dissenting.
Attorney Philip Wright concedes that a mistake he made in the course of representing Richard Kimmer in a workers’ compensation case was a breach of the duty he owed to his client. He thus concedes the first two elements of a legal malpractice claim existed as of the date of the mistake. However, as with many mistakes lawyers make in the course of litigation, no damage resulted from the mistake until the workers’ compensation commission denied benefits to Kimmer. At that point, the other two elements which must be present before a cause of action for legal malpractice accrues — causation and damage — came into existence for the first time. Kimmer filed suit against Wright within three years of the date all four elements existed, and thus complied with the statute of limitations. I respectfully dissent.
The statute of limitations requires that legal malpractice actions “be commenced within three years after the person knew or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known that he had a cause of action.” Berry v. McLeod, 328 S.C. 435, 444-45, 492 S.E.2d 794, 799 (Ct.App.1997). A legal malpractice cause of action consists of four elements: “(1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship; (2) a breach of duty by the attorney; (3) damage to the client; and (4) proximate cause of the client’s damages by the breach.” Rydde v. Morris, 381 S.C. 643, 646, 675 S.E.2d 431, 433 (2009). When any one of these elements is missing, the client does not have a legal malpractice cause of action against the lawyer. *64Thus, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until all four elements, including damage, are present.
A lawyer’s breach of duty to the client necessarily occurs before the damage resulting from the breach. In other words, damage is always the last element of a legal malpractice claim to occur. Therefore, our courts have described the point at which the statute of limitations begins to run as “where the facts and circumstances of an injury would put a person of common knowledge and experience on notice that some right of his has been invaded or that some claim against another party might exist.” Mitchell v. Holler, 311 S.C. 406, 409, 429 S.E.2d 793, 795 (1993) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In Mitchell, as in every published decision on the statute of limitations in a legal malpractice case except for one, the prospective plaintiff discovered the injury before learning of the negligent act or omission that caused it. In each of those cases, the court held that the occurrence of the injury put the client on notice to inquire as to whether the injury was caused by the attorney’s negligence.2
*65Here, the situation is different. Wright made Kimmer aware of the negligence, but Kimmer did not suffer an actionable injury for another three years. The majority has taken language from these prior cases, inapplicable to the facts of this case,3 and used it to hold that when the client learns of his lawyer’s negligence, the statute of limitations begins to run even though he has yet to suffer any injury. I respectfully disagree.
My point is illustrated by Epstein v. Brown, 363 S.C. 372, 610 S.E.2d 816 (2005), the one decision in which the factual scenario is similar, although not identical, to this one. Dr. Epstein sued Brown for legal malpractice Brown allegedly committed in the course of defending Dr. Epstein in a medical malpractice lawsuit. 363 S.C. at 374-75, 610 S.E.2d at 817. The medical malpractice lawsuit resulted in a $6,028,535.88 verdict against Dr. Epstein. Id. The trial court granted summary judgment to Brown on the basis that Dr. Epstein had not complied with the statute of limitations. 363 S.C. at 375, 610 S.E.2d at 817. The supreme court affirmed, holding “Dr. Epstein clearly knew, or should have known he might have had some claim against Brown at the conclusion of his trial.” 363 S.C. at 382, 610 S.E.2d at 821.
I will discuss below my contention that Epstein is controlling, and that the statute therefore began to run “at the conclusion of [Kimmer’s] trial,” the date of the single commissioner’s ruling. However, even if Epstein is not controlling, the supreme court’s holding illustrates an important reality about litigation that requires us to affirm the circuit court: lawyers make mistakes during the course of litigation, and yet if the client wins the case, no damage results from those mistakes. Recognizing this reality is essential to the analysis of a statute of limitations question in a legal malpractice action arising out of litigation because the existence of damage is one of the elements. Rydde, 381 S.C. at 646, 675 S.E.2d at 433 *66(stating the elements of a legal malpractice claim include “damage to the client”). Like Kimmer in this case, Dr. Epstein made allegations of malpractice against Brown arising out of events that occurred long before the trial.4 However, if the jury found in Dr. Epstein’s favor, he would not have suffered damages, and no cause of action would ever have accrued against Brown.
The same is true here. The effect of Wright’s negligence on Kimmer’s right to recover workers’ compensation benefits was not known until at least July 31, 2003, when the single commissioner ruled against Kimmer and denied his claim for benefits. Until then, Kimmer and his lawyers were working hard to win the case, despite Wright’s negligence. The damages element was missing because the possibility remained that Kimmer would prevail on the claim. When the single commissioner ruled, however, Kimmer knew Wright’s negligence caused him to lose his workers’ compensation case. Because damage existed then for the first time, Wright’s negligence became actionable malpractice for the first time. Kimmer commenced this action on October 14, 2004, well within the statute of limitations.
