*89OPINION OF THE COURT
Read, J.On the evening of April 19, 2007, one man was shot to death and another was wounded (he was shot in the buttocks) in a shooting incident that took place outside an abandoned building on Bainbridge Street in Brooklyn, which had become a hangout for a group of young men. The body of the deceased victim was discovered in the building’s basement, to which he evidently retreated after he was hit. Defendant Dean Pacquette was indicted for second-degree murder (intentional) (Penal Law § 125.25 [1]), second-degree assault (Penal Law § 120.05 [2]), and second-degree weapon possession (two counts) (Penal Law § 265.03 [1] [b]; [3]) in connection with the shooting. He moved to suppress inculpatory statements that he made to the police on the ground that they were obtained in violation of his right to counsel.
At the ensuing Huntley hearing, Detective Alan Killigrew testified that he identified defendant as a suspect because of information he received shortly after the shooting from two eyewitnesses. Then on May 17, 2007, he learned that defendant had been arrested for a drug crime in Manhattan. Detective Richard Amato traveled to Manhattan to “pick up” defendant and bring him to the precinct in Brooklyn for a lineup. Amato found defendant in a holding cell in Manhattan, waiting to be arraigned, and arranged through the New York City Police Department for him to be released temporarily into his custody.
A few hours after Amato arrived at the precinct in Brooklyn with defendant, the police conducted two separate lineups — one for each of the two eyewitnesses. Both eyewitnesses identified defendant. Before these lineups, at about 9:00 p.m., Miranda warnings were issued to defendant, who claimed that he knew nothing about the shooting; after the lineups, Killigrew advised defendant that he was “charged with homicide.” Amato and Detective Erick Parks then escorted defendant back to Manhattan for arraignment for the drug crime. During the ride back, Amato “probably” let defendant know that he had been identified in both lineups.
Upon arrival in Manhattan, Amato spoke to prosecutors to clear defendant’s release on his own recognizance after arraignment so that he could be taken back to Brooklyn. Meanwhile, Parks accompanied defendant to the courtroom. When Amato later joined them, defendant sat between the two detectives in the front row, waiting for his case to be called. At some point *90before defendant’s arraignment, attorney Daniel Scott was assigned to represent him on the drug charge. While Scott, Amato and Parks agree that they met and spoke in the Manhattan courtroom, their accounts of exactly what was said differ in certain respects.
According to Amato, Scott introduced himself as “the attorney for the arraignment on this case,” meaning “[defendant’s] drug case.” Scott did not indicate that he represented defendant in any other case. Amato “took [Scott’s] business card,” which is how Amato later recalled Scott’s name. When Scott asked Amato if he could speak to defendant “in private,” Amato moved two rows back and Parks slid down the row and away from defendant so as to accommodate this request.
After defendant was arraigned and released on his own recognizance, Amato arrested him “for the homicide.” The detectives then took defendant back to where he had been sitting in the courtroom because “the attorney . . . wanted to speak to him.” Amato testified that he overheard Scott tell defendant that he was “not going across the bridge into Brooklyn to represent him,” and that he didn’t
“represent him in the other case. He represents him in the drug case. He’ll have an attorney for his new case in Brooklyn. He also said, I advise you not to speak to the police because I can’t tell you that you cannot speak to the police but I’m advising you not to.”
Amato added that Scott did not at any time tell him that he was representing defendant on the homicide charge; Amato gave Scott his business card at Scott’s request.
Parks testified that he, Amato and defendant were sitting in the front row of the courtroom waiting for defendant to be arraigned when someone he assumed to be a Legal Aid attorney (whose name Parks did not recall) “approached” defendant and “asked if he could have a moment with” him. He and Amato then “moved [their] position” so as to allow the attorney to interview defendant while they still kept an eye on him. Parks also testified that at some point after the arraignment Amato had a “brief’ conversation with the attorney, and that Amato informed him that he had overheard the attorney tell defendant that “he represented] him on the Manhattan case,” and “doesn’t go over the bridge,” and was “not representing him in *91Brooklyn, that he’ll represent him in the Manhattan case.” According to Parks, the attorney never told him that defendant was represented by counsel, and never directed him not to question defendant.
