Petitioner has filed a motion for a delayed appeal from a judgment denying his petition for post-conviction relief. He asserts that his post-conviction counsel’s (counsel) failure to file a timely notice of appeal violated his statutory right to suitable counsel. ORS 138.590. He argues that the reasoning of State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Geist, 310 Or 176, 796 P2d 1193 (1990), in which the Supreme Court created a remedy for the violation of a statutory right to adequate counsel in termination of parental rights proceedings, should be extended to the statutory right to suitable counsel in post-conviction proceedings. Petitioner also relies on State ex rel SOSCF v. Hammons, 169 Or App 589, 10 P3d 310 (2000), in which, based on Geist, we held that a parent whose appointed counsel failed to file a timely notice of appeal from a termination judgment was entitled to a delayed appeal as a remedy for inadequate assistance of counsel. For the reasons set forth below, we decline to extend the rationale of Geist and Hammons to this proceeding, and we deny the motion for delayed appeal.
Petitioner was convicted of two counts of murder. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief, asserting that several errors, including inadequate assistance of criminal trial counsel, resulted in his conviction. On July 24,2000, the post-conviction trial court entered a judgment denying relief. ORCP 70 B required the court clerk to send notice of entry of the judgment to both parties.1 However, the trial court administrator notified only the Attorney General’s office that the judgment was entered and did not notify petitioner or petitioner’s attorney. On September 21, unaware that a judgment had been entered, counsel filed a notice pursuant to UTCR 2.030, reminding the court that the case had been under advisement for more than 60 days. Shortly thereafter, counsel learned that a judgment had, in fact, been entered *503and then notified petitioner of that fact. On October 18, petitioner sent a pro se notice of appeal to this court. On October 20, counsel mailed to this court both a notice of appeal and a motion for a delayed appeal. Petitioner then filed a request with the trial court for appellate counsel on October 23. On November 6, the trial court appointed appellate counsel for petitioner but appellate counsel was unaware of the appointment until January 8, 2001, when he received a letter from petitioner. On January 26, appellate counsel filed an amended notice of appeal and a more detailed motion for delayed appeal.
Defendant opposes the motion, arguing that in Felkel v. Thompson, 157 Or App 218, 970 P2d 657 (1998), this court determined that ORS 138.650 imposes, without exception, a 30-day time limit for filing a notice of appeal from a judgment denying post-conviction relief. Petitioner argues that he is entitled to a delayed appeal, despite Felkel, because his counsel was unsuitable for failing to file a timely notice of appeal.2 Defendant responds that we should not create a delayed appeal remedy for any alleged violation of petitioner’s statutory right to suitable counsel in this case.
In Felkel, we dispensed with a former practice of allowing post-conviction petitioners to file a late notice of appeal based on a showing of good cause. In following our previous practice,3 we had relied on ORS 138.071(4)(a),4 *504which provides for delayed appeals in criminal cases. We had also relied on ORS 138.650, which provides:
“Either the petitioner or the defendant may appeal to the Court of Appeals within 30 days after the entry of final judgment on a petition [for post-conviction relief] pursuant to ORS 138.510 to 138.680. The manner of taking the appeal and the scope of review by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court shall be the same as that provided by law for appeals in criminal actions * *
We had read ORS 138.071(4)(a) and ORS 138.650 together, concluding that delayed appeals were equally permissible in criminal and post-conviction cases.
In Felkel, we held that the delayed appeal provision of ORS 138.071(4)(a) related to the time, not the manner, of perfecting an appeal, and therefore did not apply to post-conviction proceedings under ORS 138.650. 157 Or App at 221-22. As a result, we concluded “that ORS 138.650 requires, without exception, that appeals from post-conviction judgments be filed and served within 30 days of entry of the final judgment.” Id. at 223 (emphasis added). Although Felkel does inform our inquiry, we agree with petitioner that it is not dispositive. Our decision there did not involve an allegation of unsuitable representation by counsel. Thus, we did not consider whether the petitioner had an implied right to a delayed appeal in order to vindicate his statutory right to suitable counsel.
