dissenting.
Respectfully, I write separately because I do not understand the majority opinion to have addressed the issues raised by Appellant.
Appellant argues that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of extraneous offenses because Appellant did not place identity in issue beyond the degree to which the State placed identity in issue. The majority addresses Appellant’s point by reiterating the questions Appellant asked regarding witnesses’ ability to view the actor and questions regarding the photo lineup. Appellant, however, does not argue that he did not mention those matters. Appellant argues that he did not go beyond the questions raised by the State on direct examination. That is, Appellant argues that the State cannot raise the issue of identity in order to make extraneous offenses admissible to prove identity, and a defendant who only repeats the questions raised by the State does not open the door to make admissible evidence of extraneous offenses.
The majority does not explain the extent to which the State raised the issue of identity, nor does the majority explain how Appellant went beyond the State’s questioning the bases of witnesses’ identification in order to open the door to extraneous offenses. The majority also does not explain, except for a mention in a footnote, how the extraneous offense evidence resolved any questions of identity.
As the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has discussed,
The general rule is that the defendant is to be tried only for the offense charged, not for any other crimes or for being a criminal generally. However, evidence of extraneous acts of misconduct may be admissible if (1) the uncharged act is relevant to a material issue in the case, and (2) the probative value of that evidence is not significantly outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Because the propensity to commit crimes is not a material fact in a criminal case, Rule 404(b) explicitly prohibits the admission of uncharged acts to prove conduct in conformity with a bad character.
One of the main rationales for admitting extraneous-offense evidence is to prove the identity of the offender. Here, the theory of relevancy is usually that of modus operandi in which the pattern and characteristics of the charged crime and the uncharged misconduct are so distinctively similar that they constitute a “signature.” Usually, it is the accretion of small, sometimes individually insignificant, details that marks each crime as the handiwork or modus operandi of a single individual. No rigid rules dictate what constitutes *155sufficient similarities; rather, the common characteristics may be proximity in time and place, mode of commission of the crimes, the person’s dress, or any other elements which mark both crimes as having been committed by the same person. But if the similarities are “generic,” ie., typical to this type of crime, they will not constitute a “signature” crime. Sometimes, however, the “signature” is one unique characteristic. For example, suppose that three bank robberies are committed over a four-year period in different cities in which the robber used an antique silver crossbow. This scenario is so unusual that it is highly likely that each robbery was committed by the same person using the same antique silver crossbow. This is “the mark of Zorro” mode of proving identity; it is a remarkably unusual fact, in which a single detail suffices to establish identity.1
The burden of showing admissibility rests upon the proponent of the evidence of extraneous offenses.2 As the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has explained,
In Jones, we concluded that, even though the state had the burden of proving guilty intent and identity, the state could not permissibly use extraneous offenses as circumstantial evidence on these issues where the state had uncon-troverted direct evidence on the issue of identity and guilty intent could be inferred from the act itself. In that type of situation, the prejudicial effect of the evidence far outweighs its relevance to any issue in the case; and the evidence of the extraneous offense serves only to establish the accused’s bad character.3
Here, Appellant argues that the State delved into the witnesses’ ability to observe the actor and the degree to which their testimony regarding identification had been influenced. This is what a good lawyer does. If the defense did nothing but repeat what the State had already proved, how did Appellant challenge the witnesses’ identification and thereby open the door for proof of extraneous offenses? I do not understand how the majority opinion explains the answer to this question. If Appellant did so challenge and undermine the validity of the witnesses’ identification, how did the State as proponent of the evidence of the extraneous offenses satisfy its burden to show admissibility?
True, the majority mentions in a footnote that the offenses at trial and the extraneous offenses were all committed by a black man.4 They were committed in convenience stores during early morning hours of “dates near the date of the offense at issue here.”5 So far, it is difficult to perceive how the majority construes this evidence as a signature motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. The majority mentions a towel on Appellant’s head6 and on the man’s head in the extraneous offenses but does not provide any discussion.7 Additionally, Appellant carried a crowbar. The majority mentions *156in the footnote that the man or men in the extraneous offenses carried a weapon.8 In one offense, the perpetrator carried a knife, in one, he carried a steel pipe, and in one, he carried a crowbar.
“Faced with an objection, the proponent of such evidence must satisfy the trial court that the extraneous act has relevance apart from its tendency to prove character conformity.”9 Except for the aside in the footnote, I do not understand how the majority opinion addresses whether the State satisfied this obligation.
For these reasons, I cannot join the majority opinion.
. Segundo v. State, 270 S.W.3d 79, 87-88 (Tex.Crim.App.2008) (footnotes omitted), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 53, 175 L.Ed.2d 43 (2009).
. Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 387 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (op. on reh'g).
. Albrecht v. State, 486 S.W.2d 97, 101 (Tex.Crim.App.1972).
. Majority op. at 151 n. 3.
. Id.
. Id.
. Id.
. Id.
. Feldman v. State, 71 S.W.3d 738, 754 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (citing Santellan v. State, 939 S.W.2d 155, 168 (Tex.Crim.App.1997), and McFarland v. State, 845 S.W.2d 824, 837-38 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 963, 113 S.Ct. 2937, 124 L.Ed.2d 686 (1993), overruled on other grounds by Bingham v. State, 915 S.W.2d 9 (Tex.Crim.App.1994)).