dissenting:
1 15 I dissent from the majority opinion. I would affirm the trial court's ruling denying David Lynn Porter's ("Porter") petition to change his name to "Santa Claus."
116 Sections 42-1-1 and-2 of the Utah Code "provide a codified process to aid an individual's common law right to adopt another name at will." In re Cruchelow, 926 P.2d 833, 834 (Utah 1996). As the majority correctly notes, the statutory procedure benefits the petitioner and society by producing a record of the name change, and consequently, applications for name changes under sections 42-1-1 and-2 should be encouraged and "should generally be granted unless sought for a wrongful or fraudulent purpose." Id.
117 However, although the primary reason for denying a requested name change application is fraud, requesting a court to approve a name change requires additional considerations not mentioned by the majority opinion. As the Ohio Court of Appeals has aptly noted:
A name change application becomes subject to judicial serutiny because the applicant is requesting court approval of the name change. "An inevitable by-product of the statutory process is the result that the judicial imprimatur is placed upon the change of name lending it the aura of propriety and official sanction."
In re Bicknell, Nos.2000-07-140, 2000-07 141, 2001 WL 121147, at *3, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 650, at *7-8 (Ohio Ct.App. Feb. 12, 2001) (quoting In re Linda Ann. A., 126 Misc.2d 43, 480 N.Y.S.2d 996, 997 (App.Div.1984)). Because of these considerations, many courts in other jurisdictions have included a review of public policy considerations when ruling on a statutory name change application.1 See, e.g., In re Applica*523tion of Pirlamarla, 208 N.J.Super. 112, 504 A.2d 1238, 1241 (Law Div.1985) ("Any individual ... should be allowed to adopt a new name 'exeept for fraudulent or criminal purposes, In re Application of Jackson, 177 N.J.Super. 591, 427 A.2d 139, 140 (Law Div. 1981), or unless there is an overriding social policy which militates against the change." (emphasis added)); In re Bicknell, 2001 WL 121147, at *8, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 650, at *7-8 (holding that the meaning of the term "proper" in relation to a statutory name change does not mean only that the change is not requested for fraudulent purposes, but also that the requested name change is consistent with public policy); In re Harris, 707 A.2d 225, 227 (Pa.Super.Ct.1997) ("[The court must act in such a way as to 'comport with good sense, common decency and fairness to all concerned and to the public'" (emphasis added) (quoting Petition of Falcucci, 355 Pa. 588, 50 A.2d 200, 202 (1947))); see also In re Sakaris, 160 Misc.2d 657, 610 N.Y.S.2d 1007, 1011-12 (Civ.Ct.1993) (dismissing requested name change application on the ground that granting the application would "undermine ... considerations of pub-lie policy"); In re Linda Ann. A., 480 N.Y.S.2d at 997 (dismissing the petitioner's requested name change application on "public policy" grounds). Like the above courts, I would hold that in addition to a determination that the requested name change is not sought for a wrongful or fraudulent purpose, sections 42-1-1 and-2 allow for judicial seru-tiny regarding whether the name change is consistent with public policy.
1 18 Under this standard, the trial court's ruling denying Porter's application to change his name to "Santa Clause" or, alternatively, to "Kris Kringle" must be affirmed. Indeed, in In re Name Change of Handley, 107 Ohio Misc.2d 24, 736 N.E.2d 125, 126 (Prob.Ct.2000), a case virtually identical to the case at hand, the trial court denied the petitioner's request to change his name to "Santa Robert Clause." In doing so, the court stated:
[There is an economic value to the name of Santa Claus. The court finds no fraudulent intent of the petitioner to take advantage of the economic value for the use of the name. However, the court finds public policy reasons to deny the petitioner's request, particularly the interference with the rights of others. The petitioner is seeking more than a name change, he is seeking the identity of an individual that this culture has recognized throughout the world, for well over one hundred years. Thus, the public has a propriety interest, a propriety right in the identity of Santa Claus, both in the name and the persona. Santa Claus is really an icon of our culture; he exists in the minds of millions of children as well as adults.
The history of Santa Claus ... is a treasure that society passes on from generation to generation, and the petitioner seeks to take not only the name of Santa Claus, but also to take on the identity of Santa Claus.... [The court believes it would be very misleading to the children in the community, particularly to the children in the area [where] the petitioner lives, to approve the applicant's name change petition.
Id. at 126-27.
1 19 In the instant case, the trial court, in denying Porter's application to change his name to "Santa Claus," noted similar public policy concerns:
Santa Claus is a fictional character that has been portrayed publicly for many, many years. The court takes judicial notice of the fact that to allow the petitioner to adopt the name Santa Claus, even for the legitimate purposes that he suggests, would likely create confusion, misunderstanding and intended or unintended, could allow for substantial mischief.
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Because the name Santa Claus is associated with a mystical and fictional character, but widely known, substantial confu*524sion would likely result and the ability of third persons to make reference to "Santa Claus" may be prohibited should the petitioner be allowed to change his name.
(Emphasis added.)
T 20 Accordingly, as the trial court indicated, and as other courts have held, allowing Porter to take the name of Santa Claus and, by doing so, to take on the identity and persona of Santa Claus-an icon of our culture existing in the minds of millions of children and adults-would certainly be against public policy. Accordingly, I would hold that the trial court acted well within its discretion in denying petitioner's application.
4 21 Chief Justice HOWE concurs in Associate Chief Justice RUSSON's dissenting opinion.. Moreover, courts have also denied petitions for requested name changes, even under a statute providing that the court shall grant such an application unless it finds an intent to defraud or *523mislead, where the name requested is racist, obscene, or likely to provoke violence, see In re Application of Dengler, 287 N.W.2d 637, 639 (Minn.1979), where the requested name change would imply a conferring of a title of nobility or superior rank, see In re Thompson, 82 Misc.2d 460, 369 N.Y.S.2d 278, 279 (Civ.Ct.1975), and where the petitioner seeks to change his or her name to a numeral. See In re Ritchie, 159 Cal.App.3d 1070, 206 Cal.Rptr. 239, 241 (1984).