As noted, petitioner relies on Geist, where, on direct appeal, the mother argued that her trial counsel was inadequate. The mother’s attorney had been appointed pursuant to former ORS 419.525(2), repealed by Or Laws 1993, ch 33, § 373, which provided that “[i]f the parents are determined to be indigent by the court, and request the assistance of appointed counsel, the court shall appoint an attorney to represent them at state expense.”5 The court held that former *505ORS 419.525(2) implicitly provided for the appointment of adequate counsel. Geist, 310 Or at 185. The court further held that in the absence of “an express legislative procedure for vindicating the statutory right to adequate counsel, this court may fashion an appropriate remedy” for its violation. Id. at 185.6 The court concluded that the appropriate procedure for challenging inadequate counsel in a parental rights termination proceeding was to raise the issue on direct appeal from the termination judgment. Id. at 187.
In Hammons, we considered the reach of the holding in Geist. There, a mother filed a motion for leave to file a notice of appeal from a judgment terminating her parental rights after the expiration of all statutory deadlines.7 The mother alleged that her former attorney was inadequate in failing to file a timely notice of appeal. We recognized that, under Geist, the mother’s remedy for inadequate assistance of counsel was review on direct appeal. However, that remedy would have been unworkable in Hammons because counsel’s failure to timely file a notice of appeal nullified the mother’s statutory appeal rights. We declined to leave the mother remediless, concluding that “[w]here the alleged inadequacy of counsel resulted in an untimely appeal, the obvious remedy, and the only remedy suggested by the parties in this case, is permitting mother to pursue a delayed appeal from the order terminating her parental rights.” Hammons, 169 Or App at 594. Accordingly, we allowed a delayed appeal even though the mother’s motion was filed after the ultimate 90-day time limit for pro se appellants had expired and the statute did not expressly provide for a delayed appeal for parties who are represented by counsel.
Petitioner argues that Hammons is controlling here because it furnishes precedent for the implication of a *506delayed appeal right in cases where there is no such express statutory right. Petitioner asserts that, although they involved termination of parental rights proceedings, the reasoning of Hammons and Geist should be extended to post-conviction proceedings. Defendant replies that differences in the nature of post-conviction and termination proceedings make those cases inapposite here. To resolve the parties’ dispute, we must first examine the source of the right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings.
ORS 138.590 governs the appointment of trial counsel for indigent petitioners in post-conviction proceedings. ORS 138.590(1) provides:
“Any petitioner who is unable to pay the expenses of a proceeding pursuant to ORS 138.510 to 138.680 or to employ suitable counsel possessing skills and experience commensurate with the nature of the conviction and complexity of the case for such a proceeding may proceed as an indigent person pursuant to this section upon order of the circuit court in which the petition is filed.”
If the petitioner is indigent, “the circuit court shall appoint suitable counsel to represent petitioner. Counsel so appointed shall represent petitioner throughout the proceedings in the circuit court.” ORS 138.590(4). The right to appellate counsel in both direct criminal appeals and post-conviction appeals is provided by ORS 138.500(1):
“If a defendant in a criminal action or a petitioner in a proceeding pursuant to ORS 138.510 to 138.680 [the Post-Conviction Hearing Act] wishes to appeal from an appealable adverse final order or judgment of a circuit court and if the person is without funds to employ suitable counsel possessing skills and experience commensurate with the nature and complexity of the case for the appeal, the person may request the circuit court from which the appeal is or would be taken to appoint counsel to represent the person on appeal.”
Several appellate decisions have examined the nature and limits of the statutory right to suitable counsel in post-c:cnviction proceedings. McClure v. Maass, 110 Or App *507119, 821 P2d 1105 (1991), rev den 313 Or 74 (1992), for example, demonstrates that the petitioner in a post-conviction proceeding personally bears the responsibility for presenting all relevant issues to the court. In McClure, the plaintiff in a habeas corpus proceeding alleged that he was denied adequate assistance of counsel in his criminal trial and in an initial post-conviction proceeding. The plaintiff had also filed a second petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his first post-conviction counsel was inadequate because he had failed to raise relevant issues. The trial court had dismissed the petition in the second post-conviction proceeding for failure to state a claim for relief. The plaintiff then filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, alleging that his counsel in the first post-conviction proceeding was inadequate. Id. at 122. We affirmed the dismissal of that action. We acknowledged that ORS 138.590 provides for the appointment of “suitable counsel” in post-conviction proceedings, but we reasoned that “post-conviction counsel is not obligated to scour the record to unearth every conceivable challenge to the lawfulness of the petitioner’s conviction or sentence. The responsibility for discerning and selecting the issues for litigation rests with the petitioner.” Id. at 124. Although McClure involved a collateral attack on, rather than a direct appeal of, a judgment denying post-conviction relief, it makes clear that the ultimate responsibility for prosecuting the proceeding lies with the petitioner, not with counsel.
