dissenting.
The issue that the majority appears to decide is whether petitioner, which properly exercised its undisputed statutory right to appear before LUBA to challenge the county’s decision in this case, now has constitutional standing to seek judicial review of LUBA’s adverse decision.1 In concluding that petitioner does not have that standing, the majority misconceives the nature of the legislature’s authority to permit a nongovernmental entity to seek a judicial determination of the legality of governmental action when that entity has participated in the process that led to the action in question. Because I believe that petitioner’s involvement was sufficient to give it an interest that the Oregon Constitution permits the legislature to recognize, I dissent from the majority’s decision.
The legislature’s broad grant of standing in ORS 197.830(2) to appeal a local land use decision to LUBA is part of its general scheme for enforcing the statewide land use system that it first enacted almost 30 years ago and that it *586has frequently reinforced since then. See Or Laws 1973, ch 80; ORS chapter 197. Under that system, local governmental land use decisions must comply with criteria whose ultimate source is state law, as expressed in statewide goals that the Land Conservation and Development Commission (LCDC) has adopted. To ensure that those decisions comply, the legislature provided for appeals from the local government to LUBA by any “person” who meets the standing requirements of ORS 197.830(2), including organizations like petitioner. ORS 197.015(18). It also provided that a person who appears as a party before LUBA may seek judicial review of LUBA’s decision. ORS 197.850. In doing so, the legislature recognized the difficulty of relying solely on a state agency to enforce the statewide requirements in the multitude of land use decisions that local governments make. The heart of my disagreement with the majority is its failure to recognize the public policy considerations involved in the legislature’s decision, including the legislature’s broad discretion to determine who may challenge the legality of executive department actions, and its concomitant failure to recognize the resulting constitutional sufficiency of the legislature’s conferral of standing on those persons.
It is essential to remember that this case is not a private dispute between private parties; it involves the implementation, through the action of the executive department, of a major legislative policy. Like other administrative decisions in quasi-judicial cases, it did not begin in the courts; rather it came to us fully formed from another branch of government. The Executive Department, implementing the relevant statutes and their accompanying legislative policy, has already determined the issues in the case and the parties to it. Only after LUBA, an agency of the Executive Department, completed its work could those involved seek judicial review. See, e.g., Oregon Health Care Assn. v. Health Div., 329 Or 480, 992 P2d 434 (1999). Thus, the case comes to the judiciary with the issues, parties, and evidence that it had when it left the executive department. The judiciary’s role is not to change those things but to determine whether the executive acted in accordance with the applicable legal requirements. See ORS 183.482(8). The very fact that courts refer to their role as “judicial review” rather than as an “appeal” from a *587lower tribunal reflects the different nature of their involvement with administrative cases.
One aspect of administrative cases is that statutes that describe who may be a party to them govern the actions of the Executive Department before they have any effect on the judiciary. Thus, the Executive Department will simply comply with a broad legislative grant of standing to appear before an administrative agency; so far as the Executive Department is concerned, there are no constitutional problems. A number of statutes contain such broad grants. As noted, ORS 197.830(2), which permits a person to challenge a land use decision before LUBA if the person participated before the local government, gives broad standing as a matter of right. On the other hand, ORS 183.310(6)(c), which permits an agency to allow any person to be a party to a contested case when the agency determines that the person has an interest in the case “or represents a public interest” in the result, and ORS 469.370(5), which allows the Energy Facility Siting Council to permit any person to be a party if the person participated at an earlier stage of the proceeding, give agencies discretion to grant a person standing as a party.
As ORS 183.310(6)(c) suggests, one of the purposes of a broad grant of standing at the administrative level may be to ensure that the public interest is fully represented. This is a point that the Supreme Court emphasized in Market v. Portland Gen. Elect., 277 Or 447, 561 P2d 154 (1977). In rejecting a challenge to a private party’s intervention in an energy facility siting case, it explained that ORS 469.370(5)
“gives no greater procedural weight to an intervenor’s personal self-interest than to an interest that he shares with other members of the public. It expresses the legislature’s judgment that the important decisions of public policy entrusted to the Energy Facility Siting Council are not to be treated as a dispute between opposing private interests.” Id. at 453-54.
