I agree with the majority that the judgment of the Court of Appeal must be reversed. The Court of Appeal erroneously held that “in unlawful detainer proceedings properly commenced under the Ellis Act, a tenant may not raise an affirmative defense of retaliatory eviction.” The Ellis Act (Gov. Code, § 7060 et seq.) expressly provides that it does not supersede Civil Code section 1942.5, which offers tenants protection against retaliatory eviction. The Ellis Act underscores this point by further stating that it is not intended to “[ojverride procedural protections designed to prevent abuse of the right to evict tenants.” (Gov. Code, § 7060.7, subd. (c).) It is clear, as the majority recognizes, that a tenant may raise the defense of retaliatory eviction in unlawful detainer proceedings brought under the Ellis Act.
I disagree, however, with the majority’s holding that, on remand, the trial court should reconsider the landlord’s motion for summary adjudication under the standard that “a landlord’s bona fide intent to withdraw the property from the rental market under the Ellis Act will defeat the statutory defense of retaliatory eviction.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 588.) As I will explain, I find nothing in the language of the Ellis Act or the statutes governing the defense of retaliatory eviction that permits a landlord to evict tenants under the Ellis Act for a retaliatory purpose.
The Ellis Act was intended to supersede our decision in Nash v. City of Santa Monica (1984) 37 Cal.3d 97 [207 Cal.Rptr. 285, 688 P.2d 894], which upheld a city charter provision that prohibited removal of rental units from the housing market absent a permit from the city rent control board. (First Presbyterian Church v. City of Berkeley (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1249 [69 Cal.Rptr.2d 710].) The Ellis Act begins by stating: “No public entity . . . shall . . . compel the owner of any residential real property to offer, or to continue to offer, accommodations in the property for rent or lease.” (Gov. Code, § 7060, subd. (a).)
*603The Legislature thus prohibited municipalities from preventing a landlord from removing an entire residential building from the rental market, but the Legislature took considerable pains to limit the reach of the Ellis Act. As particularly relevant here, Government Code section 7060.1, subdivision (d), provides that nothing in the Ellis Act supersedes numerous provisions of several codes, including “Title 5 (commencing with Section 1925) of Part 4 of Division 3 of the Civil Code.” Title 5 includes Civil Code section 1942.5 (hereafter section 1942.5), which protects tenants against retaliatory evictions.
Underscoring the limitations placed on the scope of the Ellis Act, Government Code section 7060.7 states: “It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this chapter to supersede any holding or portion of any holding in Nash v. City of Santa Monica, 37 Cal.3d 97 [207 Cal.Rptr. 285, 688 P.2d 894] to the extent that the holding, or portion of the holding, conflicts with this chapter, so as to permit landlords to go out of business. However, this act is not otherwise intended to do any of the following: [][]... [][] (c) Override procedural protections designed to prevent abuse of the right to evict tenants.”
The majority reasons that Government Code section 7060.7, subdivision (c), does not apply because it refers to “ ‘procedural’ ” protections designed to prevent abuse of the right to evict tenants, and the prohibition against retaliatory eviction is “ ‘substantive.’ ” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 599, fn. 5, italics omitted.) In support of this contention, the majority quotes Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley (1976) 17 Cal.3d 129, 149 [130 Cal.Rptr. 465, 550 P.2d 1001], for the proposition that the defense of retaliatory eviction is “a limitation upon the landlord’s property rights under the police power, giving rise to a substantive ground of defense in unlawful detainer proceedings.” (Italics added.) But the quoted portion of Birkenfeld does not refer to the defense of retaliatory eviction, or to section 1942.5, but to the Berkeley rent control law that required landlords to obtain a certificate of eviction from the city to recover possession of a rent-controlled unit. This is clear when the partial quotation relied upon by the majority is considered in context: “The purpose of the unlawful detainer statutes is procedural. The statutes implement the landlord’s property rights by permitting him to recover possession once the consensual basis for the tenant’s occupancy is at an end. In contrast the charter amendment’s elimination of particular grounds for eviction is a limitation upon the landlord’s property rights under the police power, giving rise to a substantive ground of defense in unlawful detainer proceedings.” (Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p.149, italics added.)