Scott testified that when he was assigned to represent defendant in the drug case, he was notified by the clerk of the night court that two Brooklyn detectives had brought defendant to the courtroom. The clerk asked him to expedite the arraignment “because the detectives had brought [defendant] in.” The clerk also alerted Scott to the “agreement between the detectives and the district attorney’s office [for defendant to] be released into the detectives’ custody.” Scott introduced himself to defendant, who was sitting between the two detectives, and gave him his business card. He “may or may not have given” business cards to the detectives, but, in any event, “it was apparent who [he] was and what [he] was doing there.”
Scott did not interview defendant, because “there was no privacy whatsoever.” He simply read the felony complaint and asked defendant if he understood what he was being charged with; there was “no reason to discuss . . . bail because his ROR had . . . previously been worked out.” Scott, who was not on the 18-B panel in Kings County, testified that he “clearly” recalled warning the detectives that defendant “was represented by counsel and that they should not question him.” Similarly, he advised defendant not to “discuss any legal matter with [the detectives] whatsoever.”1
Scott denied telling defendant or the detectives that he would not cross over the Brooklyn Bridge; he conceded, however, that he never indicated to defendant that he would be or was considering representing him in the homicide case, although he might have commented that he “would be happy to represent him.” In answers to questions posed by the judge, Scott confirmed that he was not defendant’s attorney for the homicide, and never told the detectives otherwise:
*92“the court: I just want to be clear, Mr. Scott, did you tell the detectives from Brooklyn who brought [defendant] over for his arraignment in Manhattan that you were representing [defendant] at any time?
Did you tell them that?
“the witness: Yes, I did. Aside from it being—
“the court: Okay.
“the witness: Yes, I said, he is represented by counsel, do not question him.
“the court: As far as the drug case or the homicide case or both?
“the witness: I didn’t specify.
“the court: You didn’t specify. So you had been engaged to represent him as an 18 B for the drug sale case in Manhattan, correct?
“the witness: Correct.
“the court: You had not been engaged by anybody to represent him in the homicide case, correct?
“the witness: Correct.
“the court: And you did not tell the detectives that you were representing him in the homicide case, correct?
“the witness: Correct.”
On the way back to the precinct in Brooklyn, Amato mentioned to defendant that he
“found it kind of funny that this guy was telling [him] that he wasn’t coming to Brooklyn to represent him. I didn’t think it was right. I said, you know what? I said, I wouldn’t look out for you like that. I said, you know what? If you tell us what happened, you know, maybe we can help you out.”
Amato acknowledged that he was “try[ing to] get [defendant] to say exactly what happened the day of the homicide.” Defendant was noncommittal, remarking that “he would have to think about it.” As Parks put it, defendant “had already been in a lineup so he understood what the purpose of going back to the precinct was. We spoke to him about . . . his attorney, that the *93attorney doesn’t represent him here in Brooklyn. If he’d like to make a statement to Detective Killigrew, that’s his choice.”
Amato and Parks arrived at the precinct with defendant around 1:30 or 2:00 a.m. on May 18, 2007. At about 2:30 a.m., defendant announced to Amato and Killigrew that he wanted to talk about what happened. Amato contacted the assistant district attorney on duty to “make sure that [defendant’s] right to counsel didn’t attach because of the [Manhattan drug] case.” The prosecutor advised Amato that he could speak to defendant “because he [did not] have counsel attached in this case. He [had] counsel attached in the drug case.” Amato related this advice to Killigrew and, after Killigrew reminded defendant that “he was still under the Miranda warnings that we issued earlier,” defendant gave an oral statement, which Killigrew took down.
