dissenting.
Because the evidence before the jury was that officers were lawfully discharging their duties when they were sent by DFCS to check on the welfare of the child, and because Harris impeded them in this lawful discharge of their duties when he pretended that he did not know to what child they were referring, the jury was authorized to find Harris guilty of misdemeanor obstruction of an officer. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
The transcript shows that a DFCS investigator went with officers from the Crimes Against Children Unit to the home of Kayla Bagwell who had a current case with DFCS and two children already in protective custody. Harris was identified as the father of all three children and had recently been arrested for aggravated assault against Bagwell. At trial, the officer explained that his division worked with DFCS and carried out “child welfare checks” for DFCS whenever there was any reason to believe that “a child is not being properly cared for.” The officer stated that the complaint could come from anywhere and their unit was responsible for checking on the child.
Here, DFCS requested the welfare check on the newborn C. H. because of the ongoing case in which the two older children were already in protective custody. When asked whether officers brought court orders or warrants with them when doing child welfare checks, the response was, “No, sir; we don’t need it.”
The officer testified: “We didn’t even necessarily have to enter into the residence if he would have brought the child out to us, but he — every time the child question would come up, he would say, “What child?” and “I don’t know who you’re talking about.” Although Harris tried to argue to the jury that he was confused about which child of his the officers meant when they asked the question, the transcript shows that after he was arrested, Harris stated, “Okay, my child’s inside the house.” The officer responded: “See how easy that was?” Harris also stated at trial: “I knew who *823they were asking about, but I was not going to answer the question.” Further, the audiotape shows that an officer responded ‘‘the ten-day old” when Harris asked “what child?”
Because this is an appeal from a jury verdict, we must look to the evidence before the jury and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the officers were in the lawful discharge of their duties when they went to Harris’s house to inquire about the welfare of the child. The officers’ undisputed testimony was that DFCS may, during an open and continuing deprivation case, conduct “child welfare checks” at the home. When asked whether officers needed any court order, the response was that they did not. The jury was charged on the law of obstruction and told “[wjhether or not the actions of the defendant did hinder or impede the officers from carrying out their assigned duties is for you, the members of the jury to decide.”
The jury found Harris guilty and there was more than sufficient evidence to support the verdict. There was no evidence presented to the jury that officers did not have a right to conduct a welfare check on the child pursuant to an open deprivation case. Harris admitted that he deliberately refused to answer their questions about the welfare of his child. Accordingly, a rational trier of fact was authorized to conclude that the officers were in the lawful discharge of their duties when they went to Harris’s house to inquire about the child, and that he impeded them in their discharge of those duties. See English v. State, 257 Ga. App. 741, 743 (572 SE2d 86) (2002) (affirming that defendant was guilty of obstruction even though defendant claimed that officer was on private property and officer stated that he was not; it was for the jury to resolve conflicts in the evidence and reach a determination as to the facts).
Further, there is no issue raised that Harris was somehow convicted of obstruction because he refused to let officers enter his house. The audiotape of the entire incident leading up to Harris’s arrest was played for the jury and shows that there was never any mention of an entry into Harris’s house without his consent. Officers were clear that the arrest was for refusing to answer questions about the child. Harris acknowledges this in his brief when he states that the “core” of the prosecution’s case is the accusation that he obstructed officers by failing to answer their questions about the whereabouts of the child and her mother. More importantly, Harris himself attempted to bring out in cross-examination that officers never asked permission to come in the house, but rather arrested him because he refused to cooperate in the investigation into the welfare of the child. The audiotape confirms this, with the officer telling Harris that he is arresting him because he would not answer the questions. Harris’s statement at trial was that officers “were *824absolutely convinced that I was going to talk to them because they were going to make me. I just wouldn’t talk. That’s it.”
The majority holds that Harris cannot be charged with obstruction for responding “what child” when officers asked him about the baby because “[i]t did not in fact deceive [them, nor did it] materially expand the 95-second exchange.” The majority does not cite to any authority, factual or legal, for this statement. Of course the officers were not deceived into believing that there was no child; DFCS had already informed them that there was a child. What they were deceived about was the welfare of the child. By professing to have no knowledge of any child, Harris was not only obstructing a lawful investigation but, in addition, his response raised valid concerns about the child’s welfare. As previously stated, Harris had a history of family violence. At that point, the officers could not leave without verifying that the child was alive and well.
Beckom v. State, 286 Ga. App. 38 (648 SE2d 656) (2007), the only authority cited by the majority in reaching its holding, is not on point. In that case, this Court held that there was no authority for the State’s
proposition that an individual’s failure to answer the phone and failure to answer a knock on the door constitutes obstruction under OCGA § 16-10-24 (a), where there is no evidence that the individual knew of an on-going investigation, and certainly no evidence that the individual was attempting “knowingly and willfully” to impede such an investigation.
Id. at 42.
In this case it is undisputed that Harris knew of an ongoing investigation as to the welfare of his children and the family violence issue and there is undisputed evidence, his own admission, that he lied to the officers. See Wells v. State, 297 Ga. App. 153, 157 (676 SE2d 821) (2009) (finding obstruction of a law enforcement officer by giving misleading information to police officer responding to accident); Duke v. State, 205 Ga. App. 689, 690 (423 SE2d 427) (1992) (The trial court was authorized to find that appellant’s lie as to whether the arrestee was present in her home actually hindered and obstructed the officers in their efforts to make the arrest.).
“Whether a defendant’s actions actually hindered or impeded an officer is a decision for the trier of fact.” Williams v. State, 289 Ga. App. 402, 403 (657 SE2d 556) (2008). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Harris’s motion for directed verdict, and the judgment should be affirmed.
*825Decided March 15, 2012. John E. Harris, pro se. Barry E. Morgan, Solicitor-General, Christopher S. Banning, Thomas J. Campbell, Assistant Solicitors-General, for appellee.I am authorized to state that Judge Dillard and Judge Boggs join in this dissent.