with whom Saitta, J., agrees, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from my colleagues in the majority. As a former public defender, special public defender, and a trial judge, I fear that the majority’s reasoning in affirming the murder conviction of appellant emasculates NRS 48.045. I hope that our trial judges in the State of Nevada will continue to follow the general rule that “proof of a distinct independent offense is inadmissible” during a criminal trial, Nester v. State of Nevada, 75 Nev. 41, 46, 334 P.2d 524, 526 (1959), and only permit the introduction of said prior bad act evidence if the trial court determines that: “(1) the incident is relevant to the crime charged, (2) the act is proven by clear and convincing evidence, and (3) the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Tinch v. State, 113 Nev. 1170, 1176, 946 P.2d 1061, 1064-65 (1997).
In the instant matter, John Vernon Fields was convicted of one count of first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon and one count of conspiracy to commit murder. He now appeals those convictions primarily on the basis of the district court’s admission of evidence of a prior bad act in the form of a prior uncharged conspiracy. Fields argues that such evidence was inadmissible for two reasons. First, Fields contends that the evidence did not fall within the common-plan-or-scheme exception to the general rule excluding bad act evidence because the crime charged was not similar enough to the prior conspiracy. Second, Fields contends that even if the bad act evidence was relevant as proof of a common plan or scheme, such evidence should not have been admitted because its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
I conclude that the district court abused its discretion in admitting this bad act evidence because the prior conspiracy was not similar enough to the crimes charged to be relevant as proof of a common plan or scheme. I also conclude that the probative value of the bad act evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. As such, I conclude that a new trial is warranted because the admission of the bad act evidence was not harmless.
FACTS
Relationship between the Fieldses and Palensky
In April 2002, Jaromir Palensky went to prison for a felony DUI conviction. Prior to going to prison, Palensky contacted Linda Marie Walker Fields (Linda) and gave her power of attorney so she could take care of his affairs while he was in prison. In addition, Linda took out a new life insurance policy on Palensky’s life with Linda as the beneficiary.
More than a year after his conviction, Palensky completed his term of incarceration. Approximately three months before his re*799lease, the Nevada Division of Parole and Probation contacted Linda to organize Palensky’s early release. After meeting with Palensky’s parole officer, Fields and Linda arranged to move Palensky’s trailer onto their property. Palensky then worked and lived on the Fieldses’ ranch until his disappearance in December 2003. The Fieldses alleged that, prior to his disappearance, Palensky made a will that made the Fieldses his heirs.
A month after Palensky’s disappearance, on January 14, 2004, his body was found floating face down in the Jordan River near Salt Lake City, Utah, by the Salt Lake County Sheriff’s Department. Dr. Edward Leis, employed by the Utah State Medical Examiner’s Office, performed an autopsy of Palensky’s body and concluded that Palensky died of a combination of four blows to the back of his head inflicted by a blunt instrument. Dr. Leis testified that he could not be certain how long Palensky was in the water, but he could not deny that the body could have been in the water up to 24 days given the water temperature.
Detective Brent Adamson, a detective with the Salt Lake County Sheriff’s office, was in charge of identifying Palensky’s body and the subsequent investigation into Palensky’s murder. Adamson did not receive any leads regarding Palensky’s death. The only people to contact Adamson were people Palensky knew many years prior when he lived in Carbon County, Utah. In Palensky’s wallet, there was a phone number for the Fieldses, which Adamson called. Fields answered, and told Adamson that Palensky was a former employee who left the ranch a month prior. Fields told Adamson to call Linda for more information. A few days after the phone call, Adamson traveled to Elko and to the Fieldses’ ranch where he spoke to the Fieldses in person. Fields and Linda provided Adamson with all of Palensky’s documents in their possession, including his trailer registration and the business documents between Linda and Palensky. Linda also provided Adamson with an agreement between her and Palensky in which Linda agreed to pay off five debts for Palensky. Fields was present when Linda gave this document to Adamson. Adamson and the Fieldses discussed that on December 19, 2003, Palensky was so intoxicated during work that the Fieldses had to send him to his trailer. Later that evening, lights were on in Palensky’s trailer, but he was not there, and the Fieldses told Adamson that was the last time they saw Palensky. Adamson looked at Palensky’s trailer but did not see anything suspicious. Kevin McKinney, a detective with the Elko County Sheriff’s Department, began investigating Linda after he was contacted by her brother, Mike Walker, and her sister-in-law, Niqua Walker, in September 2006.
