specially concurring.
¶ 34 I agree that the trial court should have granted Appellant’s motion to suppress. But I write separately because even if the events of the initial traffic stop support reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, that information, without more, cannot be retroactively asserted as a basis for a second investigatory detention unrelated to the traffic stop. Accordingly, the second detention of Appellant was impermissible under the Fourth Amendment.
¶ 35 In considering the issues presented, it is helpful to consider the events sequentially. The overall encounter between Officer Craft and Appellant consisted of three distinct phases: (1) the traffic stop (the first investigatory detention), from the time Appellant was pulled over to the time Officer Craft returned his documents and told him to “have a nice day”; (2) the consensual encounter, from the time Officer Craft called Appellant back to ask him additional questions to the time Appellant refused to consent to a search of his vehicle and turned to leave; and (3) the second investigatory detention, from the time Officer Craft grabbed Appellant’s arm through the remainder of the interchange.
A. Initial Traffic Stop
¶ 36 Appellant contests the validity of the traffic stop, asserting that A.R.S. § 28-730 (2008) requires only that a “driver of a motor vehicle ... not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent and [with] due regard for the speed of the vehicles on, the traffic on and the condition of the highway.” He contends there is no specific following distance or “gap time” required by the statute and argues he was not following the vehicle in front of him more closely than was reasonable or prudent under the circumstances at the time of the traffic stop. As such, he asserts the stop was invalid unless Officer Craft had probable cause.
¶ 37 A police officer may make an investigative traffic stop if the officer has a reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation. State v. Starr, 222 Ariz. 65, 68, ¶ 12, 213 P.3d 214, 217 (App.2009). Additionally, peace officers may “stop and detain a person as is reasonably necessary to investigate an actual or suspected violation ... and to serve a copy of the traffic complaint for an alleged civil or crimi*116nal violation of [that] title.” A.R.S. § 28-1594 (2004).
¶ 38 Here, the record indicates that Officer Craft observed Appellant travelling .88 seconds behind the vehicle in front of him while driving at 70 miles per horn’ on an interstate highway shortly after a snowfall. Officer Craft determined this distance to be unsafe under the circumstances and therefore in violation of A.R.S. § 28-730. He testified that in his experience and training, two seconds between vehicles was the minimum safe distance required. Although there was conflicting testimony about whether Appellant’s following distance was indeed reasonable under the circumstances, there was sufficient evidence to support Officer Craft’s contention that he had a reasonable suspicion that Appellant had violated AR.S. § 28-730, thus affording Officer Craft a valid reason for stopping Appellant. Because Officer Craft had a valid reason for stopping Appellant based on reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation, the traffic stop need not be evaluated under a probable cause standard.12
B. Consensual Encounter
¶ 39 Once a police officer returns a driver’s documents and hands him a written citation, the purpose of the traffic stop has concluded. Teagle, 217 Ariz. at 23, ¶ 23, 170 P.3d at 272. At that point, the officer conducting the stop must permit the driver to proceed on his way without any further delay or questions unless the encounter between the driver and the officer becomes consensual or the officer gains reasonable suspicion of illegal activity during the traffic stop, which permits an extension of that stop to investigate those suspicions. See id. at 23, ¶ 22, 170 P.3d at 272; see also United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942, 946 (10th Cir.1997) (citations omitted).
¶ 40 Whether a traffic stop has evolved into a consensual encounter or whether it has merely been extended based on reasonable suspicion is a critical question in evaluating whether subsequent police conduct is justified under the Fourth Amendment. A traffic stop evolves into a consensual encounter once the officer has returned the driver’s license and registration and the driver reasonably believes he is free to leave. Box, 205 Ariz. at 498-99, 73 P.3d at 629-30 (citing United States v. Hernandez, 93 F.3d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1996) (“A traffic stop may become a consensual encounter if the officer returns the license and registration and asks questions without further constraining the driver by an overbearing show of authority.”)); see also United States v. McKneely, 6 F.3d 1447, 1451 (10th Cir.1993). Only at that point may the officer ask the driver additional questions unrelated to the traffic stop. Teagle, 217 Ariz. at 23, ¶ 23, 170 P.3d at 272 (citations omitted). Such questions may include whether the driver is carrying anything illegal and if the police officer may search the driver’s vehicle. Id. (citations omitted). As with any voluntary encounter, the driver is free to leave at any time and the officer may only subsequently detain the driver based upon reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Box, 205 Ariz. at 497, ¶¶ 16, 21, 73 P.3d at 628.
