concurring in part and dissenting in part.
¶ 45 The only issues the parties asked us to decide were the State’s claim that the trial court erred by precluding the State from further use of the breath test results and Meza’s claim that the appropriate remedy was dismissal with prejudice. Considering the actions of, and misleading testimony by, employees of the Phoenix Crime Lab as described in the majority opinion, I agree with my colleagues that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the sanction of preclusion. See Rule 15.7(a)(4). That should have been the end of the case.
¶ 46 Instead, the majority, acting as a roving commission of justice and despite the lack of any briefing on the issue, see Clouse ex rel. Clouse v. State, 199 Ariz. 196, 203 n. 14, 16 P.3d 757, 764 (2001) (“court[s] traditionally do[ ] not address issues not presented by the parties”), have decided on their own motion “to alleviate the cost of the extraordinary discovery burden that the State has forced the defense to undergo.” Ante at ¶ 37. To do so, my colleagues interpret Rule 15.7(a) as authorizing a sweeping attorneys’ fees and costs sanction against a party, the Maricopa County Attorney (“MCA”), that neither engaged in abusive discovery practices nor acted in bad faith.11 I disagree with both the majority’s transmutation of Rule 15.7(a) into a general monetary compensation rule and their determination that the MCA is strictly liable to Meza for attorneys’ fees and other expenses incurred.
¶47 The majority engage in a two-step process to reach their conclusion that the MCA is liable for Meza’s expenses. First, relying on Idaho cases construing similar language in Idaho Criminal Rule 16(j), they interpret the phrase in Rule 15.7(a) that allows the court to “impose any sanction which it finds just under the circumstances” as authorizing the imposition of what the majority euphemistically term “a restitutionary monetary sanction[.]” Ante at ¶ 40. Second, to justify the mandatory imposition of attorneys’ fees12 against a party whose good-faith discharge of its disclosure obligations is unquestioned, the majority claim that the conduct of the Phoenix Crime Lab is nonetheless imputed to the MCA. Because I disagree with both the majority’s transmutation of Rule 15.7(a) into a broad compensatory rule and their application of it in this instance to impute liability to the MCA for Meza’s attorneys’ fees and other expenses, I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority’s opinion.
I.
¶48 The majority’s reliance on the Idaho Supreme Court’s interpretation of Idaho Criminal Rule 16(j) is misplaced. The drafters of Rule 1513 relied greatly on the ABA Standards Relating to Discovery and Procedure Before Trial (Approved Draft, 1970)14 and on the then-proposed Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(d)(2) (“Federal Rule 16(d)(2)”). See Rule 15 cmts. Section 4.7 of *61the 1970 ABA Standards and Federal Rule 16(d)(2) contain phraseology identical to Idaho Criminal Rule 16(j) authorizing the court to “enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances.” However, neither the commentaries to the ABA Standards nor cases discussing the authority of federal courts to assess attorneys’ fees support the expansive interpretation that the majority give the analogous phrase in Rule 15.7(a).
¶ 49 A fair reading of the commentaries to the 1970, 1984, and 1995 ABA Standards shows that the intent of the general authority to enter a “just” order was to allow a trial court “to tailor a remedy to fit the circumstances,” 1984 ABA Standards, § ll-4.7(a) commentary, but that an award of attorneys’ fees was not one of the intended remedies:
[T]he court also has general authority to enter an order, not specified in the standard, imposing appropriate remedies for a discovery violation. Such orders may include, for example, postponing the opposing party’s duty to make its corresponding discovery disclosures, or postponing cross-examination of a witness who was not disclosed in advance of trial.