Mike and his wife, Niqua, moved onto the Fieldses’ ranch in the summer of 2006. Prior to moving in with Linda, Mike was estranged from his sister for many years. Mike never met Palensky and *800only heard the Fieldses discuss Palensky once — when they were going to Utah to receive money from the life insurance policy taken out by Linda on Palensky’s life. Late one night when Mike got out of bed to go to the bathroom, he overheard a conversation between Fields and Linda wherein Fields said, “[w]hat if they find out we dumped the body.” Linda reacted to Fields’s statement with profanity and told Fields never to talk like that again. Thereafter, Mike and Niqua were evicted from the Fieldses’ property for alleged drug use.
In late July 2006, Linda told Niqua that she caught Palensky molesting her grandson in the shed and that she killed Palensky by hitting him in the head with a pipe. Niqua discussed this admission with Mike, and they decided to alert the police. Fields was not around when Linda allegedly confessed to Niqua that she killed Palensky.
Mike and Niqua contacted McKinney with information that Linda was involved in Palensky’s murder. They told McKinney about Linda’s confession to Niqua, and that Linda stated that she used the insurance money from Palensky’s death to pay his molestation victims. Niqua told McKinney she did not believe Linda because Linda lies a lot. Thereafter, McKinney inquired into the prior police investigation in Salt Lake City. In October 2006, McKinney and the Elko County Sheriff’s Department took over as primary investigators on the Palensky murder, with McKinney as lead investigator. McKinney set up a confrontation between Mike and Linda on November 22, 2006, by putting a body wire on Mike and instructing him to confront the Fieldses about Palensky’s murder. As soon as Mike entered the property, Fields told him to leave, and Mike left.
In November 2006, McKinney spoke to Fields at the sheriff’s office regarding the death of Palensky. Fields told McKinney that he did not know about the death of Palensky but told McKinney that Patricia Grenz, a friend of the Fieldses, now owned the trailer Palensky lived in when he worked on the Fieldses’ ranch. Grenz bought Palensky’s trailer from its original owner after Palensky’s disappearance. Thereafter, the police came to Grenz and took the trailer in which Palensky once lived in order to search it. The Fieldses also sold a red Toyota pickup to Grenz sometime before 2004. Previously, Mike and Niqua told McKinney that this pickup was used by the Fieldses to transport Palensky’s body. McKinney conducted a search of Palensky’s trailer and the red Toyota pickup. In each search, McKinney found no evidence related to Palensky’s death.
After Linda was charged with open murder and convicted by a jury of murder in the first degree in the death of Palensky, Fields was separately charged with open murder and convicted of murder in the first degree with use of a deadly weapon and conspiracy to commit murder.
*801Bad act evidence — Mobert conspiracy
At trial, in an attempt to establish a possible motive linking Fields to Palensky’s murder, the State introduced evidence of a prior uncharged conspiracy involving the Fieldses and Roy Mobert. Mobert and the Fieldses were friends who later developed a business partnership when Mobert assigned power of attorney to Linda. Mobert was elderly and in poor health, and Linda sold his property for him and arranged other affairs with the power of attorney. The business relationship soon soured, and the Fieldses filed a civil suit against Mobert, who filed a counterclaim. Mobert and the Fieldses settled this suit in 2000. Mobert died of natural causes in 2007, when Linda no longer held rights of survivorship or any other potential for pecuniary gain from Mobert.
At a hearing on pretrial motions in the instant case, the State put on Gregory Corn as its first witness. Corn was Mobert’s attorney in the civil suit between Mobert and the Fieldses, wherein the Fieldses claimed that Mobert did not follow through on a promissory note to sell the Silver Dollar to them. However, Corn was not Mobert’s attorney when Linda obtained power of attorney for Mobert. Com testified that the Fieldses used Mobert’s power of attorney “substantially” after Mobert inherited $95,000 from his mother. Corn also wrote a will for Mobert, revoking a prior will where Mobert left his entire estate to the Fieldses. The court ruled that the will could be admitted into evidence.