The majority’s reliance on Binkley and the “reasonable diligence” language from Epstein is misplaced. In Binkley, and in all cases in which the reasonable diligence language is important, the prospective plaintiff was aware of the damage, but was unaware of the attorney’s negligent conduct that caused the damage. In Binkley, for example, we held the statute of limitations began to run when the plaintiffs knew of the existence of an easement allowing a conservation district to cause flooding on the plaintiffs’ property. 352 S.C. at 297, 573 S.E.2d at 844. We held this even though no flooding had *67yet occurred, and the plaintiffs had no idea the defendant law firm had negligently failed to disclose the easement. Id. We explained that the mere existence of the easement was sufficient damage to put the plaintiff on inquiry notice. Id. (“An easement by its very nature involves the right to encroach upon another’s property.”). Because the plaintiffs knew of the easement, we held they “had inquiry notice of a possible claim against [the law firm] regarding the easement.” Id. In Binkley, it was knowledge of the existence of damage that caused the statute of limitations to begin to run.
However, the majority relies on the following language from Binkley: “the requirement of reasonable diligence to investigate this information further takes precedence over the inability to ascertain the amount of damages or even the possibility that damages may be forthcoming at all.” 352 S.C. at 298, 573 S.E.2d at 845 (emphasis added). The majority interprets the emphasized language to support its position that a legal malpractice cause of action can accrue, and thus the statute of limitations begins to run, before any damage has occurred. I respectfully disagree with the majority’s interpretation. Rather, the Binkley court’s previous statement that the mere existence of the easement caused the landowner damage, taken in the context of the case, indicates this emphasized language refers to the insignificance of the fact that no flooding had yet occurred. My point is supported by a footnote at the end of the emphasized language, in which we cited Dean v. Ruscon Corp., 321 S.C. 360, 364, 468 S.E.2d 645, 647 (1996), for the principle “the fact that the injured party may not comprehend the full extent of the damage is immaterial.” 352 S.C. at 298 n. 21, 573 S.E.2d at 845 n. 21. These circumstances demonstrate that the language from Binkley relied on by the majority does not indicate that a legal malpractice cause of action can accrue before there is damage. Rather, we used the language relied on by the majority to indicate that on those facts, the circumstance that the flooding had not yet occurred did not delay the commencement of the statute of limitations.
The majority also relies on the following language from Epstein:
The exercise of reasonable diligence means simply that an injured party must act with some promptness where the *68facts and circumstances of an injury would put a person of common knowledge and experience on notice that some right of his has been invaded or that some claim against another party might exist.
363 S.C. at 376, 610 S.E.2d at 818. The majority quotes this language, which emphasizes the word “might.” Here, the correct language to emphasize is “injured party” and “the facts and circumstances of an injury.” The language is used to describe a situation when a known injury “might” have resulted from a lawyer’s negligence. The language was never intended to apply to a situation like we have here, where a lawyer’s known negligence “might” later result in injury. The same is true in all of our published decisions on the statute of limitations in legal malpractice cases, except Epstein. In each case, the prospective plaintiff was aware of the injury, and that awareness put the plaintiff on notice to inquire into whether the injury was caused by the lawyer’s negligence.5
Wright asserts several additional reasons the statute of limitations began to run earlier than the date of the single commissioner’s ruling. First, he argues the “unmistakable” quality of his malpractice caused the statute to begin to run immediately. I disagree. As an initial matter, to condition the commencement of the statute of limitations in a legal malpractice case on the degree of the lawyer’s negligence creates an unmanageable standard for courts to apply. Even assuming Wright is correct that his malpractice was unmistakable, how would the court treat malpractice that was barely mistakable, or merely probable? Second, the circuit court’s ruling on appeal from the commission establishes that Wright’s malpractice was not unmistakable. It would be patently unfair for this court to say Kimmer should have known he would eventually be damaged, and thus had a cause of action against Wright, when a circuit judge made precisely the opposite ruling in the same case. The fact that this court later reversed the circuit judge is not important. The circuit court’s ruling established that Kimmer retained a reasonable chance of winning his workers’ compensation claim even after Wright’s “unmistakable” negligence.
