concurring.
*1349I concur in the court’s opinion and judgment and offer some additional views on political gerrymandering. For purposes of this concurring opinion, I define “political gerrymandering” as the drawing of legislative district lines in a manner intended to benefit candidates of one party and thereby provide that party greater representation than would be achieved through the drawing of lines without regard to partisan political consequences.
The court’s opinion is a thorough and correct analysis of the political gerrymandering claims at issue under principles originally developed in the context of racial vote dilution. I write separately in order (1) to note why I believe this is the correct ultimate standard under existing Supreme Court decisions, (2) to note what I believe is the most critical step in the application of this standard to the facts of this case, and (3) to respond to a defendant’s assertion that the degree of political gerrymandering exhibited in these plans should be a source of pride.
I
As an original matter, courts could take three possible approaches to political gerrymandering claims.
First, courts could reject such claims in all circumstances, either on grounds that the Constitution does not proscribe political gerrymandering, no matter how severe, or on grounds of nonjusticiability. Such an approach, however, would not comport with accepted constitutional principles. The Constitution does and should protect not just the right to cast a ballot, but also the right to a meaningful opportunity to have that ballot affect the political process. The eases collected in the court’s opinion, primarily in the racial vote dilution context, are an application of this principle. Thus a state legislature cannot constitm tionally deny a voter or group of voters all opportunity to affect the political process, and for this purpose it matters not whether the method of denial is political gerrymandering or some other device. Further, while articulating and enforcing standards for protection of this constitutional right is no easy task, it is not beyond the competence of the federal courts, as the Supreme Court recognized in Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 106 S.Ct. 2797, 92 L.Ed.2d 85 (1986).
Second, courts could hold political gerrymandering unconstitutional, period, and provide remedies requiring the practice to stop. Such an approach would not be without at least superficial support in our jurisprudence; thus, for example, partisan political considerations cannot be the basis for hiring or firing most rank and file government workers, and no one would doubt the unconstitutionality of a state’s efforts to parcel out most public benefits— medicaid payments come to mind — based on an applicant’s party affiliation. It thus may not be immediately apparent why it is permissible for a state legislature to draw district lines that afford some candidates an advantage, and saddle others with a disadvantage, based solely on the candidates’ party affiliation. But partisan political considerations long have affected the drawing of district lines. It is unlikely the Framers intended to make this practice unconstitutional. Nor should the redistricting process be managed by federal courts to the extent that would result from any effort to enforce an absolute ban on political gerrymandering. Perhaps for these reasons, the Supreme Court has made clear, sometimes without even discussing the issue, that political gerrymandering is not, without more, unconstitutional. See, e.g., Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 121 S.Ct. 1452, 149 L.Ed.2d 430 (2001) (holding that an irregularly shaped district that would have been unconstitu*1350tional if drawn based on voters’ race was constitutional because drawn based on voters’ party loyalty).1
Third, courts could take a middle approach, holding political gerrymandering permissible to a point, but concluding that at some point there is a constitutional limit. Both sides seem to embrace this approach in this case, perhaps because, as set forth above, the Supreme Court’s decisions appear to foreclose the alternatives. The issue is how much is too much. The answer corresponds with the right that is at stake: the right to a meaningful opportunity to have one’s ballot affect the political process. This is the same right at issue in the racial vote dilution cases. See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 44, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 2763, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986). The court’s opinion in the case at bar thoroughly analyzes and correctly applies the standards derived from those cases.2
II
The Florida Legislature sought to draw district lines as favorably for Republican candidates as possible (as favorably, that is, as could be done consistently with other constraints imposed by state and federal law). From all indications, the legislature did an outstanding job; in a state with a notoriously close division of Democratic and Republican voters statewide, 18 of the 25 congressional districts have been drawn to cover areas in which voters have exhibited a clear voting preference for Republicans.3 A similar pattern is present for the *1351State Senate and House. In the short run, there will undoubtedly be instances in which the drawing of the lines will affect the outcome. Republicans will win some seats that Democrats would have won had the lines been drawn without regard to politics. Were these results written in stone, I would have grave doubts about the constitutionality of these reapportionment plans.
But the results are not written in stone. The Democrats controlled the process in 1992 and undoubtedly attempted to draw district lines favorably for Democratic candidates. The Democrats may have cut the Republicans more slack, though this record gives no hint of that, or the Democrats may not have been quite as good at their craft. Any differences in this respect between 1992 and 2002, however, were surely minor. The result during the decade when the 1992 plans were in effect, far from what the Democrats hoped for or intended, was a dramatic shift from Democratic to Republican control. This happened not because of where the district lines were drawn, but because of a quantum shift in the partisan voting behavior of Floridians.