At the same pretrial hearing, the State called James Pitts, a detective with the Elko County Sheriff’s Department. Pitts worked an investigation involving Fields, Linda, and Billy Wells, a regular police informant, after Wells told the police that the Fieldses had solicited him to murder Mobert. In 2001, Pitts rigged Wells with a microphone and instructed him to meet with Fields and Linda about the possible murder for hire in an attempt to record Fields and Linda soliciting Wells to murder Mobert. Consequently, the State sought to admit the recorded conversations under the motive exception to hearsay because it showed Fields’s involvement in a prior murder solicitation. Fields objected to the admission of the tape on the basis of relevancy and prejudicial value. The court ruled that it would admit the tape at trial with a cautionary instmction.
Before Corn testified at trial, a limiting instmction pursuant to Tavares v. State1 was given regarding the bad act evidence to be given by Corn and Pitts. At trial, Com testified that Linda sold Mobert’s bar in Jarbidge, Nevada, and that she took the proceeds *802from this sale, as well as proceeds from the sale of a house for Mobert, and opened a checking account in her own name. Linda then used this money to buy a vehicle for her daughter and to make improvements on the Silver Dollar. On behalf of Mobert, Corn prepared a counterclaim against the Fieldses, claiming that Linda defrauded Mobert and misused the power of attorney against Mobert. Eventually, the civil suit settled, and Com testified that Fields returned “substantial cash and property” to Mobert.
Also at trial, and after the district court gave the Tavares instruction, Larry Kidd, Jr., a police officer with the City of Elko, testified that Wells told him that Wells had been contracted by the Fieldses to kill Mobert in 2001. Kidd helped Pitts set up Wells’s audio surveillance to record the meeting between Wells and the Fieldses. After the investigation and audio surveillance, no charges were filed against Fields. Kidd testified that the audio surveillance failed to provide substantial evidence and that Wells was “playing both ends against the middle,” meaning that he was telling the police one thing and telling the Fieldses the opposite to evade suspicion from either side. Thereafter, excerpts from the conversation were played.2 Wells was a paid informant for the narcotics task force, but there was no testimony regarding whether Wells was paid for this specific task. By introducing evidence of this uncharged prior conspiracy involving Mobert, the State sought to convey to the jury that with both Palensky and Mobert, the Fieldses, and John Fields in particular, planned to take advantage of elderly people by obtaining a power of attorney, using that power of attorney to get money and assets, and then murdering the elderly men for their estates.
Fields rebutted this testimony by not only pointing out Wells’s propensity for untruthfulness but also the lack of physical evidence in die case. Specifically, Fields pointed out the State’s inability to display a murder weapon or any evidence to suggest he was at the scene of Palensky’s murder, as well as the inefficient investigation by the Elko County Sheriff’s Department. After deliberating for three days, the jury returned a guilty verdict on all counts. The district court sentenced Fields and entered a judgment of conviction. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Admission of bad act evidence
We defer to the district court’s discretion in admitting or excluding evidence of prior bad acts. Braunstein v. State, 118 Nev. 68, 72, 40 P.3d 413, 416 (2002). We will not reverse such determinations absent manifest error. Id.
*803In analyzing the propriety of admitting evidence of prior bad acts, we have instructed trial courts to follow the parameters of NRS 48.045(2). Id. at 75, 40 P.3d at 418. Under NRS 48.045(2), such evidence is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith but may be admissible to show “proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” Before admitting evidence of prior bad acts, the district court must, outside the presence of the jury, determine whether: (1) the evidence is relevant, (2) the prior bad act is proven by clear and convincing evidence, and (3) the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the evidence’s probative value. Meek v. State, 112 Nev. 1288, 1292-93, 930 P.2d 1104, 1107 (1996). Here, although I focus on the relevance of the bad act evidence and whether its probative value is outweighed by unfair prejudice, I would hold that the State failed entirely in proving the bad act Mobert conspiracy by clear and convincing evidence.
