concurring.
Although the majority is correct that we should avoid addressing constitutional issues when unnecessary, I write separately because I think we should reach the constitutional issue presented here.
The doctrine under which we avoid unnecessary Constitutional issues is most applicable when the constitutional issue is moot, or when there are two independent grounds on which we can resolve the case, one of which does not require constitutional analysis. This is illustrated by the cases cited by the majority. See Maj. Op. at 240 n. 7, 13 A.3d at 1232-33 n.7 (citing In re Julianna B., 407 Md. 657, 667, 967 A.2d 776 (2009) (constitutional issue was moot)); Montrose Christian *278Sch. Corp. v. Walsh, 363 Md. 565, 578, 770 A.2d 111, 119 (2001) (analyzing court’s order to seal courtroom under common law principle of openness); Baltimore Sun v. Baltimore, 359 Md. 653, 659, 755 A.2d 1130, 1133-1134 (2000) (case determined on issues of conflict of laws and on “charitable immunity”). Unlike those cases, this appeal raises the threshold question of which of the levels of scrutiny is required for this claimed violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
The level of scrutiny demanded by the Constitution depends upon whether the action at issue was an individualized government action, or a neutral action of general applicability, as explained in Employment Division, Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990). This is not a separate issue which may be avoided, but a threshold question. See Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275, 292 (5th Cir.2001) (“the opt-out policy enacted by Forney is neutral and of general application[, thus] [a]s a threshold matter ... the [policy] survives constitutional scrutiny under Smith.”); First Assembly of God v. Collier County, 20 F.3d 419, 423 (11th Cir.1994) (“the threshold questions in analyzing a law challenged under the Free Exercise Clause are (1) is the law neutral, and (2) is the law of general applicability?”); Hyman v. City of Louisville, 132 F.Supp.2d 528, 537 (W.D.Ky.2001) (Smith requires a court to determine as a threshold matter whether the challenged regulation is “a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability^]’ ”) vacated on other grounds by Hyman v. City of Louisville, 53 Fed.Appx. 740 (6th Cir.2002). The majority’s conclusion that the refusal to postpone the trial was an abuse of discretion does not reheve of us of our obligation to identify which is the appropriate constitutional standard. Cf. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631-32, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 1627, 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996) (in analyzing law targeted at homosexuals, the Court first identified “rational basis” as the correct level of scrutiny, and then held that the law “fails, indeed defies, even this conventional inquiry.”) An action is only entitled to the more deferential “abuse of discretion” standard of review, and re*279lieved from higher constitutional scrutiny, if it qualifies as a neutral, generally applicable action under the threshold test.
Turning to this question, I agree that the trial court’s refusal to postpone was neutral and of “general applicability,” and not an individualized action that demands the higher scrutiny of Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963). On this point, I am persuaded by Judge Harrell’s detailed analysis of the nature of the trial court’s action, in light of Sherbert and Smith.
I would therefore hold that the correct level of scrutiny is Smith’s lower level of scrutiny, which means that we apply our usual standard of review when considering trial court discretionary decisions, i.e., whether the trial court abused its discretion. On this point, the majority opinion convincingly explains why the trial court’s action should fail. I join the majority’s analysis regarding why it was an abuse of discretion.
Because I believe this discussion resolves the question, I would decline to wade into the thorny issue of whether the court’s action imposes a “substantial burden” as Judge Harrell does. This is partly because I consider some of Judge Harrell’s reasoning regarding “substantial burden” to be inapposite. Judge Harrell faults Neustadter for faffing to raise the issue regarding his religion earlier:
Had the judge’s denial of his motion to postpone placed such a burden on Petitioner’s Free Exercise rights (or Petitioner perceived truly such a burden), Petitioner, I suspect, would have informed the trial court at some point during the period between 24 January 2008 — when the final trial dates were scheduled — and 6 May 2008 — the date on which Petitioner first and ultimately informed the trial court of the Shavuot conflict, less than a month before commencement of trial.
Although I agree that a party’s failure to raise such an objection timely is important, and often dispositive, that delay invokes an issue of “waiver,” not “substantial burden.” Clearly, whether or not a state action imposes a “substantial *280burden” on a party is an independent question from how adequately that party enforces his rights.1
Furthermore, I would not address the intriguing issue Judge Harrell raises of whether the Free Exercise clause is “applicable with equal force to the judicial branch.”
. A party's failure to make a timely assertion of the claimed infringement on his religious beliefs may reflect on his sincerity, and in that sense diminish the infringement. But the level of sincerity was resolved favorably to Neustadter by the trial court, and I see no reason to disturb that factual finding.