The majority also cites the decision in Aweeka v. Bonds (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 278, 281 [97 Cal.Rptr. 650], which, without any analysis or explanation, describes the common law doctrine of retaliatory eviction established in Schweiger v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 507 [90 Cal.Rptr. 729, *604476 P.2d 97] as a “substantive defense.” The majority further cites three Court of Appeal decisions that quote this language in Aweeka without discussion. From this, the majority infers that “the Legislature relied on contemporaneous judicial classification of the defense as substantive in deciding to preserve only procedural protections in section 7060.7, subdivision (c).” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 599, fn. 5.) I disagree. The fact that some courts have described in passing the common law doctrine of retaliatory eviction as “substantive” does not support the majority’s conclusion that the Legislature considered the protections set forth in section 1942.5 to be “substantive” rather than “procedural.” Subdivision (a) of section 1942.5, for example, provides that a landlord may not retaliate against a tenant by recovering possession of a dwelling in any action or proceeding within 180 days of certain actions by the tenant. This certainly appears to be one of the “procedural protections designed to prevent abuse of the right to evict tenants” to which Government Code section 7060.7, subdivision (c), refers. In my view, the statement in Government Code section 7060.7, subdivision (c), that the Ellis Act was not intended to “[o]verride procedural protections designed to prevent abuse of the right to evict tenants” means that the protections against retaliatory eviction afforded by section 1942.5 apply to landlords proceeding under the Ellis Act.
In the present case, the landlord of a two-unit apartment building in San Francisco filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the tenants in one of the units, alleging that he had filed with the rent control board a notice of intention to withdraw the building from the rental market under the Ellis Act and had served the tenants with notice to quit the premises, but the tenants had failed to do so. The tenants answered, raising several affirmative defenses, including retaliatory eviction.
The landlord moved for summary adjudication arguing, in part, that retaliatory eviction may not be raised as a defense to an unlawful detainer action based upon the Ellis Act. The Superior Court granted the motion for summary adjudication in part, but denied summary adjudication of the defense of retaliatory eviction.
The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that “in unlawful detainer proceedings properly commenced under the Ellis Act, a tenant may not raise an affirmative defense of retaliatory eviction to prevent displacement, but retains the right to an independent action for damages under the retaliatory eviction statute.”
As the majority recognizes, the Court of Appeal erred in concluding that the defense of retaliatory eviction under section 1942.5 may not be raised in unlawful detainer proceedings based upon the Ellis Act. As noted above, the *605Ellis Act clearly states that it does not supersede section 1942.5 and was not intended to “[ojverride procedural protections designed to prevent abuse of the right to evict tenants.” (Gov. Code, § 7060.7, subd. (c); see id., § 7060.1, subd. (d).) The language of the Ellis Act clearly permits a tenant to raise the defense of retaliatory eviction in an unlawful detainer action.
The majority goes on to hold, however, that a landlord will defeat the defense of retaliatory eviction under section 1942.5 if the landlord can demonstrate “a bona fide intent to withdraw the property from the [rental] market” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 600), even if the landlord’s purpose is to retaliate against the tenant for the tenant’s exercise of rights protected by section 1942.5. I am not convinced by the majority’s reasoning.
The majority bases its holding that a landlord may invoke the Ellis Act to evict a tenant for a retaliatory purpose not upon the language of the Ellis Act, but upon the language of the statute that provides protection against retaliatory evictions. Section 1942.5, subdivision (a), provides that a landlord may not recover possession of a leased dwelling within 180 days of the tenant’s exercise of certain rights, including making a complaint about the tenantability of the premises, if the tenant is not in default as to payment of rent and the landlord is “retaliating] against the lessee because of the exercise by the lessee of his rights under this chapter or because of his complaint to an appropriate agency as to tenantability of a dwelling.” The tenant may not invoke the protection of subdivision (a) “more than once in any 12-month period.” (Id., subd. (b).) Subdivision (c) of section 1942.5 prohibits a landlord from bringing an action to recover possession of a dwelling “for the purpose of retaliating against the lessee because he or she has lawfully organized or participated in a lessees’ association or an organization advocating lessees’ rights or has lawfully and peaceably exercised any rights under the law.”1
*606In concluding that, despite this language, a landlord may recover possession of a dwelling under the Ellis Act even if the landlord acts for a retaliatory purpose, the majority relies upon subdivision (d) of section 1942.5, which states: “Nothing in this section shall be construed as limiting in any way the exercise by the lessor of his rights under any lease or agreement or any law pertaining to the hiring of property or his right to do any of the acts described in subdivision (a) or (c) for any lawful cause.” The majority reasons that a landlord’s withdrawal of a dwelling from the rental market falls under section 1942.5, subdivision (d)’s exception to the proscription against retaliatory eviction because it constitutes “an exercise of rights under a law pertaining to the hiring of property.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 595.)