¶ 41 An encounter that is not consensual, but merely constitutes an extension of the traffic stop, triggers a different analysis. A traffic stop may be extended if during the course of a valid stop a police officer determines that reasonable suspicion of criminal activity exists. In that circumstance, the officer may continue to detain the driver to investigate his suspicions provided that the detention is “temporary and lasts no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop [and] ... the investigative methods employed [are] the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer’s suspicion in a short period of time.” Teagle, 217 Ariz. at 23, ¶ 21, 170 P.3d at 272 (quoting Royer, 460 U.S. at 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319). Stated differently, the continued detention is permissible if the length of the detention is de minimis and the scope of the *117investigation reasonably relates to matters affecting the officer’s suspicion.
¶ 42 In this case, the parties agree that the traffic stop ended when Officer Craft returned Appellant’s driver’s license and rental documents to him, and then wished him a good day. At that point Appellant was free to leave unless Officer Craft had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, in which ease Officer Craft could properly extend the traffic stop to investigate those suspicions. Tea-gle, 217 Ariz. at 23, ¶ 22, 170 P.3d at 272.
¶43 The parties disagree, however, as to whether the subsequent questioning by Officer Craft was a consensual encounter. Appellant contends that the subsequent questioning by Officer Craft constituted an impermissible extension of the initial traffic stop. The State counters that Appellant was free to decline the officer’s request that he answer additional questions or otherwise terminate the encounter. The evidence in the record supports the State on this point. After receiving the warning, Appellant turned and walked towards the driver’s side of his car. At Officer Craft’s request, he turned around and walked back to engage in further conversation. Additionally, after Appellant refused to give his consent to a search of his ear, he again turned around and began walking toward his ear until he was restrained by Officer Craft. Thus, the record clearly supports the conclusion that Appellant reasonably believed he was free to leave following the conclusion of the initial stop.13
¶44 The consensual interchange ended, however, as soon as Officer Craft grabbed Appellant’s arm and informed him that he was detaining him. From that point forward, Appellant’s detention constituted an additional seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Teagle, 217 Ariz. at 23, ¶ 25, 170 P.3d at 272.
C. Second Detention
¶ 45 Determination of whether an investigative detention meets constitutional requirements turns first on (1) whether the police officer’s action was justified at its inception and then (2) whether the action was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances for the stop in the first place. Id. at 24, ¶ 27, 170 P.3d at 273 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20, 88 S.Ct. 1868).
¶ 46 The second detention started when Officer Craft grabbed Appellant’s arm and informed him he was being detained. Men-denhall, 446 U.S. at 553, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (A person is “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only when by means of physical force or show of authority his freedom of movement is restrained.). Because Officer Craft and Appellant were engaged in a consensual encounter immediately prior to this point, Appellant was not seized and the Fourth Amendment was not implicated. United States v. Munoz, 590 F.3d 916, 920 (8th Cir.2010) (recognizing that once a completed traffic stop evolves into a consensual encounter, there is no seizure and the Fourth Amendment is not implicated); United States v. Flores, 474 F.3d 1100, 1103 (8th Cir.2007) (same). As such, the initial stop was not extended and this second detention, unrelated to the traffic stop, could only be justified if reasonable suspicion of criminal activity was aroused during the consensual encounter. See id.; see also In re Ilono H., 210 Ariz. 473, 477, ¶ 12, 113 P.3d 696, 700 (App.2005) (citing United States v. Burton, 228 F.3d 524, 528 (4th Cir.2000) (finding that once an interchange evolves into a consensual police-citizen encounter, an officer cannot conduct the exchange as an investigatory stop absent reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is underway)).