Standing, thus, depended on the intervenor’s representation of the public interest in a matter of public concern, not on the intervenor’s personal stake in the decision.
Petitioner unquestionably was a proper party to the LUBA proceeding, because the legislature has determined *588that persons in its position represent an important public interest. As a party, it also had statutory standing to seek judicial review of LUBA’s final order. In this respect, ORS 197.850(1) is identical in substance to ORS 183.480(1), which permits any party to an agency proceeding — which includes any person whom the agency in its discretion recognizes as a party — to obtain judicial review of a final order.2
The Supreme Court has linked the requirement that a controversy be justiciable to two provisions of the Oregon Constitution: Article III, section 1, and Article VII (Amended), section l.3 First Commerce of America v. Nimbus Center Assoc., 329 Or 199, 206, 986 P2d 556 (1999); Barcik v. Kubiaczyk, 321 Or 174, 188-89, 895 P2d 765 (1995). There is nothing, though, in the language of those provisions that creates the limit on legislative authority supposed by the majority. In a discussion that bears emphasis here, the leading commentators on administrative law have vigorously criticized the United States Supreme Court’s construction in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US 555, 560-61, 112 S Ct 2130, 119 L Ed 2d 351 (1992), of the “case or controversy” limitation in Article III of the United States Constitution:
“Once the legislature has declared a form of injury legally cognizable through the process of statutory enactment, the Court’s power and authority to decline to recognize that form of injury is severely limited. The Court’s *589power in this context is identical to its power to hold any statutory enactment invalid. It can hold the statute invalid only if the statute conflicts with the Constitution. This observation provides an easy answer to the hypothetical question frequently posed by administrative law scholars: Could Congress confer standing to challenge a class of government actions on all blue-eyed people? The answer is clearly ‘no,’ but that answer is based on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the case or controversy limitation in Article III.
“Of course, the case or controversy clause itself provides some limit on Congress’ power to enact a statute that makes a form of injury legally cognizable. * * * There probably are forms of injury so abstract that Congress cannot make them legally cognizable by statutory enactment consistent with Article III. It would require an imagination more vivid even than that of most law professors to list examples, however.” Kenneth Culp Davis & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., 3 Administrative Law Treatise § 16.8 at 51-52 (1994).
The authors further explained:
“The Court’s attempt [in Lujan] to transpose a doctrine of judicial restraint into a judicially enforced doctrine of congressional restraint does not work. Once Congress issues a command to agencies and calls on courts to enforce that command, a judicial refusal to enforce the command can no longer be characterized as judicial restraint. It is more accurately characterized as abdication of judicial responsibility to enforce the policy decision of a politically accountable Branch.” Id. § 16.16 at 95.
To restate the critical inquiry posed by Professors Davis and Pierce, under which provision of the Oregon Constitution is ORS 197.850(1) invalid as applied in this case? With respect, the answer is none. By giving petitioner standing to seek judicial review of LUBA’s decision, the legislature has done nothing that violates the separation of powers principle expressed in Article III, section 1, or that transgresses the judicial power conferred by Article VII (Amended), section 1. It merely has exercised the authority accorded to it by Article III, section 1, to provide for the enforcement of its statutory enactments. The majority’s decision, in point of fact, actually threatens the legislature’s constitutional exercise of *590its authority to provide for such enforcement. In that regard, it cannot be reconciled with several cases decided by the Oregon Supreme Court.
In Market, pursuant to an applicable statute, the Energy Facility Siting Council granted the petitioner party status in a proceeding involving the proposed Pebble Springs nuclear plants. On review, PGE challenged the petitioner’s standing. The court rejected the challenge, pointing out that the governing statute authorized the council to permit a person to become a party if the person represented a public interest in the result, without regard to the person’s individual interest. After pointing out that important issues of public policy raise considerations that are different from those involved in private disputes between private parties, the court held that Marbet had standing to seek judicial review not only of issues that arose from his individual intervention but of all issues in the case. 277 Or at 455-57.
