to the prosecutor’s taking the stand to provide rebuttal testimony; (b) to prepare for trial; and (c) to secure an unbiased jury.
In considering Keaton’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we apply the two-prong test set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). Keaton “must show that counsel’s performance was deficient and that, but for that deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different.” (Footnote omitted.) Jackson v. State, 282 Ga. 494, 497 (2) (651 SE2d 702) (2007). In order to show that counsel’s performance was deficient, “[t]he criminal defendant must overcome the strong presumption that trial counsel’s conduct falls within the broad range of reasonable professional conduct.” (Citation omitted.) Robinson v. State, 277 Ga. 75, 76 (586 SE2d 313) (2003). On appellate review, “[w]e accept the trial court’s factual findings and credibility determinations unless clearly erroneous, but we independently apply the legal principles to the facts.” Id.
(a) Keaton asserts that his trial attorneys were ineffective in failing to object to the prosecutor’s taking the stand to counter the defense’s cross-examination of the victim on rebuttal. The chief assistant district attorney (“Chief ADA”) asked permission to testify in response to defense questioning that implied that the victim had been instructed to show more emotion when she took the stand in rebuttal and also that she had never cried when previously interviewed about the incident. Keaton’s attorney stated that he did not “mind” if the Chief ADA took the stand. But Keaton’s counsel objected during the subsequent examination when the Chief ADA was asked what the victim’s demeanor had been during her pretrial interviews. He asserted that the question was more general than simply soliciting testimony that the victim had cried in earlier interviews and that when he agreed to the Chief ADA taking the stand, he had anticipated that the prosecutor would just state in his place that the victim had cried. The trial court allowed the testimony, and the Chief ADA stated that the victim had cried briefly when they interviewed her on two occasions. But when he began to describe her demeanor more generally, Keaton’s attorney again objected, and the trial court sustained the objection.
Keaton’s lead trial attorney testified at the hearing on his motion for new trial that he did not object to the Chief ADA’s taking the stand to say the victim had previously cried because he “didn’t think it was very effective on his part. I think it. . . made the State look[ ] pretty incompetent that the [Chief ADA was] the only one *23that they could bring in to testify at the last minute ...” as to the victim’s emotional state after presenting numerous other witnesses. And the record demonstrates that the attorney successfully objected when the testimony went beyond the scope of his agreement on this point. Accordingly, Keaton’s counsel’s acquiescence in the prosecutor’s limited testimony was a matter of trial strategy, and it is well settled that “matters of reasonable tactics and strategy, whether wise or unwise, do not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Dyer v. State, 295 Ga. App. 495, 498 (1) (672 SE2d 462) (2009).
(b) Keaton next asserts that his trial counsel failed to adequately prepare for trial. In support of this argument, he relies upon his brother Reginald Keaton’s testimony at the motion hearing. Reginald testified that he met with Keaton’s trial attorney about 8:00 or 9:00 the night before the trial. During that meeting, the attorney showed him a list of witnesses and asked what he knew about them. Reginald asked the attorney if he had interviewed the witnesses yet, and he said that the attorney replied that he had not because Corey Keaton had not paid all of the legal fees owed. Reginald also said that the attorney did not go over his testimony prior to trial and that if he had asked him earlier he could have given him information about contacts between the victim and Keaton that showed their intention to reconcile. Reginald acknowledged, however, that he did see the attorney talking to witnesses the morning before trial and Reginald further conceded that he testified about contacts between his brother and the victim at trial, but he said that he could have “delved deeper” with better preparation.
Keaton’s lead trial attorney testified at the motion hearing, however, that he and his co-counsel interviewed “a lot of witnesses” and took affidavits from some of them. He also stated that they took testimony and information from witnesses during two earlier bond hearings. He said that his file contained memos of witness interviews and affidavits, along with addresses and telephone numbers, which demonstrate his trial preparation. Co-counsel also stated that he had interviewed a number of witnesses before trial and prepared affidavits from at least two of them for use in connection with a bond motion. Accordingly, the trial court would not have been clearly erroneous in concluding that Keaton failed to establish his attorneys’ lack of preparation for trial. Moreover, Keaton utterly failed to demonstrate how any alleged lack of preparation created a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different.
