I fully agree with Justice Moreno’s dissenting opinion, which I have signed. I write separately to emphasize both its conclusion and my disagreement with the majority.
By enacting the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.)1 in general, and section 12940 in particular, the elected branch of our state government has attempted to respond to one of our society’s social ills: discrimination, harassment and retaliation in the workplace on the basis of “race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability, medical condition, marital status, sex, age, or sexual orientation.” (§ 12940, subd. (a).) Our role as a court is to construe the statutes thus enacted, giving the statutory language its plain and commonsense meaning so as to effectuate and implement the intent of the Legislature.
We have strayed far from this duty today. In analyzing the FEHA, the majority finely parses the statutory language and engages in intricate deductions of legislative intent. In so doing, the majority has lost sight of both our proper role and the basic meaning of the FEHA.
Section 12940, subdivision (h) provides that it shall be an unlawful employment practice “[f]or any . . . person to discharge, expel, or otherwise discriminate against any person because the person has opposed any practices forbidden [by the FEHA] or because the person has filed a complaint, testified, or assisted in any proceeding under [the FEHA].” (Italics added.) The language seems clear enough, as the jury found below. The Court of Appeal agreed, as has every court before today to have considered the question. If, as here, a person (such as defendant Jean Weiss) retaliates against another (such as plaintiff Scott Jones) because he has filed a complaint about harassment in the workplace, the person who engages in *1175retaliation commits an unlawful employment practice and is subject to the legal remedies set forth in the FEHA. In this simple way, our Legislature has chosen to make costly the discrimination against and harassment of employees on the basis of race and gender and the other enumerated statutory grounds, evidently concluding that the high cost visited on such unlawful behavior will dissuade people from engaging in it and employers from tolerating it.
The majority undertakes a series of analytical contortions to reach its conclusion that the phrase “any . . . person” in section 12940, subdivision (h) does not render liable a supervisor who retaliates against an employee if the employee exercises his or her right to complain of unlawful workplace harassment. Not only do I agree with Justice Moreno’s refutation of the majority’s tortured reasoning, I also find the majority undermines the entire purpose of the FEHA. Whether personal liability in these circumstances is more or less efficacious in reducing or eliminating workplace discrimination is not for this court to say. To conclude that the FEHA plainly authorizes such personal liability is enough.
To the extent the majority holds otherwise, it is incorrect. To the extent it relies on its view of policy (see, e.g., maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1167-1168), the majority departs from our role as a court. Accordingly, I join my dissenting colleagues in commending the Legislature’s attention to this area of the law.
All statutory references are to the Government Code.