In Jefferson Landfill Comm. v. Marion Co., 297 Or 280, 284, 686 P2d 310 (1984), the court construed ORS 197.830(3) (1983), which was the predecessor to the current version of ORS 197.830(2). Under the earlier version, a person could seek LUBA review of a quasi-judicial land use decision if the person had appeared before the local government orally or in writing and either was entitled to notice of the hearing or was “aggrieved or has interests adversely affected by the decision.” The issue that the court decided was what was necessary to show that the party was aggrieved under the statute. The court concluded that a showing was sufficient if:
“1. The person’s interest in the decision was recognized by the local land use decision-making body;
“2. The person asserted a position on the merits; and
“3. The local land use decision-making body reached a position contrary to the position asserted by the person.” Id. (footnote omitted).
In the absence of an express determination to the contrary by the local body, the court assumed that a person who appeared before it and asserted a position on the merits had a recognized interest in the outcome and thus would be aggrieved by *591an adverse decision. Nothing in Jefferson Landfill suggests that the court believed that the statutory meaning of “aggrieved” required less of an interest than it would when used for constitutional purposes.4
In People for Ethical Treatment v. Inst. Animal Care, 312 Or 95, 105, 817 P2d 1299 (1991), the court explained why the petitioner, despite the fact that it had advocated actively before the agency and lost, lacked standing under ORS 183.480(1) to enforce the agency’s statutory quorum requirements.5 It first noted that “PETA has not asserted an interest different from that of the general public, i.e., PETA is a bystander, and the interest of the general public is not enough to give PETA standing.” Id. at 104. The petitioner also argued that it was aggrieved because it had actively participated in the agency proceeding, even though it was not a party. In response, the court said:
“This participation test is explicit in our land use decisions on standing for an ‘aggrieved’ person. [Jefferson Landfill, 297 Or at 284]; Benton County v. Friends of Benton County, supra, 294 Or [79,] 86[, 653 P2d 1249 (1982)]. However, Benton County was a land use case. [.Marbet] does not imply standing for anyone who may participate in a hearing before an agency. PETA’s attempt to incorporate the test for standing under land use statutes into the APA generally is not well taken. This court has stated that standing as an ‘aggrieved’ person in land use proceedings is broader than that under the Oregon APA. See Jefferson Landfill[,] 297 Or at 284-86. Although the legislature may use the same words to describe the scope of standing under two different statutory schemes, the ‘criteria are by no means uniform or consistent.’ [Benton County], 294 Or at 82. Land use decisions, and the criteria for standing to seek review of these decisions, are suigeneris.” Id. at 105.
*592According to the majority, the court in People for Ethical Treatment held “that the association failed to satisfy the statutory standing requirements of the APA, ORS 183.480, because it could not demonstrate ‘a personal stake in the outcome.’ ” 176 Or App at 539. What the court actually said was that a person is “aggrieved” under ORS 183.480(1) if the person shows one or more of three factors:
“(1) the person has suffered an injury to a substantial interest resulting directly from the challenged governmental action; (2) the person seeks to further an interest that the legislature expressly wished to have considered; or (3) the person has such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure concrete adverseness to the proceeding.” People for Ethical Treatment, 312 Or at 101-02 (citations omitted; emphasis added).
According to the Supreme Court, none of those factors confers “aggrieved” status on persons “who merely are ‘dissatisfied with the agency’s order,’ or who have only an ‘abstract interest * * * in the question presented,’ or who are mere bystanders.” Id. at 102 (citations omitted). Given that construction, the majority’s understanding of the constitutional “practical effect” requirement is, in effect, indistinguishable from the Supreme Court’s description of the statutory test for an aggrieved person.6
As the foregoing decisions make clear, the Supreme Court has accepted legislative determinations to tie standing to seek judicial review directly to participation in the administrative proceeding as a party or statutory aggrievement. In doing so, it has recognized that administrative proceedings involve public interests, not simply disputes between opposing private parties. By deciding those cases as it did, it also has implicitly recognized that a person who has standing before the administrative agency under those criteria has constitutional standing. That is, someone on whom the legislature has conferred party status before an executive *593agency so that the person can represent the public interest in proceedings in that branch, or who is statutorily aggrieved by the agency’s decision, has thereby acquired a sufficient interest in the outcome to call upon the courts to determine whether the Executive Department has acted legally.
