specially concurring.
II36 I fully concur in the analysis of the motion-to-suppress issue and the ultimate disposition affirming Aleman’s convictions and sentences. With respect to the Blakely issues, however, I would find no error, and therefore no need to engage in any harmless error review. Under Blakely, Aleman’s pri- or conviction, by itself, authorized the aggravated range and permitted the trial court to impose a sentence anywhere up to the prescribed statutory maximum. State v. Estrada, 210 Ariz. 111, 108 P.3d 261 (App.2005); State v. Chiappetta, 210 Ariz. 40, 107 P.3d 366 (App.2005) (Espinosa, J.); see State v. Martinez, 209 Ariz. 280, 100 P.3d 30 (App.2004) (one Blakely-compliant aggravator permits sentencing within expanded statutory range).
¶37 It also bears mention that the dissent’s view that any Blakely error, by its very nature, is structural and, therefore, not subject to harmless error review has been rejected by both divisions of this court. See State v. Henderson, 209 Ariz. 300, 100 P.3d 911 (App.2004); State v. Resendis-Felix, 209 Ariz. 292, 100 P.3d 457 (App.2004). Furthermore, the notion that a sentencing factor admitted by a defendant is subject to independent review pursuant to Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), needlessly elevates form over substance, particularly on the facts here. There is no question or doubt about the status of Aleman’s suspended license, which the jury expressly found in its verdicts on the DUI charges, or his prior DUI conviction. Indeed, Aleman knowingly and with the assistance of counsel stipulated to the former and acknowledged the latter to the court at sentencing and does not contest those facts or raise the theory adopted by the dissent.
¶38 Our supreme court has said: “In cases in which a defendant stipulates, confesses or admits to facts sufficient to establish an aggravating circumstance, we will regard that factor as established.” State v. Ring, 204 Ariz. 534, 563, 65 P.3d 915, 944 (2003); see also State v. Finch, 205 Ariz. 170, 68 P.3d 123 (2003) (defendant’s admission that he had shot victim to prevent his reporting the robbery fully established pecuniary gain motive); State v. Miranda-Cabrera, 209 Ariz. 220, ¶ 30, 99 P.3d 35, 42 (App.2004) (defendant’s trial testimony constituted “facts ‘admitted by the defendant’ ” for purposes of sentence aggravation comporting with Blakely); Wickliff v. State, 816 N.E.2d 1165, 1167 (Ind.Ct.App.2004) (defendant’s statements at sentencing were facts admitted by him and were “exempt from the ApprendHBlakely rule”); cf. State v. Montaño, 206 Ariz. 296, 77 P.3d 1246 (2003) (defendant’s introduction of mitigation evidence relating to prisoner status was admission of in-custody status for sentence aggravation).
¶ 39 Moreover, it is difficult to comprehend how even a routine stipulation or admission by a defendant can provide an element of an offense or the factual basis for a finding of guilt and judgment of conviction, as occurred here and has occurred in countless other cases, yet would be deemed insufficient for sentencing purposes absent an independent Boykin advisory. It was no surprise to Ale-man, nor has it ever surprised any criminal defendant assisted by competent counsel, that such admissions could or would affect their sentences. In short, the dissent’s view has never been the law, and Blakely does not compel such an expansion of the Sixth Amendment.
1140 Finally, even if harmless error analysis were appropriate or required, I agree that any alleged Blakely error here would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.