The majority’s reasoning fails because even assuming that withdrawing a property from the rental market under the Ellis Act constitutes “an exercise of rights under a law pertaining to the hiring of property” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 595), permitting a tenant to raise a defense of retaliatory eviction does not “limit[] in any way” the landlord’s exercise of rights under the Ellis Act. (§ 1942.5, subd. (d).) The Ellis Act expressly states that it is subject to the proscription against retaliatory eviction set forth in section 1942.5. As noted above, Government Code section 7060.1, subdivision (d), states that nothing in the Ellis Act supersedes numerous statutory provisions, including section 1942.5’s proscription against retaliatory eviction. Government Code section 7060.7 declares the Legislature’s intent that the Ellis Act not “[ojverride procedural protection designed to prevent abuse of the right to evict tenants.” The procedures for removing a dwelling from the rental market provided by the Ellis Act, therefore, are subject to the proscription against retaliatory eviction set forth in section 1942.5. The Ellis Act does not give landlords the right to evict tenants for a retaliatory purpose. Prohibiting a landlord from evicting a tenant under the Ellis Act for a retaliatory purpose, therefore, does not limit the landlord’s exercise of rights under the Ellis Act. The majority mistakenly limits its analysis to whether “a landlord’s withdrawal of property from the rental market under the Ellis Act constitute^] an exercise of rights under a law pertaining to the hiring of property” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 595), without further considering whether a tenant’s assertion of the defense of retaliatory eviction limits the landlord’s exercise of rights under the Ellis Act.
*607It is difficult to imagine why the Legislature would have specifically stated in the Ellis Act that it did not supersede the protections against retaliatory eviction in section 1942.5 if it simply intended, as the majority holds, that a landlord may evict a tenant for a retaliatory purpose under the Ellis Act as long as the landlord actually intends to withdraw the building from the rental market.
The legislative history of Government Code section 7060.1, subdivision (d), supports the conclusion that a landlord may not evict a tenant under the Ellis Act for a retaliatory purpose. As the majority recognizes, a Senate committee analysis of the legislation that enacted Government Code section 7060.1, subdivision (d), states that “ ‘this provision would probably prohibit a landlord from going out of business if the tenant had requested repairs or reported housing code violations. An eviction of the tenant under such circumstances could be deemed a prohibited retaliatory eviction.’ ” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 598.) The majority dismisses this compelling evidence of the intent of the Legislature, citing our decision in Folsom v. Butte County Assn. of Governments (1982) 32 Cal.3d 668 [186 Cal.Rptr. 589, 652 P.2d 437], to support its conclusion that “the use of the words ‘probably’ and ‘could’ are sufficiently tentative and equivocal to caution us against relying too heavily on this snippet.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 598.) Our decision in Folsom v. Butte County Assn. of Governments does not support the majority’s conclusion.
Folsom v. Butte County Assn. of Governments, supra, 32 Cal.3d 668, 681-682, concluded that legislative history showing that the word “private” had been included in the original version of a bill, deleted by the Assembly, and then reinserted by the Senate was “at best equivocal.” By contrast, the committee analysis relied upon by tenants in the present case could hardly be more clear. It demonstrates that the Legislature specifically contemplated that the Ellis Act would not allow a landlord to go out of business for a retaliatory purpose. The use of the words “probably” and “could” do not affect this conclusion. Those words acknowledge that a notice to quit under the Ellis Act that followed a tenant’s report of housing code violations “would probably” or “could” be deemed retaliatory, but would not necessarily be deemed so. The committee analysis is clear and unequivocal, however, that a “retaliatory eviction,” if established, would be “prohibited.” (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, analysis of Sen. Bill No. 505 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) as amended Sept. 10, 1985, p. 3.) This is compelling evidence that the Legislature did not intend the Ellis Act to empower a landlord to evict a tenant for a retaliatory purpose.
The majority states that, notwithstanding subdivision (d) of section 1942.5, “landlords must assert their invocation of the Ellis Act ‘in good faith’ ” under *608subdivision (e) of section 1942.5. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 595.)2 The majority interprets the term “good faith” in this context to mean a bona fide intent to withdraw the property from the rental market. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 596.) I do not agree that a bona fide intent to withdraw a dwelling from the rental market necessarily establishes that a landlord acts in good faith in attempting to evict a tenant.