(c) Keaton also asserts that counsel were ineffective in failing to strike two jurors from the panel who each had interacted or had family members who had interacted with Keaton in his capacity as a *24policeman. Keaton testified at the motion hearing that he had informed his attorneys that these two jurors might have problems with him. But Keaton’s lead trial attorney testified that he did not recall the specific jurors, and he was sure that he discussed the jury panel with Keaton. He said he believed that if Keaton told him that he did not want someone on the jury, the only reasons they would have remained on the jury would have been that the defense was out of strikes or there were other prospective jurors they felt more strongly about striking from the panel. Co-counsel testified that his notes from the trial indicate that in their discussions with Keaton they had found the two jurors to be acceptable. Once again, we find no clear error in the trial court’s conclusion that Keaton failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel under the Strickland test on this ground.
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Barnes, P. J., and Phipps, P J., concur Ellington, C. J., Miller, P J., and Doyle, J., concur in Divisions 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 and concur specially and in the judgment only as to Division 1. Blackwell, J., concurs in Divisions 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 and dissents as to Division 1.This is the second appearance of this case before this Court. After Keaton filed an earlier appeal from the denial of his original motion for new trial, he raised allegations that his trial attorneys rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. This Court subsequently remanded the case for hearing on these allegations before addressing the merits of his appeal. The trial court appointed new counsel and, after a full hearing, denied the amended motion for new trial. This appeal followed.
Keaton does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict on the remaining charges.
Peace bonds and temporary protective orders were not added to the list until an amendment in 1995. Ga. L. 1995, p. 911, § 1.
The first version of the aggravated stalking bill, S. B. 13, sponsored by Senator Mary Margaret Oliver, was completely different from the bill eventually enacted. Oliver’s initial bill made no mention of orders, injunctions, bond conditions or the like. Rather it based the offense of aggravated stalking on certain actions or the existence of the pending complaint. 1993 Ga. Sen. J., v. 1, p. 141. Four other bills were pending in the house at the same time. 1993 Ga. House J., v. 1, pp. 68, 125, 299, 951. In a substitute version of S. B. 13, the House Judiciary Committee changed the definition of aggravated stalking to focus upon the violation of a court action after considering the various house proposals, including one sponsored by Rep. Cathy Cox. 1993 Ga. House J., v. 2, pp. 2004-2005; Ochandarena, at 97, n. 29. One commentator conducted an April 12, 1993 interview with Cox, who explained the change by noting that “[offenders who disregard a judicial order prohibiting stalking were viewed as in need of more severe sanctions.” Ochandarena, at 98, n. 33. Because Georgia has no formal legislative history, this interview may offer the best contemporaneous view of the legislature’s intent. It appears likely that the legislators were more focused upon providing enhanced punishment for those who violate existing stalking orders, conditions, or injunctions than they were upon *16precisely placing these items among the disjunctives in the statute. Nothing in the progress of the bill through the legislature suggests otherwise.
Although no cases have addressed the present issue directly, the cases appear to apply the modifying language “in effect prohibiting the behavior described in this subsection” to orders, bonds, injunctions or conditions without regard for where they appear in the statutory list. See, e.g., State v. Carlisle, 280 Ga. 770, 771 (1) (631 SE2d 347) (2006) (“Under OCGA § 16-5-91 (a), a person commits the offense of aggravated stalking when, in violation of certain types of court orders that ‘in effect prohibit( ) the behavior described in this subsection’ . . .”) (condition of pretrial release); Reed v. State, 309 Ga. App. 183, 184 (1) (709 SE2d 847) (2011) (“A person commits the offense of aggravated stalking when he, in violation of an order or bond condition ‘prohibiting the behavior described in this subsection’ . . .”) (12-month temporary protective order); Ford v. State, 283 Ga. App. 460, 460 (1) (641 SE2d 671) (2007) (applying modifying language “in effect prohibiting the behavior described in this subsection” to temporary and permanent restraining orders and temporary and permanent protective orders) (temporary protective order); Stevens v. State, 261 Ga. App. 73 (581 SE2d 685) (2003) (“A person commits aggravated stalking when he violates a judicial order, including a condition of pretrial release, ‘prohibiting the behavior described in this subsection,’ . . . [Cit.]”) (bond condition).
We note, however, that Keaton’s behavior could have subjected him to prosecution for stalking under OCGA § 16-5-90 or criminal trespass. At the very least, he would have been subject to a finding of contempt for violating the order.
In support of this argument, Keaton also cites earlier testimony from the victim describing a conversation with Keaton’s aunt, in which the aunt states that her husband had stabbed her multiple times in the past and that Keaton was on suicide watch, but Keaton did not move for a mistrial or otherwise object to this testimony at trial.
Additionally, Keaton called three separate witnesses to testify that he had a good reputation in the community.
Russell v. State, 308 Ga. App. 328, 330 (707 SE2d 543) (2011) (trial court has considerable discretion in determining whether mistrial is necessary).