1995 ABA Standards, § ll-7.1(a) commentary (footnotes omitted).
¶ 50 Instead, since their inception, the Standards, as has Rule 15.7(a), have contained a specific provision authorizing the court to exercise its contempt powers as necessary to secure compliance with discovery rules. Compare 1995 Standards, § 11— 7.1(b) (“The court may subject counsel to appropriate sanctions, including a finding of contempt, upon a finding that counsel willfully violated a discovery rule or order.”) and Rule 15.7(a)(3) (court may “[h]old[ ] a witness, party, or counsel in contempt” for failure to comply with Rule 15)15 with Idaho Criminal Rule 16 (no contempt provision). The majority, by imposing attorneys’ fees through a broad interpretation of Rule 15.7(a)’s general grant of authority, skirts the more stringent requirements of the contempt remedy authorized by Rule 15.7(a)(3).16
¶ 51 Neither can the majority’s holding be explained as an exercise of its inherent authority apart from Rule 15.7. In Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 257-58, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975), the United States Supreme Court affirmed the continuing vitality of the “American Rule” that requires each party to bear the cost of its own attorneys’ fees absent express statutory authority except in the following exceptional circumstances: (1) the common fund doctrine applies; (2) a party willfully disobeys a court order; or (3) a party acts in bad faith. See also Zambrano v. City of Tustin, 885 F.2d 1473, 1482 (9th Cir.1989) (holding that absent “explicit Congressional authorization, the factual prerequisites of bad faith misconduct or willful disobedience laid out in Alyeska must be met”) (footnote omitted).
¶ 52 Similarly, in Arizona, which follows the American Rule, attorneys’ fees are generally not recoverable absent authorization by statute, contract, or court rule. Cortaro Water Users’ Ass’n v. Steiner, 148 Ariz. 314, 316, 714 P.2d 807, 809 (1986); Schwab Sales, Inc. v. GN Constr. Co., 196 Ariz. 33, 35, ¶ 4, 992 P.2d 1128, 1130 (App.1998). There are numerous statutes and court rules in Arizona that contain express provisions either autho*62rizing or requiring the assessment of attorneys’ fees,17 but I believe this is the first case in Arizona in which an appellate court, using a general grant of authority to make “just” orders, has imposed attorneys’ fees based on a theory of imputed liability.18 Cf. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 260, 95 S.Ct. 1612 (Congress has not “extended any roving authority to the Judiciary to allow counsel fees as costs or otherwise whenever the courts might deem them warranted.”). More importantly, the rationale for holding the prosecutor accountable under Rule 15.7 for a law enforcement agency’s failure to disclose potentially exculpatory information does not support imputing liability for Meza’s attorneys’ fees.
II.
¶53 The majority’s remand order is not conditioned on a finding by the trial court that the MCA willfully disobeyed the trial court’s orders or attempted in bad faith to avoid complying with Rule 15. Instead, my colleagues obviate the necessity of such a finding by treating the MCA and the Phoenix Crime Lab as a monolithic entity, despite their claim to the contrary. Ante at ¶43. They justify this linkage on the theory that a prosecutor is accountable for any misconduct by a law enforcement agency involved in the investigation.
¶ 54 The legal linchpin of the majority’s decision to hold the MCA strictly liable for the Phoenix Crime Lab’s sins and omissions is Rule 15.1(a)(7), which requires a prosecutor to make available to a defendant “[a]ll material or information which tends to mitigate or negate the defendant’s guilt” that was “within the prosecutor’s possession or control.” I do not dispute that the Phoenix Crime Lab was under the MCA’s control for purposes of its general compliance with Rule 15.1. Carpenter v. Superior Court, 176 Ariz. 486, 490, 862 P.2d 246, 250 (App.1993) (holding that state law enforcement agencies fall under prosecutor’s control for purposes of Rule 15.1 disclosure); Rule 15.1(d) (“The prosecutor’s obligation under this rule extends to material and information in the possession or control of members of the prosecutor’s staff and of any other persons who have participated in the investigation or evaluation of the case and who are under the prosecutor’s control.”) (emphasis added). Therefore, although the MCA discharged its disclosure obligations in good faith, the trial court’s order precluding the State from use of the breath test results was an exercise of its authority explicitly authorized by Rule 15.7(a).
¶ 55 It makes good sense to hold prosecutors responsible for ensuring that relevant information in the possession of law enforcement agencies is disclosed by imposing the sanction of preclusion for non-disclosure of evidence. Preclusion is justified as a tool to encourage prosecutors to develop policies to ensure the flow of discoverable information to their offices from local law enforcement agencies. See Carpenter, 176 Ariz. at 489, 862 P.2d at 249.