Additional case law demonstrates that the adequacy of post-conviction counsel may not be challenged in a later post-conviction proceeding. In Hetrick v. Keeney, 77 Or App 506, 713 P2d 688, rev den 300 Or 722 (1986), this court held that “[t]he grounds for post-conviction relief are found in ORS 138.530(1). * * * The alleged inadequacy of prior post-conviction counsel is not one of the enumerated grounds. Therefore, petitioner is not entitled to post-conviction relief.” Id. at 507. In Page v. Cupp, 78 Or App 520, 523, 717 P2d 1183, rev den 301 Or 338 (1986), this court noted that ORS 138.590 provides for the appointment of “suitable” counsel but nevertheless reaffirmed that any right to counsel cannot be vindicated in later litigation. Id. at 523 & n 2. In reaching that conclusion, the court relied, in part, on Church v. Gladden, 244 Or 308, 311, 417 P2d 993 (1966). In Church, the Supreme Court *508explained that, if a remedy were to exist for inadequacy of counsel in second-tier proceedings,
“it is absolutely impossible that there be any finality to this type of litigation. In each successive post-conviction proceeding all a petitioner need do is allege that his attorneys in each of his previous proceedings were unfaithful to their trust, and the door is opened wide to relitigate ad infinitum.” Id.
Petitioner’s argument that he is entitled to a delayed appeal is difficult to reconcile with the decisions in Church, Page, and Hetrick. Counsel’s failure to perfect an appeal from a judgment denying relief is not different, in practical effect, from any other form of inadequate assistance rendered during the course of post-conviction litigation. There is no principled basis for distinguishing between inadequate post-conviction counsel who fails to raise critical errors committed by criminal trial counsel that would have entitled the petitioner to post-conviction relief and inadequate post-conviction counsel who fails to file a timely appeal from a judgment denying post-conviction relief.8
The foregoing decisions reveal fundamental differences between the nature of termination of parental rights and post-conviction proceedings, differences that make the rules announced in Geist and Hammons inapplicable here. In a termination proceeding, the state initiates an action against a parent to deprive the parent of a substantial interest: the right to be a parent. The direct assault on that right requires that the finality sought by the state be achieved, if at all, in a manner that is “consistent with due process.” Geist, 310 Or at 186. In that regard, termination proceedings are analogous to criminal prosecutions, where defendants also have a right to a delayed appeal when criminal trial counsel fails to file a timely notice of appeal. ORS 138.071(4)(a). See also Shipman v. Gladden, 253 Or 192, 453 P2d 921 (1969) (holding, prior to enactment of ORS 138.071(4)(a), that, based on due process considerations, petitioner was entitled to a delayed criminal appeal where his criminal trial counsel failed to file a timely appeal). A post-conviction proceeding, *509on the other hand, is a collateral action initiated by the petitioner after a criminal conviction already has deprived the petitioner of a liberty interest. We recently acknowledged the importance of that distinction in Elkins v. Thompson, 174 Or App 307, 25 P3d 376 (2001), where a post-conviction petitioner argued that Geist governed his claim that he was entitled to a hearing on his request for substitute counsel. In rejecting the petitioner’s argument, we explained:
“[U]nlike a proceeding for termination of parental rights, in which the state brings the direct weight of its power to bear on parents who risk losing the fundamental right of parenthood, petitioner has been convicted of a crime in an underlying proceeding. In contrast to the challenge of the defending parent in Geist, petitioner’s motion did not address the performance of counsel in the underlying proceeding that resulted in a deprivation of his liberty interests. Here, unlike in the criminal proceeding, petitioner is the party who is ultimately responsible for prosecuting the action. In sum, this is a collateral civil proceeding, in which petitioner is the party seeking relief. The Geist rationale is not controlling here merely because petitioner, like the parent in Geist, also has a statutory right to suitable counsel.” Id. at 315-16 (emphasis in original; citations omitted).