Relevance and the danger of unfair prejudice
Prior bad act evidence is admissible pursuant to the common-plan-or-scheme exception of NRS 48.045(2) when both the prior bad act evidence and the crime charged constitute “an ‘integral part of an overarching plan explicitly conceived and executed by the defendant.’ ‘The test is not whether the other offense has certain elements in common with the crime charged, but whether it tends to establish a preconceived plan which resulted in the commission of that crime.’ ” Ledbetter v. State, 122 Nev. 252, 260-61, 129 P.3d 671, 677-78 (2006) (quoting Rosky v. State, 121 Nev. 184, 196, 111 P.3d 690, 698 (2005) (other internal citations and quotations omitted)).
I conclude that the evidence of an uncharged prior bad act admitted here — the Mobert conspiracy — was irrelevant because it was not part of a common plan or scheme when considered with the crimes charged because the State did not show that the two acts were part of an overarching, preconceived plan. As such, I conclude that the district court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of the prior uncharged bad acts alleged as the Mobert conspiracy for the reasons discussed below. There is a significant distinction between Mobert and Palensky. Mobert was in his late seventies, in poor health, and needed to have his affairs taken care of by another person at the time of the alleged conspiracy, whereas Palensky was in his sixties, in good health, and still had the strength to work on a ranch. The State portrayed to the jury that both of these victims were the same — elderly, frail, and helpless — when they were allegedly taken advantage of by the Fieldses. I conclude that this portrayal is inaccurate because the victims were not in the same circumstance *804such that they could be considered similar enough to be part of a preconceived plan, as they were not the same age or in the same condition.
Mobert died in 2007 after there was a civil settlement approved by the court between him and the Fieldses — there was no ongoing dispute over money at the time of his death. Palensky was murdered, and there was no dispute with the Fieldses over money before his death. The circumstances of the alleged conspiracies are not similar, and the prior conspiracy alleged against Fields involving Mobert is irrelevant because the manner and cause of death of each of the victims are wholly different.
Mobert died of natural causes. The State failed to demonstrate that any alleged solicited murder of Mobert was relevant to proving a preconceived, overarching plan that resulted in the murder of Palensky. As such, I conclude that the district court abused its discretion by admitting the bad act evidence under the common-plan-or-scheme exception.
Even if the State had shown that the Mobert conspiracy was relevant to proving a common plan to conspire to murder Palensky, I conclude that the district court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of the Mobert conspiracy because the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, and its admission led to serious jury confusion. Evidence of an alleged solicitation to murder Mobert from a police informant who even the police suggested was ‘ ‘playing both ends against the middle,’ ’ which belies the police’s own trust in the informant, is not relevant and goes solely to a showing of bad character.
Furthermore, NRS 48.035(1) provides for the exclusion of evidence, even if relevant, if the probative value of that evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or of misleading the jury. Here, I conclude that the district court abused its discretion in the admission of evidence of the Mobert conspiracy because it was more prejudicial than probative and it led to serious jury confusion. A significant amount of time at trial was spent playing the excerpts of the conversations between Fields, Linda, and Wells related to the alleged Mobert conspiracy, as well as presenting Corn’s testimony regarding the civil suit between the Fieldses and Mobert. Explaining every aspect of a civil suit within a criminal prosecution is potentially confusing to the jury because the standards and evidence are very different. The alleged conspiracies were not sufficiently similar for the Mobert conspiracy to be admitted under the common-plan-or-scheme exception. Because the Mobert conspiracy is by all accounts a business deal gone wrong, although it was settled out of court, I conclude that the district court erred in allowing evidence of this conspiracy to be admitted in the underlying case because Wells was not a reliable in*805formant, the conspiracy was never charged, and the volume of information and time spent on submitting this conspiracy may have led to jury confusion.
Prior bad act evidence confuses jurors
The majority bases part of its decision to affirm Fields’s conviction on the fact that presentation of the Mobert conspiracy evidence took less than a half day of a two-week trial. As a criminal defense lawyer for almost three decades, I can attest that any mention of prior bad acts in a criminal trial cannot be analyzed by the time it took to present said evidence. Further, the presentation of this type of evidence can feel like a “lifetime” to a defense attorney and his or her client! Less than a half day of this type of evidence is certainly unfair. Limiting instructions are fíne as well as not using prior bad acts to show “propensity.” However, this type of evidence in the instant case could only confuse the jury, and any probative value, which I do not believe exists, is outweighed by its prejudicial effect.
Although I conclude that the district court abused its discretion in admitting this uncharged prior bad act evidence, a new trial is not warranted unless the error was not harmless.
