agree, concurring in part and dissenting in part:'
I concur with my colleagues in the majority in reversing the award of damages to Yang and Chai because it was duplicative and not supported by evidence showing that it was related to the claim or calculated to compensate for harm caused. However, I respectfully dissent from my colleagues as to the striking of the pleadings filed by Doman, Foster, and Cochrane. The majority concludes that the court’s decision to strike the above-mentioned pleadings was supported by sufficient evidence under the factors set forth in Young v. Johnny Ribeiro Building, 106 Nev. 88, 787 P.2d 777 (1990). I respectfully disagree.
As to Doman, Foster, and Cochrane, I would hold the following: (1) these parties did not display the requisite degree of willfulness necessary to support the striking of pleadings and ordering *74of sanctions under Young-, (2) Doman suffered from health problems; (3) Doman did not act willfully because he reasonably believed that the IESI bankruptcy stayed discovery; (4) Doman was unable to comply with Dingwall’s discovery requests; (5) the district court failed to properly consider Dornan’s justification for noncompliance; (6) the sanction was too severe in light of the totality of the circumstances, and lesser sanctions would have been adequate to remedy the situation; (7) the district court erred when it assumed prejudice to Dingwall; (8) the district court did not consider the feasibility and fairness of alternative, less severe sanctions; and (9) Doman, Foster, and Cochrane were denied a trial on the merits concerning liability and also were denied a trial on the merits concerning damages. I also question how the sanctioning of these parties is just, fair, and has a deterrent purpose as to other cases in our state.
For these reasons, I must dissent as to the striking of pleadings filed on behalf of Doman, Foster, and Cochrane.