Defendant admitted to shooting — first with a shotgun, until it jammed, and then with a handgun, until it, too, became inoperable — in the direction of the door at the Bainbridge Street building, causing those standing on the front stoop to scatter or run inside. He claimed that he only meant to scare these hangers-on, one of whom he feared on account of a previous run-in, and had been unaware until the following day that anyone had died. Defendant then repeated substantially the same statement on videotape to an assistant district attorney. At the beginning of the videotaped statement, defendant again waived his Miranda rights; near the end, he answered “no” when asked if he was represented by a lawyer in the homicide case.
In a May 30, 2008 decision and order, the judge denied defendant’s motion to suppress his statements. He reasoned that “[a]ssuming arguendo that Scott told the Detectives not to question Defendant,” that instruction was nugatory because even though “Defendant was represented by counsel on the Manhattan narcotics charges, he was not in custody on those charges, having been released on his own recognizance. Scott did not represent Defendant on the homicide charges, nor did he tell the Detectives that he did.”
Defendant was tried by a jury before another judge. The two eyewitnesses testified. Killigrew read his transcription of defendant’s statement, and the jury viewed the videotape. Scott was the only witness called by the defense. He again testified that he instructed the detectives not to question defendant. In the following series of questions and answers on cross-examination, however, he once more conceded that he did not *94represent defendant on the homicide charge at the time defendant gave his statements:
“Q Did you represent [defendant] on the homicide matter in this county, in Brooklyn?
“A I was not assigned to represent him.
“Q That is a simple question. You stood there in Manhattan Criminal Court. You had a conversation.
“When you did that, did you represent this man on the homicide matter that these detectives had a duty and desire to investigate?
“Yes or no?
“A No.”
The jury acquitted defendant of intentional murder (Penal Law § 125.25 [1]) and convicted him of the weapon charge based upon possession of a loaded firearm outside the home or business (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]).2 The judge subsequently sentenced defendant to 15 years of imprisonment followed by five years of postrelease supervision. Defendant appealed. He argued that his indelible right to counsel had attached because Scott let the detectives know that he was represented by counsel and was not to be questioned, and he challenged his sentence.
In a decision and order dated May 18, 2010, the Appellate Division concluded that comments made by the sentencing court “demonstrated that it improperly considered” the murder count “as a basis for sentencing” (73 AD3d 1088 [2d Dept 2010]), and so vacated the sentence and remitted the matter to Supreme Court for resentencing.3 The Appellate Division otherwise affirmed, deciding that any error in not suppressing defendant’s statements was harmless because “the evidence of the defendant’s guilt . . . was overwhelming, and there [was] no reasonable possibility that the alleged error might have contributed to [his] conviction” (id.). A Judge of this Court granted defendant permission to appeal (15 NY3d 808 [2010]), and we now affirm.
Defendant urges us to send this case back to the hearing court for the judge to decide whether Scott, in fact, told the detectives that defendant “was represented by counsel and that they *95should not question him.” In defendant’s view, if Scott made this assertion and gave this direction, the right to counsel indelibly attached, and the statements subsequently given by defendant in the absence of counsel must be suppressed even though Scott did not, in fact, represent defendant in the murder case at the time (or ever, for that matter); or, put slightly differently, defendant contends that Scott’s neglect to “specify” to the detectives whether he represented defendant in “the drug case or the homicide case or both” created an ambiguity causing the indelible right to counsel to attach. We have never held that an attorney may unilaterally create an attorney-client relationship in a criminal proceeding in this fashion, and decline to do so now.