Harmless error
In reviewing nonconstitutional error, we use the standard set forth in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946), which is identical to NRS 178.598. Tavares, 117 Nev. at 732, 30 P.3d at 1132. “The test under Kotteakos is whether the error ‘had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’ ” Id. (quoting Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776). Accordingly, unless it is clear that the defendant “suffered no prejudice as determined by the Kotteakos test, the conviction must be reversed.” Id. (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 741 (1993)).
I conclude that the district court’s improper admission of the bad act evidence regarding the Mobert conspiracy was not harmless for two reasons. First, I conclude that the unfair prejudice Fields suffered from the admission of the bad act evidence substantially outweighed any probative value of such an admission because there is no direct evidence tying Fields to the murder of Palensky and the circumstantial evidence of guilt is less than overwhelming. Second, I conclude that the error in admitting the evidence certainly had a substantial and injurious influence in determining the jury’s verdict because the alleged prior bad act was so serious and potentially confusing to the jury. Consequently, the error was not harmless because the unfair prejudice to Fields that resulted from the district court’s error in admitting the bad act evidence substantially outweighed its probative value. Rather, the admission of the evidence regarding the Mobert conspiracy — evidence of an alleged prior murder solicitation *806by Fields — surely had an impact on the jury’s verdict because even if the jury could not tie Fields to Palensky’s murder, the guilty verdict rendered could have been determined, in part, by the admission of evidence of Fields’s alleged solicitation to kill Mobert.
Stare decisis would cause the evidence of the Mobert conspiracy to be inadmissible
The majority has successfully undermined the long line of cases and jurisprudence that has disallowed the use of prior bad acts by prosecutors. In Phillips v. State, 121 Nev. 591, 119 P.3d 711 (2005), receded from on other grounds as stated in Cortinas v. State, 124 Nev. 1013, 1026 n.52, 195 P.3d 315, 324 n.52 (2008), this court held that the probative value of defendant’s prior convictions was outweighed by their prejudicial effect. Id. at 591, 119 P.3d at 711. In Phillips, admission of prior convictions, which met the burden of beyond a reasonable doubt, not merely clear and convincing evidence, were found to be error albeit harmless. Id. at 601-02, 119 P.3d at 718-19. Justice Rose, in his dissent, not only held the admission of prior bad act testimony to be error, but also that its presentation to the jury was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore should have resulted in a reversal of the conviction. Id. at 603-04, 119 P.3d at 719-20 (Rose, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
In reversing the first-degree murder conviction in Longoria v. State, 99 Nev. 754, 670 P.2d 939 (1983), this court held that the district court committed reversible error by permitting the prosecutor to cross-examine the defendant about his alleged commission of attempted murder in a prior incident. Id. at 756-57, 670 P.2d at 940-41. The rationale of Longoria is applicable in the instant case since, in both cases, the evidence was not overwhelming and the jury may have reached a different conclusion if the error had not occurred. See also Bellon v. State, 121 Nev. 436, 117 P.3d 176 (2005); Walker v. State, 116 Nev. 442, 997 P.2d 803 (2000); Roever v. State, 114 Nev. 867, 963 P.2d 503 (1998); Winiarz v. State, 107 Nev. 812, 820 P.2d 1317 (1991).
CONCLUSION
I conclude that the district court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of the Mobert conspiracy because the evidence was inadmissible prior bad act evidence that did not fall under the common-plan-or-scheme exception, and thus, was irrelevant. I further conclude that the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. I further conclude the prior bad act was not proven by clear and convincing evidence. I conclude that a new trial is warranted because the admission of such evidence was not harmless — the confusing admission *807of the tapes and the amount of time spent on discussing the alleged uncharged conspiracy surely had an impact on the verdict. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of conviction and remand this case to the district court for a new trial with the evidence of the Mobert conspiracy excluded.
117 Nev. 725, 733, 30 P.3d 1128, 1133 (2001) (stating that the trial court, absent a waiver from the defendant, must give a limiting instruction explaining the purposes for which bad act evidence is admitted immediately prior to its admission and a general instruction at the end of trial reminding the jurors that certain evidence may be used only for limited purposes).
The record did not contain the transcript of the tapes or excerpts of conversations that were played for the jury.