In Western Land Office, Inc. v. Cervantes, supra, 175 Cal.App.3d 724, 733, the Court of Appeal examined the predecessor to subdivision (e) of section 1942.5 and observed that it “covered the situation where the complaining tenant was not in violation of any law or agreement, but the landlord nevertheless wished to take action in good faith for a valid reason.” (Italics added.) The court offered examples of such valid reasons: “[A] landlord might have wanted (1) to raise the tenant’s rent because taxes on the property had increased; (2) to recover possession of the tenant’s dwelling for the purpose of remodeling or demolishing; or (3) to sell the premises to someone who had another tenant in mind.” (Ibid.)
Contrary to the majority’s holding, the Court of Appeal in Cervantes made clear that a landlord who was acting for a retaliatory purpose was not acting in good faith: “Proof of a valid ground may undermine evidence of a retaliatory motive. But proof of a valid ground is not equivalent to proof of good faith. In a given instance, a valid ground might exist but the landlord might nevertheless act with a retaliatory motive. A property tax increase of five dollars does not necessarily justify an increase in rent of one hundred dollars. Therefore, under subdivision (a) of the statute, a trier of fact confronted with substantial evidence of a valid ground nevertheless had to decide whether the landlord’s ‘dominant purpose’ was retaliation.” (Western Land Office, Inc. v. Cervantes, supra, 175 Cal.App.3d 724, 734.)3 In my view, therefore, a landlord who is acting for a retaliatory purpose is not acting in “good faith” within the meaning of subdivision (e) of section 1942.5.
The majority observes that neither the tenants nor the author of this opinion “has identified a single jurisdiction in this country that has sustained a retaliatory eviction defense—or what might more accurately be termed a retaliatory withdrawal defense—where a landlord seeks to take a building off *609the market.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 596.) The significance of this fact escapes me. It is equally true that the majority has not identified any jurisdiction that has upheld a retaliatory eviction on the grounds that the landlord intends to remove the dwelling from the rental market.
In support of its observation that no jurisdiction has sustained a “retaliatory withdrawal defense,” the majority relies upon two opinions that are inapposite. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 596.) The majority cites the decision in California Livestock Production Credit Assn. v. Sutfin (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 136 [211 Cal.Rptr. 152], for the proposition that a “claim of retaliation is not a defense in [an] unlawful detainer action based on foreclosure of property.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 596.) The decision in California Livestock held that retaliatory eviction is not a defense to eviction following a valid foreclosure sale because “there is no antecedent landlord-tenant relationship between the trustor and the purchaser. There is no lease or rental agreement entitling the trustor to remain in possession of the premises; the trustor’s only right to possession is based on his title to the premises, which has been lost at a valid foreclosure sale. Thus, even if the purchaser were precluded from using an ‘invalid reason’ for eviction, the trustor would still have no lawful claim to continued possession.” (California Livestock Production Credit Assn. v. Sutfin, supra, 165 Cal.App.3d at p. 143.) This reasoning has no application in the present case.
The majority also cites Carol Rickert & Associates v. Law (2002) 132 N.M. 687 [54 P.3d 91], for the proposition that a “claim of retaliation is not a defense in [an] unlawful detainer action based on [a] landlord’s decision not to remain in the federal government’s former Section 8 housing program.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 596.) The decision in Carol Rickert clearly is distinguishable. The New Mexico statute at issue in Carol Rickert prohibited retaliatory eviction, but included an exception that permitted a landlord to increase rent or alter services “if the owner can establish that the increased rent or changes in services are consistent with those imposed on other residents of similar rental units and are not directed at the particular resident, but are uniform.” (Carol Rickert & Associates v. Law, supra, 54 P.3d at p. 98.) Carol Rickert held that the tenant’s claim of retaliatory eviction was prohibited by this statutory language because the landlord’s action was uniform: “[T]he parties do not dispute that Owner’s decision to discontinue participation in the Section 8 housing program was to be uniformly applied to all Section 8 tenants as their leases expired. Accordingly, Tenant cannot base her retaliation defense on Owner’s decision to discontinue the Section 8 program.” (Ibid.) Carol Rickert thus has no bearing on the issues in the present case.