¶ 47 A similar' situation was examined in State v. Ballard, 617 N.W.2d 837 (S.D.2000). Ballard was stopped for a traffic violation; during the stop the officer noticed that Ballard was fidgety, her hands were shaking, and she looked “wired.” Id. at 839, ¶¶ 2-4. After issuing a warning citation, the officer *118told Ballard she was “free to leave.” Id. at 839, ¶ 4. He then told her he was suspicious of drugs in her ear and asked for her consent to search it; Ballard refused. Id. Nonetheless, the officer detained her and requested a drug interdiction dog be brought to the scene to sniff the vehicle. Id. at ¶ 5. Approximately five minutes later the dog arrived, sniffed the vehicle, and alerted. Id. at ¶ 6. The vehicle was then searched, drugs were found, and Ballard was arrested. Id. The South Dakota Supreme Court concluded that detaining Ballard after informing her she was free to go was impermissible under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 841, ¶ 15. As relevant here, the court reasoned that “[a]ll the observations [ ] made about [Ballard] occurred before [the officer] told her she was free to go and no new suspicious information arose before he decided to detain her further.” Id. The court further noted that after a police officer signals to a traffic violator that he or she is free to go, “the Fourth Amendment intercedes to limit a further detention or search.” Id. at 842, ¶ 17 (citing $404,905.00 in U.S. Currency, 182 F.3d at 648). The court acknowledged that the case was a “close call” on when detention becomes unreasonable, but held that “[a] refusal to give consent to search after the motorist is free to leave cannot give rise, of itself, to further suspicion and justification for a search; otherwise, the exercise of a Fourth Amendment right would be meaningless.” Id. at 842, ¶ 17.
¶ 48 The 10th Circuit examined a similar situation in United States v. Williams, in which it arrived at a different conclusion. 271 F.3d 1262 (10th Cir.2001). There, Williams was stopped for a traffic violation. Id. at 1264. During the stop, the officer became suspicious that Williams was involved in criminal activity based on a number of observable indicators. Id. at 1265. Nonetheless, after clearing Williams’ driver’s license and registration, he returned the documents to Williams and indicated he was free to go. Id. The officer then asked if he could ask additional questions, to which Williams agreed. Id. Among the questions the officer asked were whether Williams was carrying any contraband or large amounts of cash and if Williams would agree to a search of his ear. Id. After Williams denied having any contraband or cash and refused a search of the vehicle, the officer informed him that he was being detained for a canine sniff of the vehicle. Id. When the dog arrived, it alerted to the trunk of the car where several large bales of marijuana were found. Id. Williams was then arrested. Id. Williams argued, inter alia, that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him in order to conduct a dog sniff. Id. at 1266. The court examined whether there was sufficient evidence of reasonable suspicion aroused during the traffic stop to warrant extending the stop to permit the dog sniff. Id. at 1268-69. Williams did not argue, and the court did not analyze, whether the return of Williams’ documents at the completion of the traffic stop evolved the stop into a consensual encounter or whether the detention for the dog sniff was a second, independent stop which required newly aroused reasonable suspicion. Id. at 1266, 1268-71. Because those two matters are of central importance in this case and were not considered in Williams, it is not persuasive authority here.
¶ 49 On the other hand, I find Arizona v. Johnson instructive on this issue. -U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 781. In that case, the passenger of a car that had been validly stopped for a traffic violation agreed to answer questions about an unrelated matter while the driver’s documents were being cleared. Id. 129 S.Ct. at 784-85. Prior to beginning the questioning, the passenger was subjected to an involuntary pat-down; a gun was found, and the passenger was arrested as a prohibited possessor. Id. at 785. Upon review, the United States Supreme Court held that the pat-down was not a violation of the passenger’s Fourth Amendment rights because it was conducted during a valid stop that had not yet evolved into a consensual encounter; a distinction the Court found to be noteworthy. Id. at 787-88.
¶ 50 In this matter, the State inexplicably contends that despite releasing Appellant at the conclusion of the initial stop, instead of merely extending the initial stop, Officer Craft initiated a second detention for the singular purpose of conducting a dog sniff based solely on information he gleaned dur*119ing the just-coneluded traffic stop. The State provides no explanation, however, as to why Officer Craft did not act or could not have acted on his apparent suspicion when it allegedly first arose. Further, the State cites no authority, nor has my research revealed any, that supports such wholesale retroactive reliance on reasonable suspicion as a basis for a subsequent, unrelated detention.