People v Ramos (40 NY2d 610 [1976]), for example, is not “virtually identical” to the situation here, as defendant contends. Ramos, who was wanted by the police in relation to a shooting in Manhattan, was subsequently arrested in the Bronx on a narcotics charge. At the arraignment in the Bronx on the drug matter, Ramos’s attorney proclaimed in open court, in the presence of a detective from Manhattan who was waiting to take the defendant into custody, that “[flor the record, [he had] advised [Ramos] not to make any statements to these police officers who are taking him into custody” (id. at 612). Ramos was then escorted to Manhattan, where he made an incriminating statement to an assistant district attorney. At the outset of this interrogation, he was equivocal about whether he wanted a lawyer — stating, for example, “What I can tell about this here I can tell you myself just like it happened. It can go against me, I would like a lawyer. I can tell you that myself, I hope it don’t go against me, I am trying to get out of this jam” — before finally saying to the assistant district attorney “Go ahead, ask me some questions” (id. at 613).4
We held that the statement taken by the assistant district attorney should be suppressed because “the defendant was represented by counsel at the time of his interrogation” (id. at 618) by virtue of “the attorney’s affirmative and direct action” — i.e.,
*96his statements on the defendant’s behalf in front of the judge in open court — “relative to the interrogation which was about to be commenced in connection with” the shooting (id. at 617). Further, we noted that Ramos’s “specific although perhaps confused request: Tt can go against me, I would like a lawyer’, [gave] testimony to his need and desire for legal advice from a lawyer representing his interests” (id. at 618 [emphasis added]).
Here, by contrast, Scott made no statements during the arraignment on the drug crime even arguably related to the homicide. If he had said in open court that defendant “was represented by counsel and that [the police] should not question him,” the prosecutor (or the judge) would have had the occasion and the opportunity to ask him flat out whether he was defendant’s lawyer in the murder case, as the judge and the prosecutor later did at the Huntley hearing and the trial, respectively. Moreover, there is no ambiguity here, as there was in Ramos, about whether defendant may have intended to invoke his right to counsel before making the inculpatory statements.
Indeed, in People v Marrero (51 NY2d 56, 59 [1980]), the other case principally relied upon by defendant, we equated the defendant’s conduct to “a verbal request for counsel.” Marrero, believing that he was being sought in a homicide investigation, asked a lawyer to contact the police and arrange for his surrender. As a result, the police took Marrero into custody in the attorney’s office with the lawyer present. There was no doubt that the lawyer represented the defendant at that juncture of the homicide investigation. Later at the police station, Marrero made incriminating statements.
We held that the statements should be suppressed, observing that “[b]y consulting a lawyer to contact the police, and then surrendering in the attorney’s office with counsel present, the defendant had manifested his own view that he [was] not competent to deal with the authorities without legal advice” (id. at 59 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). Further, we observed that the police did not know about the limited nature of the attorney’s representation. Rather, “[a]ll they knew was that the defendant had sought the assistance of counsel in connection with the charge they were investigating” (id. [emphasis added]; see also People v West, 81 NY2d 370, 380 [1993] [citing Marrero for the proposition that “(a)bsent some indication that the representation had ceased, the police could not question defendant concerning the very matter as to which *97they knew he had a lawyer” (emphasis added)]). Here, however, nothing about defendant’s conduct suggests that he meant to invoke his right to counsel before he made the statements, and, also unlike the situation in Marrero, Scott had not already conspicuously represented defendant in an aspect of the homicide matter, causing the indelible right to attach.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.
. Although defendant insists that Scott made these remarks post-arraignment, his hearing testimony is, at best, ambiguous on the matter of timing. As relevant to this point, Scott testified that all his conversation with defendant took place within earshot of the two detectives, and lasted from 5 to 10 minutes “[t]otal,” since “[i]t was just a question of informing [defendant] of the charges, never mind the bail, and advising him not to speak” (emphasis added). He also testified that “in the past” in similar situations he had “asked the judge while we were all in the well of the courtroom” — i.e., during arraignment — “to advise or reinforce the warning or advisement not to question [his] client.”
. The judge did not submit the assault and other weapon possession count to the jury.
. On July 21, 2010, Supreme Court resentenced defendant to the same sentence originally imposed.
. When Ramos agreed to talk to the assistant district attorney, he was well aware that he had earlier made incriminating statements to three Bronx police officers who questioned him about the shooting while he was awaiting arraignment on the drug charge: he told the assistant district attorney “I already talked to detectives, if they got that record already it don’t make no difference” whether he again implicated himself in the shooting (40 NY2d at 613). The admissibility of these statements was not raised on the appeal (id. at 612 n 2).