*69Wright also argues the statute of limitations began to run because Kimmer did in fact suffer damage before the single commissioner’s ruling due to the carrier’s denial of temporary benefits. I disagree. First, this also creates an unmanageable standard. The courts cannot condition the commencement of the statute of limitations on whether a workers’ compensation insurance adjuster agrees or refuses to pay temporary benefits. Taken not even to its extreme, Wright’s argument provides that a cause of action accrues against a workers’ compensation claimant’s lawyer any time some minor mistake in the lawyer’s office results in even a brief delay in requesting temporary benefits. Second, and more importantly, a claimant who is denied temporary benefits but later prevails at the final hearing is entitled to receive retroactive benefits. See Langdale v. Harris Carpets, 395 S.C. 194, 717 S.E.2d 80 (Ct.App.2011) (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 24 at 97, 106) (affirming commission’s award of temporary benefits after employer denied payment). Thus, Kimmer did not suffer any damage resulting from his interim loss of temporary benefits. Rather, as with any other type of contested workers’ compensation benefits, his entitlement to temporary benefits depended on the ultimate decision of the commission. See Tiller v. Nat’l Health Care Ctr. of Sumter, 334 S.C. 333, 343, 513 S.E.2d 843, 848 (1999) (affirming commission’s award of temporary total benefits).
Finally, and most importantly, the supreme court addressed this question in Epstein, and held that in an action based on alleged malpractice during the course of litigation, the statute of limitations begins to run when a lawyer’s negligence results in a ruling adverse to the client in a trial. “Dr. Epstein clearly knew, or should have known he might have had some claim against Brown at the conclusion of his trial.” Epstein, 363 S.C. at 382, 610 S.E.2d at 821 (emphasis added). The comparable point in time in this case, when under Epstein the statute of limitations began to run, is the single commissioner’s ruling. I believe we are bound to apply Epstein to this appeal, and must affirm.
The majority argues, however, that Epstein is not controlling, emphasizing a footnote in which the court stated:
We do not hold that, in all instances, the date of a jury’s adverse verdict is the date on which the [statute of limita*70tions] begins to run. To the contrary, we hold only that, under the facts of this case, Dr. Epstein knew of a potential claim against Brown by this date, at the latest.
363 S.C. at 383 n. 8, 610 S.E.2d at 821 n. 8 (emphasis added). The majority argues the emphasized language “at the latest” means that under some circumstances the statute could begin to run before an adverse decision by a trial court or administrative agency, but could never begin to run afterwards.
However, I believe “at the latest” means the opposite of what the majority contends. In order to understand this point, consider the dissenting opinion filed by the Chief Justice and the unique damages claim made by Dr. Epstein. In her dissent, the Chief Justice argued that no injury occurred, and thus the statute of limitations did not begin to run, until all appeals were exhausted and the remittitur had been sent to the lower court. 363 S.C. at 383, 610 S.E.2d at 822. As to Dr. Epstein’s damages claim, he alleged damages to his reputation arising from adverse publicity when the verdict was announced, in addition to economic losses arising from the $6 million judgment against him. See 363 S.C. at 376, 382, 610 S.E.2d at 818, 821.
Several paragraphs before the Epstein majority’s “at the conclusion of his trial” holding, and the “at the latest” language of footnote 8, the majority began discussing the position the Chief Justice took in her dissent as follows:
Dr. Epstein asserts that, even if we do not adopt the continuous representation rule, the statute of limitations should not be deemed to have begun to run until the date on which this Court denied certiorari (January 11, 2001), because it was not until that date upon which he suffered “legal damages.” We disagree.
363 S.C. at 380, 610 S.E.2d at 820. The Epstein majority then gave several reasons it disagreed. First, the court cited a number of decisions from other jurisdictions which “tend to hold that a plaintiff may institute a malpractice action prior to the conclusion of the appeal.” 363 S.C. at 380-81, 610 S.E.2d at 820-21. Second, the court refuted the argument “that requiring [a plaintiff] to pursue an appeal while simultaneously filing a malpractice suit against his attorney puts him in the *71awkward position of arguing inconsistent positions in two different courts.” 363 S.C. at 381-82, 610 S.E.2d at 821.
Then the Epstein majority cited the “discovery rule,” and noted “[t]he fact that the injured party may not comprehend the full extent of the damage is immaterial.” 363 S.C. at 382, 610 S.E.2d at 821. Applying the discovery rule “[u]nder the facts of this case,” the Epstein majority pointed out: “The damages [Dr. Epstein] claims are largely those to his reputation.” Id. After discussing what Dr. Epstein knew before the trial and during the course of the appeal about his lawyer’s performance, the court concluded: “It is patent Dr. Epstein knew, or should have known, of a possible claim against Brown long before this Court denied certiorari in January 2001.” 363 S.C. at 383, 610 S.E.2d at 821. Footnote 8 is found at the end of the next sentence.
I believe the purpose of footnote 8 and the “at the latest” statement is to demonstrate that the Chief Justice’s argument would not change the outcome of Epstein because of the allegation of injury to reputation. In other words, the purpose of footnote 8 is to explain that even if an appellate court had reversed the verdict, thereby eliminating the economic portion of Dr. Epstein’s damages claim, the alleged injury to his reputation was at least partially irreversible and would have remained. In that situation, regardless of what the appellate court did to reverse his economic injury, Dr. Epstein suffered injury to his reputation as of the date of the jury verdict. Therefore, the court stated “under the facts of this case, Dr. Epstein knew of a potential claim against Brown by [the date of the jury’s verdict], at the latest.” 363 S.C. at 383 n. 8, 610 S.E.2d at 821 n. 8.