The majority states that prohibiting landlords from engaging in retaliatory evictions under the Ellis Act would be inconsistent with other laws and lead *610to absurd results. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 599.) The majority cites Civil Code section 1942.4, which prohibits a landlord from collecting rent for a dwelling that is deemed untenantable, but expressly provides that a landlord who is withdrawing the building from the rental market under the Ellis Act need not comply with this statute. The majority also cites Code of Civil Procedure section 1174.2, subdivision (d), which permits a tenant to assert that the premises are uninhabitable as a defense in an unlawful detainer action following default in the payment of rent, but expressly provides that nothing in the statute “shall limit or supersede any provision” of the Ellis Act. Neither of these statutes is inconsistent with prohibiting a landlord from evicting a tenant under the Ellis Act for a retaliatory purpose. Further, these statutes demonstrate that the Legislature knew how to exempt landlords who are proceeding under the Ellis Act from the requirements of certain statutes. The Legislature chose not to exempt landlords from the prohibition against retaliatory evictions set forth in section 1942.5. “ ‘We must assume that the Legislature knew how to create an exception if it wished to do so ... .’ [Citation.]” (California Fed. Savings & Loan Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (1995) 11 Cal.4th 342, 349 [45 Cal.Rptr.2d 279, 902 P.2d 297]; see County of San Diego v. State of California (1997) 15 Cal.4th 68, 94-95 [61 Cal.Rptr.2d 134, 931 P.2d 312]; City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 88 [260 Cal.Rptr. 520, 776 P.2d 222].)
The majority also observes that a contrary holding “could permit tenants to force the landlord to remain in business indefinitely” “or, at the least, until a trier of fact determined that the retaliatory motive had dissipated.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 599.) As the majority recognizes, however, this concern does not apply if the tenant proceeds under subdivision (a) of section 1942.5, which only prohibits the landlord from evicting the tenant within 180 days of the tenant’s exercise of the specified rights and which can be invoked by the tenant only once in any 12-month period. The majority’s concern applies only if the tenant proceeds under subdivision (c) of section 1942.5 and is able to prove that the landlord is acting “for the purpose of retaliating against the lessee because he or she has lawfully organized or participated in a lessees’ association or an organization advocating lessees’ rights or has lawfully and peaceably exercised any rights under the law.”
We confronted the same concern in recognizing the common law doctrine of retaliatory eviction, stating: “Of course, we do not imply that a tenant who proves a retaliatory purpose is entitled to remain in possession in perpetuity. As the court stated in Edwards: ‘If this illegal purpose is dissipated, the landlord can . . . evict his tenants or raise their rents for economic or other legitimate reasons, or even for no reason at all. The question of permissible or impermissible purpose is one of fact for the court or jury. . . .’ (Fns. omitted.) [Citation.]” (Schweiger v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.3d 507, 517.) Even when a tenant proceeds under subdivision (c) of section 1942.5, a landlord is *611prohibited from removing a building from the rental market only as long as the landlord is acting for a retaliatory purpose. This means only that landlords may not wrongfully use the Ellis Act to engage in retaliatory evictions. Nothing in section 1942.5 prevents a landlord who is not acting for a retaliatory purpose from withdrawing a dwelling from the rental market.
“Section 1942.5 is a remedial statute aimed at protecting tenants from certain types of abuses. It is to be ‘liberally construed to effect its objectives and to suppress, not encourage, the mischief at which it was directed. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Barela v. Superior Court (1981) 30 Cal.3d 244, 251 [178 Cal.Rptr. 618, 636 P.2d 582].) In Schweiger v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.3d 507, 513, we quoted at length the “persuasive reasoning” in Edwards v. Habib (D.C. Cir. 1968) 130 U.S.App.D.C. 126 [397 F.2d 687], that “ ‘while the landlord may evict for any legal reason or for no reason at all, he is not, we hold, free to evict in retaliation for his tenant’s report of housing code violations to the authorities. As a matter of statutory construction and for reasons of public policy, such an eviction cannot be permitted.’ ” (Schweiger v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 512.) We recognized that protection against retaliatory eviction was necessary to protect a tenant’s ability to demand clean and safe housing: “ ‘The housing and sanitary codes . . . indicate a strong and pervasive congressional concern to secure for the city’s slum dwellers decent, or at least safe and sanitary, places to live. Effective implementation and enforcement of the codes obviously depend in part on private initiative in the reporting of violations. ... To permit retaliatory evictions . . . would clearly frustrate the effectiveness of the housing code as a means of upgrading the quality of housing in Washington. . . . There can be no doubt that the slum dweller, even though his home be marred by housing code violations, will pause long before he complains of them if he fears eviction as a consequence. Hence an eviction under the circumstances of this case would not only punish appellant for making a complaint which she had a constitutional right to make, . . . but also would stand as a warning to others that they dare not be so bold ....’” (Ibid.)
