Wallace v. State

BARNES, Judge,

concurring.

I concur in this case, albeit reluctantly because of the wording of the voyeurism statute and the application we are obliged to make here. Make no mistake, Wallace’s alleged conduct was hardly chivalrous, and he defines the word cad. Ultimately, I think he could properly be found guilty of Class D felony voyeurism if the facts alleged here are proven true. However, the voyeurism statute was drawn primarily to punish persons who peep into bathrooms, locker rooms, dressing rooms, and the like.

If the allegations here are true, there is no doubt that A.J. was filmed without her knowledge. It is also true she consensually engaged in sex with Wallace and knew *534what she was doing. She necessarily consented to Wallace seeing her naked. She made a barter choice, and I do not think she is a typical “victim” envisaged by this statute. As the majority acknowledges, it seems Wallace did not peep upon A.J. or commit Class B misdemeanor voyeurism when he saw A.J. naked while having consensual sex. Wallace was charged with the greater Class D felony voyeurism offense, and normally if one does not commit a lesser included offense, he or she cannot be convicted of the greater offense. See Simmons v. State, 793 N.E.2d 321, 325 (Ind.Ct.App.2003).

The camera that Wallace set up, however, did peep. Although a camera by itself cannot commit a crime, the recording it made permitted Wallace to repeatedly view A.J. naked and engaging in sex with him. A.J. did not consent to being seen naked repeatedly by Wallace. She also certainly did not consent to her private act of sexual intercourse with Wallace being shown to her boyfriend, or to whomever Wallace might choose to show it. The alleged facts here are that A.J. was filmed without her knowledge and/or consent, and so I believe there was a “peeping” within the meaning of the voyeurism statute because it was a “looking of a clandestine, surreptitious, prying, or secretive nature.” Ind.Code § 35-45-4-5(a)(2). Thus, I vote to affirm the trial court’s denial of Wallace’s motion to dismiss.