1 1 The issue before us is whether the trial court erred in denying David Lynn Porter's petition to change his name to "Santa Claus." We conclude it did and reverse.
BACKGROUND
T2 David Lynn Porter petitioned the district court to change his name to "Santa Claus" pursuant to section 42-1-1 of the Utah Code. On August 10, 2000, the district court conducted a hearing at which Porter appeared with counsel and presented evidence in support of his petition. Porter testified he desired to be known as "Santa Claus" for purposes of business and charity work. After the hearing, the district court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order dated August 16, 2000, denying Porter's request. The court found no "improper purpose" or "inappropriate intention" on the part of the petitioner, and concluded there was no "legal reason" why the request should be denied. Nonetheless, the district court denied the petition. In support of this decision, the court said that permitting Porter to change his name to Santa Claus "would likely create confusion, misunderstanding, ... allow for substantial mischief," and might cause a "substantial chilling effect for a person or entity otherwise entitled to exercise their access to the courts," who would be faced with the prospect of suing Santa Claus.
3 Porter asked the court to reconsider its order denying the petition to change his name to Santa Claus, or alternatively to allow him to change his name to "Kris Kringle." This request was denied for the same reasons as the prior petition. Porter appeals. |
STANDARD OF REVIEW
{4 We review a trial court's decision to grant or deny a petition for a name change under an abuse of discretion standard. See In re Cruchelow, 926 P.2d 833, 834 (Utah 1996). In In re Cruchelow we also delineated the seope of permitted discretion for cases involving a petition for name change, saying that "although a trial court normally has wide discretion in matters of this type, the court must show some substantial reason before it is justified in denying a petition for a name change." Id.
DISCUSSION
T5 In order to legally change one's name, a petitioner must comply with section 42-1-1 of the Utah Code, which provides:
*521Any natural person, desiring to change his [or her] name, may file a petition therefor in the district court of the county where he [or shel resides, setting forth:
(1) The cause for which the change of name is sought.
(2) The name proposed.
(8) That he [or shel has been a bona fide resident of the county for the year immediately prior to the filing of the petition.
Utah Code Ann. § 42-1-1 (1998). Onee the petition is filed, section 42-1-2 requires the district court to
order what, if any, notice shall be given of the hearing, and after the giving of such notice, if any, may order the change of name as requested, upon proof in open court of the allegations of the petition and that there exists proper cause for granting the same.
Utah Code Ann. § 42-1-2 (1998).
T6 In this case, the petitioner complied with the three requirements of section 42-1-1. Porter filed a petition in the district court explaining that he wanted to change his name to "Santa Claus" because he "resembles the fictional character Santa Claus and does numerous [charitable and business] activities in the Santa Claus persona, and [that] the name change is for these functions and public relations purposes." He also indicated that he had been a Salt Lake County resident for the year prior to filing the petition.
17 We turn therefore to the requirements of section 42-1-2. Petitioner argues, inter alia, that the district court failed to follow section 42-1-2 because it failed to articulate a reason for denying the petition.1 The plain language of section 42-1-2 requires the district court to determine, among other things, whether the petitioner has presented adequate proof that proper cause exists for granting the name change. If the district court concludes that a petitioner has not presented proper cause, the district court "must show some substantial reason before it is justified in denying a petition for a name change," and "the trial record must contain factual support for the trial court's denial of a petition for a name change." In re Cruchelow, 926 P.2d at 834. A substantial reason may exist when there is factual proof of an "unworthy motive, the possibility of fraud on the public, or the choice of a name that is bizarre, unduly lengthy, ridiculous or offensive to common decency and good taste." Moskowitz v. Moskowitz, 118 N.H. 199, 385 A.2d 120, 122 (1978), cited in In re Cruchelow, 926 P.2d at 834. "[UInsupported generalizations and speculation do not constitute a cause shown to deny a change of name." 57 Am.Jur.2d Name § 22 (1988), cited in In re Cruchelow, 926 P.2d at 834.
18 The purpose of these two statutes bears upon our analysis regarding whether proper cause exists to grant a name change. Statutes similar to sections 42-1-1 and-2 are recognized to merely provide a codified process to aid an individual's common law right to adopt another name at will. In re Cruchelow, 926 P.2d at 834; see also In re Knight, 36 Colo.App. 187, 537 P.2d 1085, 1086 (1975); Moskowitz, 385 A.2d at 122. The statutory procedure benefits the petitioner and society by producing a record of the change. In re Cruchelow, 926 P.2d at 834. Consequently, applications under the statute should be encouraged and " 'should generally be granted unless sought for a wrongful or fraudulent purpose'" Id. (quoting Isom v. Circuit Court of the Tenth Jud. Circuit, 437 So.2d 732, 733 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1983)).
T9 The reasons offered by the district court for denying Porter's petition included that the name "Santa Claus" would likely "create confusion, misunderstanding and intended or unintended, could allow for *522substantial mischief." The district court also feared that the name could cause a substantial chilling effect for persons otherwise entitled to exercise access to the courts but who would be hesitant to sue Santa Claus.
1110 However, the record contains insufficient factual support for the district court's denial of Porter's petition. In fact, the record below contains only factual support for granting the name change. The district court found that "the testimony given by the petitioner did not indicate to the Court that the name was being sought for any improper purpose." The district court admitted it saw no "legal reason upon which [the] Court should prohibit the requested name."
111 On the record before us, we simply disagree with the district court that the likelihood of confusion, misunderstanding, or substantial mischief is sufficient to deny the petition, nor is the concern that some may be unwilling to sue a person named Santa Claus sufficient. The record does not contain any evidence to support these concerns. Porter's proposed name may be thought by some to be unwise, and it may very well be more difficult for him to conduct his business and his normal everyday affairs as a result. However, Porter has the right to select the name by which he is known, within very broad limits. Significantly, Porter already tells others that he is Santa Claus. Allowing him to legally change his name to reflect his practice of doing so is more likely to avoid greater confusion than to create it by making Porter legally responsible for his actions in the name Santa Claus.
1 12 Because the district court did not find any wrongful or fraudulent purpose for seeking the name change, nor any "improper purpose" or "inappropriate intention" on the part of the petitioner, and because the district court concluded that no "legal reason" existed to deny the petition, we conclude that the district court exceeded the permitted seope of discretion afforded it in denying Porter's petition.
113 The order of the district court is reversed. The case is remanded for entry of the necessary order changing petitioner's legal name to Santa Claus forthwith.
1 14 Justice DURHAM and Justice DURRANT concur.. In his brief, Porter also argues that the hearing held August 10, 2000, was not in "open court" as directed by section 42-1-2, and that the trial court failed to "offer evidence or testimony'' supporting the finding that the name change may cause "substantial mischief." Porter is mistaken on both points. The hearing held August 10, 2000, although in chambers, was on the record and satisfies the requirements of the statute that the hearing on the petition be held in open court. Furthermore, although we disagree with the trial court's analysis of the legal import of allowing Porter to change his name to Santa Claus, the burden never falls on the trial court to present evidence on a question before it.