concurring in part and dissenting in part.
¶ 41 I concur with the decision to affirm Aleman’s convictions. I also join Judge Pe-lander in rejecting the state’s argument that, even when a trial court finds both aggravating and mitigating factors, a single Blakely-compliant or -exempt aggravating factor authorizes the court to find additional aggravating factors by reasonable evidence. I dissent, however, because I believe the trial court erred by considering at least one aggravating factor that was neither exempt from nor compliant with Blakely. Because I agree with Judge Eckerstrom’s special concurrence in State v. Resendis-Felix, 209 *245Ariz. 292, 100 P.3d 457 (App.2004), that any Blakely error is structural and, therefore, not subject to harmless error analysis, I would remand the case for resentencing.
¶ 42 I would find Blakely error because, in determining Aleman was eligible for an aggravated sentence, the court weighed at least one non-Blakely-exempt fact that was neither found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt nor admitted by Aleman under circumstances I believe are implicitly required under Blakely and Apprendi — namely, that Aleman admitted the alleged fact in a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to have it decided by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) (record in criminal trial must show that a guilty plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made).
¶ 43 Apprendi made clear that, other than the fact of a prior conviction, a criminal defendant has the right to have a jury determine beyond a reasonable doubt “any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum.” Id at 490, 120 S.Ct. at 2362-63, 147 L.Ed.2d at 455. “Almost without exception, the requirement of a knowing and intelligent waiver has been applied ... to those rights which the Constitution guarantees to a criminal defendant in order to preserve a fair trial.” Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 237, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2052-53, 36 L.Ed.2d 854, 868 (1973); see also Boykin, and State v. Avila, 127 Ariz. 21, 617 P.2d 1137 (1980) (extending knowing, voluntary and intelligent standard to all cases in which defendant waives right to a jury trial); State v. Conroy, 168 Ariz. 373, 375, 814 P.2d 330, 332 (1991) (“[T]he knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver standard articulated in Boykin applies to all waivers of a jury trial, for that standard applies to the waiver of any constitutional right.”). The rights Blakely and Apprendi protect fall within that protected category, and exist at the core of our criminal justice system. In Blakely, the Supreme Court expressed its “commitment” to insure that the right to a jury trial “is no mere procedural formality, but a fundamental reservation of power in our constitutional structure.” 542 U.S. at -, 124 S.Ct. at 2538-39. I see no reason to carve out an exception to the general rule expressed in Schneckloth.
¶ 44 Therefore, although the majority correctly points out that Aleman, in the face of undisputed evidence presented at trial, conceded at sentencing that “he knew he was impaired and shouldn’t have been driving” at the time of the accident, that statement cannot be considered an admission for the purpose of complying with Blakely. Had Aleman known the consequences of his statement — that the fact he “admitted” would be used against him to aggravate his sentence — and had he understood that he had a right to require the state to prove this fact beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury, he might well have not conceded it at sentencing.