¶ 56 It is quite another thing, however, to assess attorneys’ fees against a prosecutor who makes a diligent, good-faith effort to comply with Rule 15.1 but is frustrated in his or her efforts by the conduct of a law enforcement agency not directly answerable to the prosecutor. Under such circumstances, the search for truth — the ultimate goal of Rule 15’s reciprocal disclosure requirements — is not advanced by awarding attor*63neys’ fees against the prosecutor. My colleagues blithely assert that today’s decision will simplify disclosure and eliminate unnecessary delay and expense. Ante at ¶ 40. I, on the other hand, fear that the majority’s unprecedented construction of Rule 15.7 will have just the opposite effect, and will result in interminable delays as parties aggressively wield Rule 15.7 as a weapon to recoup litigation expenses instead of using it as a shield of last resort after the parties have been unable to informally resolve any discovery disputes between themselves.
¶57 For the reasons expressed above, I would simply affirm the trial court’s order of preclusion and not remand for additional sanctions.
. Defense counsel, while arguing Meza’s first motion to dismiss on December 21, 1998, described the prosecutor’s conduct:
I believe she did not know what was going on here, and in good faith efforts I think she was running around trying to get those logs and produce it for me, I have been in touch with [the prosecutor], I consider her ethics very high, the highest, and her capabilities are the highest. She, too, must have the information presented to her the same as I do.
. Although it is clear that the majority do not intend that Meza's restitution be limited to attorneys’ fees, in the interest of brevity, I focus my dissent on that issue. For analogous reasons, however, I also believe Rule 15.7(a) does not authorize other "restitutionary” sanctions such as court costs and expert witness fees, except to the extent that they may be imposed as contempt sanctions under Rule 15.7(a)(3). See infra at ¶¶ 49-52.
. The supreme court adopted Rule 15 effective September 1, 1973, as part of a comprehensive revision of Arizona’s criminal rules of procedure.
. See also ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, § 11-4.7 (2d ed.1984); ABA Standards for Criminal Justice Discovery and Trial by Jury, § 11-7.1 (3d ed. 1995).
. Compare also the amendment to Rule 15.7(a)(3) which broadens the court’s authority by allowing it to hold in contempt a "person acting under the direction or control of a party.” Order Amending Rule 15, Rules of Criminal Procedure, Supreme Court No. R-00-0003 at 12 (May 31, 2002) (renumbered as 15.7(b)(4)) (effective Dec. 31, 2002).
. A court may assess attorneys’ fees as part of a fine levied for criminal contempt. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 258, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975). Criminal contempt however, requires a finding of willful disobedience by the offending party. See, e.g., Riley v. Superior Court, 124 Ariz. 498, 499, 605 P.2d 900, 901 (App.1980). The majority’s reliance on Rule 15.7’s general authority enables my colleagues to avoid discussing whether Rule 15.7(a)(3)’s contempt sanction authorizes a remedial award of attorneys’ fees for civil contempt. Compare Perry v. O’Donnell, 759 F.2d 702, 704 (9th Cir.1985) (express finding of wilfulness not required for award of attorneys’ fees in civil contempt actions) with Wright v. Jackson, 522 F.2d 955, 958 (4th Cir.1975) (refusal to comply with a court order must rise to the level of obstinacy, obduracy, or recalcitrance before Alyeska’s "willful disobedience” exception may be invoked).
. See, e.g., A.R.S. §§ 12-341.01 (A) (1992) (“any contested action arising out of a contract”); - 348(A)(1) (2000) ("[a] civil action brought by the state or a city, town or county against the [prevailing] party”); -349(A) (1992) (a civil action where an attorney or party: (1) "[b]rings or defends a claim without substantial justification," (2) “[b]rings or defends a claim solely or primarily for delay or harassment,” (3) “[unreasonably expands or delays the proceeding,” or (4) “[e]ngages in abuse of discovery”); Ariz. R. Civ. P. 11 (“a pleading, motion or other paper [ ] signed in violation of this rule”); and Ariz. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1) ("disclosure [made] pursuant to Rule 26.1 that the party or attorney knew or should have known was inaccurate or incomplete and thereby causes an opposing party to engage in investigation or discovery”).
. Arizona has judicially created several equitable exceptions to the American Rule against fee-shifting, none of which apply here. See, e.g., Arnold v. Ariz. Dep't of Health Servs., 160 Ariz. 593, 609, 775 P.2d 521, 537 (1989) (private attorney general doctrine); Steinfeld v. Zeckendorf, 15 Ariz. 335, 341, 138 P. 1044, 1045-47 (1914) (common fund doctrine).