As one commentator observed: “In large measure, the scope and effectiveness of tenant remedies for substandard housing will be determined by the degree of protection given tenants against retaliatory actions by landlords. If a landlord is free to evict or otherwise harass a tenant who exercises his right to secure better housing conditions, few tenants will use the remedies for fear of being put out on the street.” (Daniels, Judicial and Legislative Remedies for Substandard Housing: Landlord-Tenant Law Reform in the District of Columbia (1971) 59 Geo. L.J. 909, 943.)
The majority’s holding will permit landlords to threaten tenants that if they complain about the condition of their residence or exercise their rights under *612Civil Code section 1942 to make necessary repairs and deduct the cost from their rent, the landlord may remove the building from the rental market under the Ellis Act and evict them. Such a threat might be especially effective in discouraging the formation of tenant associations, which are specifically protected under section 1942.5, subdivision (c). The majority opinion thus violates the public policy of this state by encouraging retaliatory eviction.
Like the majority, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal, but I would not hold, as does the majority, “that a landlord’s bona fide intent to withdraw the property from the rental market under the Ellis Act will defeat the statutory defense of retaliatory eviction.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 588.) In my view, the Ellis Act was not intended to permit a landlord to evict a tenant for a retaliatory purpose.
Kennard, J., and Werdegar, J., concurred.
Section 1942.5 provides, in pertinent part: “(a) If the lessor retaliates against the lessee because of the exercise by the lessee of his rights under this chapter or because of his complaint to an appropriate agency as to tenantability of a dwelling, and if the lessee of a dwelling is not in default as to the payment of his rent, the lessor may not recover possession of a dwelling in any action or proceeding . . . within 180 days: [][] (1) After the date upon which the lessee, in good faith, has given notice pursuant to Section 1942, or has made an oral complaint to the lessor regarding tenantability; or [fj (2) After the date upon which the lessee, in good faith, has filed a written complaint, or an oral complaint which is registered or otherwise recorded in writing, with an appropriate agency, of which the lessor has notice, for the purpose of obtaining correction of a condition relating to tenantability ffl (b) A lessee may not invoke the provisions of subdivision (a) more than once in any 12-month period. [][] (c) It shall be unlawful for a lessor to . . . bring an action to recover possession . . . for the purpose of retaliating against the lessee because he or she has lawfully organized or participated in a lessees’ association or an organization advocating lessees’ rights or has lawfully and peaceably exercised any rights under the law. In an action brought by or against the lessee pursuant to this subdivision, the lessee shall bear the burden of producing evidence that the lessor’s conduct was, in fact, retaliatory, [f] (d) Nothing in this section shall be *606construed as limiting in any way the exercise by the lessor of his rights under any lease or agreement or any law pertaining to the hiring of property or his right to do any of the acts described in subdivision (a) or (c) for any lawful cause. ... [10 (e) Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivisions (a) to (d), inclusive, a lessor may recover possession of a dwelling and do any of the other acts described in subdivision (a) within the period or periods prescribed therein, or within subdivision (c), if the notice of termination, rent increase, or other act, and any pleading or statement of issues in an arbitration, if any, states the ground upon which the lessor, in good faith, seeks to recover possession, increase rent, or do any of the other acts described in subdivision (a) or (c). If such statement be controverted, the lessor shall establish its truth at the trial or other hearing.”
I question the majority’s premise that subdivision (e) of section 1942.5 imposes additional requirements to those set forth in subdivision (d) of the statute. Rather, it appears that subdivision (e) provides a separate and distinct exception to the proscription against retaliatory eviction. (See Western Land Office, Inc. v. Cervantes (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 724, 733-734 [220 Cal.Rptr. 784].)
The requirement in section 1942.5, subdivision (a), as originally enacted, that the landlord “ ‘has as his dominant purpose retaliation against the lessee’ ” (Western Land Office, Inc. v. Cervantes, supra, 175 Cal.App.3d 724, 732, fn. 5) is replaced in the current statute with the requirement that the landlord “retaliates against the lessee.” (§ 1942.5, subd. (a).)