Because I believe public policy does not prohibit the arbitration of the “no-layoff’ clause in the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) governing the relationship of the parties in this case, and because the majority opinion departs from this Court’s commitment to the furtherance of arbitration as a preferred means of resolving public sector labor disputes, I respectfully dissent.
*39Under the Taylor Law, public sector parties are empowered to arbitrate labor relations disputes arising from a CBA (see Civil Service Law § 204; see also Matter of Board of Educ. of Water-town City School Dist. [Watertown Educ. Assn.], 93 NY2d 132, 137 [1999] [Watertown]). The law embodies the Legislature’s explicit policy of encouraging arbitration “as a means of promoting harmonious relations between governmental employers and their employees, and preventing labor strife endangering uninterrupted governmental operations” (Matter of New York City Tr. Auth. v Transport Workers Union of Am.., Local 100, AFL-CIO, 99 NY2d 1, 7 [2002] [Transport Workers]). Still, not all disputes are arbitrable (see Watertown, 93 NY2d at 137-139). Under a two-prong test, courts must:
“first ask whether there is any statutory, constitutional or public policy prohibition against arbitration of the grievance. This is the ‘may-they - arbitrate’ prong. If there is no prohibition against arbitrating, we then examine the CBA to determine if the parties have agreed to arbitrate the dispute at issue. This is the ‘did-they-agree-to arbitrate prong’ ” (Matter of City of Johnstown [Johnstown Police Benevolent Assn.], 99 NY2d 273, 278 [2002] [citations omitted]).
“[J]udicial intervention on public policy grounds,” however, “constitutes a narrow exception to the otherwise broad power of parties to agree to arbitrate” (Transport Workers, 99 NY2d at 6-7) and restraint is especially appropriate in the context of public employment (see id. at 7).
In Matter of Board of Educ. of Yonkers City School Dist. v Yonkers Fedn. of Teachers (40 NY2d 268 [1976]), we held that “[a] provision in a [CBA] guaranteeing public employees job security for a reasonable period of time is not prohibited by any statute or controlling decisional law and is not contrary to public policy” (id. at 271). We stated that “[a] job security provision insures that, at least for the duration of the agreement, the employee need not fear being put out of a job” (id. at 275). We recognized that, indeed, the “absence of [such] fear may be critical to the maintenance and efficiency of public employment, just as the fear of inability to meet its debts may destroy the credit of the municipality” (id.). In deciding Yonkers Fedn. of Teachers and two related opinions issued with it, Matter of Burke v Bowen (40 NY2d 264 [1976]) and Yonkers School Crossing Guard Union of Westchester Ch., CSEA v City of Yonkers (39 *40NY2d 964 [1976] [Crossing Guard Union]), we established the principle that an arbitrable job security clause is one that is explicit, unambiguous and comprehensive.
Here, the no-layoff clause in the parties’ CBA states in explicit terms that the “Village shall not lay-off any member of the bargaining unit during the term of this contract.” Though the majority finds otherwise (see majority op at 38), a plain reading of that provision indicates that the Union negotiated to ensure that its constituents need not fear being put out of their firefighting jobs during the life of the CBA. At a time when the term “layoff’ pervades the public dialogue, typically signifying the kind of large scale public and private workforce reductions that have characterized recent economic crises, it is reasonable to conclude that the parties employed that term to succinctly but thoroughly address the threat of job insecurity. Regardless, then, of whether “layoff,” pertained to a temporary period of unemployment or a permanent job cut—an issue of interpretation, which should be decided by an arbitrator—the no-layoff clause at issue here should be deemed an explicit, unambiguous and comprehensive job security provision.
Furthermore, the provision extended for a reasonable time— approximately three years—and “was not negotiated in a period of a legislatively declared financial emergency between parties of unequal bargaining power” (Matter of Burke, 40 NY2d at 267). Despite the majority’s suggestion to the contrary (see majority op at 38), a job security clause need not specifically reference protection against reductions due to fiscal strain to be enforceable (see Matter of Burke, 40 NY2d at 267). Thus, permitting the parties in this case to submit their dispute to arbitration would not violate public policy.
Even assuming, arguendo, that the provision at issue is not explicit, unambiguous and comprehensive, as we required over 30 years ago in Crossing Guard Union (see 39 NY2d at 965), this Court’s commitment, through a “policy of noninterference,” to “further[ing] . . . the laudable purposes served by permitting consenting parties to submit controversies to arbitration” (Matter of Sprinzen [Nomberg], 46 NY2d 623, 629 [1979]) may warrant a more flexible approach. We have previously recognized that public policy determinations do not lend themselves to the kind of bright-line rule to which the majority adheres. As we said in Matter of Sprinzen-.
“[Controversies involving questions of public policy *41can rarely, if ever, be resolved by the blind application of sedentary legal principles. The very nature of the concept of public policy itself militates against any attempt to define its ingredients in a manner which would allow one to become complacent in the thought that those precepts which society so steadfastly embraces today will continue to serve as the foundation upon which society will function tomorrow. Public policy, like society, is continually evolving and those entrusted with its implementation must respond to its everchanging demands” (id. at 628).
Those demands require us now to assess the reasonableness of a bargained-for job security provision not in a vacuum but with an eye toward the social and economic realities in which the parties who are subject to the CBA live and operate. To be sure, municipalities, just like individuals, are straining under budgetary shortfalls to do more with less. But “[a] job security clause is useless if the public employer is free to disregard it when it is first needed” (Yonkers Fedn. of Teachers, 40 NY2d at 275). That a seemingly straightforward provision like the one at issue here can be so rendered threatens to undermine confidence in the collective bargaining process. This result, I believe, is contrary to the spirit and purpose of the Taylor Law (see Civil Service Law § 200) and, therefore, violates public policy.
Having determined that there is no prohibition against arbitration of the no-layoff clause, I turn to the second question of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the instant dispute. The plain language of the CBA provides that either party may take a dispute “involving the interpretation or application of any provisions of [the CBA]” to arbitration before the Public Employment Relations Board. As the Union’s grievance involves the interpretation and application of the no-layoff clause in the CBA, the Appellate Division correctly concluded that the parties reserved such matters for an arbitrator (see 72 AD3d 1235, 1238 [2010]). Thus, I would affirm the order of the Appellate Division.
Judges Graffeo, Read and Smith concur with Judge Pigott; Judge Ciparick dissents and votes to affirm in a separate opinion in which Chief Judge Lippman and Judge Jones concur.
Order reversed, etc.