¶ 51 If Officer Craft had developed reasonable suspicion that Appellant was engaged in criminal activity during the initial traffic stop, he would have acted permissibly in detaining Appellant beyond the scope of the initial stop in order to investigate those suspicions. See supra, ¶ 41. Likewise, initiating a second detention following the consensual encounter would have been proper had reasonable suspicion been aroused during the voluntary exchange. See supra, ¶¶ 39-40. Neither situation occurred here. Instead, all of the facts upon which the State relies to support reasonable suspicion occurred during the initial traffic stop. Yet, Officer Craft did not act on those suspicions at that time; he permitted Appellant to go on his way. He then engaged Appellant in voluntary questioning — a consensual encounter. The only significant event that occurred during that exchange, lasting forty-one seconds,14 was Appellant’s refusal to consent to the requested search and sniff.15 That refusal obviously cannot provide the basis for supporting reasonable suspicion. See also Wood, 106 F.3d at 946; Palenkas, 188 Ariz. at 212, 933 P.2d at 1280; Ballard, 617 N.W.2d at 842, ¶ 17.
¶ 52 If Officer Craft did not have reasonable suspicion sufficient to detain Appellant at the conclusion of the traffic stop, he certainly did not gain any additional insights to arrive at such a conclusion during this extremely brief consensual encounter. If he did have reasonable suspicion, then he was obligated to act on it before telling Appellant he could leave. Johnson, — U.S. at —, 129 S.Ct. at 786 (stating that once reasonable suspicion is aroused, police officers must be positioned to act instantly on that suspicion); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (recognizing the need for police officers to take swift action based upon on-the-spot observations that lead to reasonable suspicion). He failed to do so and assumed the risk that Appellant would not consent to a search of the vehicle. In sum, the second detention of Appellant was impermissible because it was initiated from a consensual encounter in which no event occurred that by itself, or in combination with information obtained during the initial traffic stop, would have caused the arousal of reasonable suspicion justifying a second, independent detention.
¶ 53 Officer Craft testified that he was trained to follow a procedure similar to that in Ballard; specifically, he was trained to issue a warning, release the motorist from the traffic-stop detention, call him back to initiate a consensual encounter, seek consent to sniff or search, and then detain for a sniff and search if consent is declined. This tactic apparently is implemented in an attempt to obtain consent to search the motorist’s vehicle without having to rely on reasonable suspicion or probable cause as a basis for the search. While I question the wisdom of such a practice, see Ballard,16 I am unaware of any current legal impediment to its use. Police officers may engage in certain interrogation practices, including the technique described by Officer Craft. In doing so, however, they run the risk that the individual being investigated will exercise his constitutional right to refuse a search of his vehicle. The officer must then be prepared to justify *120a second detention based on additional factors not originally discovered during the initial traffic stop.
¶ 54 For the reasons explained in this concurrence, I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the evidence seized from Appellant’s vehicle must be suppressed.
. Appellant relies on Whren v. United States to argue that seizure of an individual based solely on observation of a specific violation of the law requires probable cause. 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). However, Appellant’s reliance is misplaced. As stated in Starr, Whren holds only that probable cause is sufficient to support a traffic stop, not that it is necessary. 222 Ariz. at 68, ¶ 12, 213 P.3d at 217.
. If the evidence did not support a finding that the encounter was consensual, then I would address this case as an extension of the traffic stop. Under that scenario, assuming reasonable suspicion had been aroused during the stop, I would find that the length of the continued detention was de minimis. See Teagle, 217 Ariz. at 26, ¶¶ 33-34, 170 P.3d at 275; Box, 205 Ariz. at 498-99, ¶¶ 21-23, 73 P.3d at 629-30.
. The videotape of the encounter shows the initial traffic stop concluding at 9:03:33 and the second detention being initiated at 9:04:14.
. The State does not argue that anything occurred during the consensual encounter which would have aroused further suspicion. At the suppression hearing, Officer Craft testified that Appellant had a "little smirk on his face." Appellant’s alleged reaction, however, occurred after he was grabbed by Officer Craft and ordered to stand in front of the police car.
. The Ballard court expressed concern "with the dubious message we send to law enforcement officers and the public if we validate a procedure allowing officers to falsely tell traffic offenders they are free to go, only for the purpose of eliciting their uncoerced agreement to search their automobiles.” 617 N.W.2d at 842, ¶ 17.