The dissent’s failure to recognize this fundamental difference leads it, erroneously in our view, to conclude that the reasoning of Geist is controlling in this case. The only question for decision in this case, as framed by petitioner, is whether this court should create, by implication, a remedy that the legislature has not expressly provided for the violation of a statutory right in a collateral proceeding.
PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 859 P2d 1143 (1993), decided after Geist, provides a structured methodology for statutory construction, which at the first level, requires construction based upon statutory text and context. Simply put, there is no textual or contextual support for the existence of a delayed appeal right for post-conviction petitioners arising from ORS 138.590(1).9 The *510statute’s context, in fact, suggests that the legislature did not intend to create such a remedy. By enacting ORS 138.071(4)(a), the legislature provided a statutory remedy for the inadequacy of counsel who fails to timely perfect a criminal appeal. However, it has not provided any statutory mechanism for review of the adequacy of counsel in a post-conviction proceeding, let alone a delayed appeal remedy in the case of counsel’s failure to perfect an appeal. The express legislative creation of a review procedure, in general, and a delayed appeal remedy, in particular, only for inadequate representation in criminal proceedings, strongly suggests that the legislature did not intend to provide a delayed appeal remedy for inadequacy of post-conviction counsel. See PGE (stating that, in construing a statute, the inquiry into its context includes other related statutes); Orr v. City of Eugene, 151 Or App 541, 545, 950 P2d 397 (1997) (rejecting implication of statutory term where exploration of other statutes discloses that legislature knows how to unambiguously express such a term). Against that background, we decline to imply a statutory right to a delayed appeal as a remedy for the alleged inadequacy of post-conviction counsel in failing to file a timely notice of appeal. We are not called upon to determine whether petitioner is entitled to relief on any other ground.
Motion for delayed appeal denied; appeal dismissed.
ORCP 70 B provides, in part:
“The clerk, on the date judgment is entered, shall mail a notice of the date of entry of the judgment in the register and shall mail a copy of the entry in the judgment docket. * * * The clerk shall mail the notice to the attorneys of record, if any, of each party who is not in default for failure to appear.”
A linchpin of petitioner’s reliance on Geist and Hammons is the assumption that counsel’s failure to file a timely notice of appeal constituted unsuitable representation. Counsel appears to have relied on ORCP 70 B by waiting to receive notice from the court clerk that a judgment had been entered. For reasons explained below, we need not decide whether, under those circumstances, counsel’s performance was inadequate as a matter of law. However, we expressly disapprove of any failure to provide notice of the entry of judgment to all parties who are entitled to notice under ORCP 70 B.
That practice had developed in connection with the issuance of unpublished orders in prior cases.
ORS 138.071(4)(a) provides:
“Upon motion of a defendant, the Court of Appeals shall grant the defendant leave to file a notice of appeal after the time limits described in subsections (1) to (3) of this section if:
“(A) The defendant, by clear and convincing evidence, shows that the failure to file a timely notice of appeal is not attributable to the defendant personally; and
*504“(B) The defendant shows a colorable claim of error in the proceeding from which the appeal is taken.”
ORS 419.525 was repealed, Or Laws 1993, ch 33, § 373, and the legislature added ORS 419B.518, which provides for the appointment of counsel, using the same language as former ORS 419.525(2). This change did not affect the holding of Geist. See Hunt v. Weiss, 169 Or App 317, 321 & n 3, 8 P3d 990 (2000) (holding that pare. t parental termination proceeding is entitled to counsel under ORS *505419B.518, noting that ORS 419B.518 provides the same right as former ORS 419.525(2)).
The court did not reach the mother’s “Fourteenth Amendment due process claim that the state must provide a remedy to vindicate her right to adequate counsel.” Id. at 187 n 12.
ORS 419A.200(3)(c) generally requires the filing of a notice of appeal within 30 days after entry of a termination judgment, but ORS 419A.200(4)(c) permits, under specified circumstances, delayed appeals up to 90 days after the entry of judgment for pro se petitioners.
The dissent disagrees but offers no persuasive rationale for treating unsuitable representation rendered in those contexts differently.
As the dissent notes, we followed the reasoning of Geist in Hammons. We also applied the Geist principle in State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Balderas, 172 Or App 223, 18 P3d 434 (2001), a juvenile delinquency case. However, both Hammons and Balderas involved primary actions against individuals whose liberty interests were directly at stake. They are not applicable here.