Under this reading, the Epstein majority did not intend the “at the latest” statement to indicate that the statute might have started to run before the verdict. Rather, the statement is part of the majority’s response to the argument that the statute begins to run after the appeals have been exhausted, and specifically recognizes that the unique allegation of damage to Dr. Epstein’s reputation makes that argument inapplicable to the facts of that case. Thus, the majority’s reason for distinguishing Epstein is unfounded, and we are left with no basis on which to conclude that the supreme court did not mean what it said when it chose these words: “Dr. Epstein *72clearly knew, or should have known he might have had some claim against Brown at the conclusion of his trial.” 363 S.C. at 382, 610 S.E.2d at 821. Epstein therefore controls the outcome of this case: the statute of limitations did not run on Kimmer’s claim.
The practice of law is an imperfect art in which lawyers necessarily take risks and make mistakes. However, when a litigator makes a mistake — indeed commits malpractice, such as Wright did in this case — nobody knows whether the mistake will cause damage until the damage materializes in the form of an adverse judgment. For this reason, the statute of limitations did not begin to run on Kimmer’s claim against Wright until July 31, 2003, when the single commissioner denied workers’ compensation benefits. Kimmer filed suit on October 14, 2004. Because he commenced his action against Wright within the three-year statute of limitations, the circuit court correctly granted partial summary judgment to Kimmer.
I would affirm.
. See Christensen v. Mikell, 324 S.C. 70, 73, 476 S.E.2d 692, 694 (1996) (finding statute ran from point when client knew he did not have title insurance); Mitchell, 311 S.C. at 409, 429 S.E.2d at 795 (holding knowledge of murder conviction, coupled with complaint about trial counsel's performance, commenced running of statute); Manios v. Nelson, Mullins, Riley & Scarborough, LLP, 389 S.C. 126, 145, 697 S.E.2d 644, 654 (Ct.App.2010) (holding there was conflicting evidence on when client should have known deed of trust with priority over client’s interest caused damage); Kelly v. Logan, Jolley, & Smith, LLP, 383 S.C. 626, 635-36, 682 S.E.2d 1, 6 (Ct.App.2009) (finding statute ran from client’s knowledge she had not been named as a plaintiff in medical malpractice action); Binkley v. Burry, 352 S.C. 286, 297, 573 S.E.2d 838, 844 (Ct.App.2002) (holding statute ran from date landowners knew their property was encumbered by easement not disclosed at closing); Peterson v. Richland Cnty., 335 S.C. 135, 139, 515 S.E.2d 553, 555 (Ct.App.1999) (holding statute ran from client’s knowledge of improperly indexed judgment); Holy Loch Distribs., Inc. v. Hitchcock, 332 S.C. 247, 254, 503 S.E.2d 787, 791 (Ct.App.1998) (holding statute began to run when ATF agents notified plaintiffs they were operating their business in violation of federal law due to lack of appropriate permits and licenses), rev’d on other grounds, 340 S.C. 20, 531 S.E.2d 282 (2000); Berry, 328 S.C. at 445-46, 492 S.E.2d at 800 (holding that where plaintiffs claimed a right to hold referendum on municipal bond, statute began to run when plaintiffs knew bond was issued without a referendum); Burgess v. Am. Cancer Soc’y, S.C. Div., Inc., 300 S.C. 182, *65187, 386 S.E.2d 798, 800 (Ct.App.1989) (holding statute was triggered by client’s knowledge of attorney's affair with officer of company client was suing). But see True v. Monteith, 327 S.C. 116, 120-21, 489 S.E.2d 615, 617 (1997) (holding although client knew of injury for years, there was a question of fact as to when she should have learned of attorney’s conflict of interest in transaction causing the injury).
. See discussion of Binkley below.
. For example, as the supreme court stated:
In his complaint, Dr. Epstein alleged Brown was negligent in numerous particulars, including: failing to conduct an adequate investigation, failing to advise Epstein to settle, failing to keep Epstein adequately informed during the pendency of the case, representing multiple defendants with conflicts of interest, ... and adopting a defense which was contrary to Dr. Epstein's medical opinion.
Epstein, 363 S.C. at 376, 610 S.E.2d at 818. Several of these allegations arise out of actions Brown took before he even filed an answer. Presumably, for example, Brown made the decision to represent multiple defendants almost as soon as Dr. Epstein’s complaint was served.
. See footnote 2.