Voters move into and out of Florida daily. They move within the state. Immigrants become citizens and register to vote. Other unregistered but eligible voters choose to register for the first time. Children reach voting age, and other voters die. Voters change their party loyalties. And at least as importantly, they vote not always for the candidate that shares them political party affiliation, but for the candidate they find most acceptable given the issues and personalities involved in a given race. If this is not the nation’s most dynamic state politically, it is surely close. If Republicans are still in control in 2012, it will be because, in the majority of races, their candidate beat the Democratic candidate on the merits, not because the 2002 Florida Legislature accurately predicted demographic changes and voting behavior ten years in advance.
In short, Democratic voters have not been denied a meaningful opportunity to elect candidates of them choice. They will elect many candidates of their choice; others will lose. Who will win more often, Democrats or Republicans, will depend on the myriad factors that drive electoral politics.
Ill
That we have correctly decided this case, in light of the existing Supreme Court precedents, seems clear. This does not mean, however, that the degree of political gerrymandering exhibited in this case is to be applauded. One of the defendants asserted in closing argument that Floridians should be justly proud of the apportionment plans adopted in this case. Floridians should be proud, perhaps, of the innovative FREDS software and the technical proficiency with which it has been applied, but not of the degree of political gerrymandering that drove these plans. Floridians should perhaps be proud, instead, when an apportionment plan is adopted in an effort to be fair to all, rather than in an effort to optimize the outcome for one party or the other.
Political gerrymandering is as old as the republican form of government. The Framers assigned the responsibility for congressional apportionment to the state legislatures, undoubtedly knowing that partisan politics would play a role. Still, *1352the issue has recently taken on a different dimension; the “sea change” of advancing technology, as one witness described it, has substantially increased the extent of successful political gerrymandering that is achievable, as a few minutes online with FREDS will confirm. Some states have turned to non-partisan commissions in an effort to take raw partisan politics out of the equation. Whether that works, and whether the results are better or more fair, are subjects for a different branch of government, or for academic study. The Constitution does not commit such decisions to the judiciary. The plans adopted by the Florida Legislature are constitutional.
. Under the two-tiered equal protection approach embraced in a series of Supreme Court decisions, the right to vote and to support the party of one's choice could be classified as a fundamental right, requiring lines drawn on this basis to undergo strict scrutiny. Later cases have placed diminished reliance on the two-tiered approach, see generally Gerald Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L.Rev. 1 (1972), and it is clear, in any event, that strict scrutiny does not apply to the drawing of districts for partisan political reasons. See, e.g., Easley v. Cromartie, supra. This underscores that drawing district lines is different from other uses of political affiliation as a basis for government action.
. To be sure, there is a difference between racial vote dilution and political gerrymandering. In racial vote dilution cases, the class at issue is defined by a characteristic (race) that exists separate and apart from voting behavior. The Gingles factors are designed in part to identify the circumstances under which that characteristic is politically significant, that is, to bridge the gap between a nonpolitical characteristic (race) and politics (the opportunity to cast a meaningful vote). Thus, for example, when blacks are “politically cohesive,’’ their placement within the various districts affects their opportunity to have a meaningful impact on the political process. In political gerrymandering cases, in contrast, the class is defined by a characteristic (voting behavior) that is part and parcel of the political process. If the affected class is defined as individuals who vote for Democratic candidates, there is no gap to be bridged between that behavior (voting) and its impact on politics. For this reason, the subsidiary Gingles factors may apply in differing degrees in political gerrymandering cases as contrasted with racial vote dilution cases, but the ultimate issue is the same: whether a group of voters has been denied a meaningful opportunity to affect the political process.
.This is some indication that the lines have been drawn to favor Republicans, but this is not as conclusive as might appear at first blush. Other things being equal, Democratic voters are often more concentrated geographically, while Republican voters are often more dispersed. Thus, for example, inner-city districts often have an overwhelming majority of Democratic voters; this "wastes” Democratic votes not because of political gerrymandering, but simply as the result of demographics. It thus would not be surprising to find that, with an even split of voters statewide, more than half of the districts would still have a majority of Republican voters, without regard to political gerrymandering. On a national scale, the same concept was illustrated by the 2000 presidential election, where Mr. Gore re*1351ceived more popular votes nationwide than Mr. Bush, but Mr. Bush carried 30 states. This record does not indicate what the split of congressional districts in Florida would have been had the lines been drawn without regard to partisan politics, but any such non-partisan plan clearly would have been better for Democrats than the plan as adopted.