The court’s emphasis in Marbet on the public policy implications of standing to seek review of administration determinations is particularly significant in this case because of the special role that land use law has in Oregon’s legal system. Land use decisions do not simply affect property owners, neighbors, and the public bodies within whose jurisdiction the land in question may lie. Rather, they arise from a legislative choice to regulate land use on a statewide basis, for the protection and benefit of the people of the state as a whole. That is why the legislature gave members of the public who actively participate in land use decisions the right both to appeal those decisions to LUBA and to seek judicial review of LUBA’s actions. Even assuming that statutory standing may, in extreme circumstances, fail to satisfy state constitutional requirements, that proposition does not justify the majority’s conclusion that the legislature’s conferral of standing — and the legislature’s determination of the state’s public policy and who may enforce that policy in the courts— is irrelevant in determining whether a party has the kind of interest that will create standing. In my view, and as the Supreme Court has suggested, a general public interest that the legislature has defined as such can be enough to give rise to the “practical effect” that the majority finds necessary. That legislative policy choice neither interferes with the judiciary’s ability to do its job nor brings a nonjusticiable case before it; thus, the courts are not free to supplant it.
None of the cases relied on by the majority requires a contrary conclusion. In Rawls, the court refused to sanction a judgment sought by parties who were not adverse that would bind nonparties with respect to the constitutionality of a statute. Not surprisingly, the court declined to enter a declaratory judgment where no controversy existed between the parties. Rawls did not turn on whether a judicial determination would have a practical effect on the parties. Instead, the court quite properly was concerned with the effect of such a determination on nonparties. 281 Or at 298-99.
*594Again, this case presents a very different set of circumstances. Nobody questions that petitioner’s position is adverse to the interests of the respondents. To the contrary, if petitioner is not permitted to contest LUBA’s decision, it will go unchallenged, even if erroneous. When the legislature gave broad standing to aggrieved persons, it likely had circumstances such as these in mind. Often, only organizations like petitioner will be vigilant and resourceful enough to ensure that the state’s land use laws are enforced. For this court to hold that LUBA’s decision has no practical effect on petitioner misses that point altogether.
Nor does Mclntire v. Forbes, 322 Or 426, 909 P2d 846 (1996), pose a barrier to our determination that the petition is justiciable. The court’s holding that the term “any interested person,” as used in the Light Rail Funding Act, “at least includes a taxpayer whose tax burden will be or is likely to be increased by operation of the Act,” id. at 432, does not govern whether LUBA’s decision in this case has a practical effect on petitioner. In Mclntire, the court simply reaffirmed its statement in Brumnett v. PSRB, 315 Or 402, 848 P2d 1194 (1993), that the “standing” aspect of justiciability requires that a judicial decision must have a practical effect on the rights of parties. Id. at 433. Although the court analyzed the justiciability of the petitioners’ claims in a separate portion of the opinion from its consideration of the petitioners’ statutory authority to bring a claim under the Act, it linked the two analyses with a summary declaration: “As discussed more fully elsewhere, a decision by the court will have a practical effect on the parties.” Id. at 433-34. Because the court had no reason to consider whether a statute such as the one before us was constitutional under the circumstances present here, Mclntire does not meaningfully assist us in determining the contours of the “practical effect” requirement.
Likewise, our decision in Poddar is distinguishable because it did not involve review of a legislative conferral of standing. In short, none of the foregoing cases suggests that the Oregon Constitution requires that a party seeking judicial review of a LUBA decision must satisfy a more rigorous test for standing than is necessary to prove that he or she was a party before the agency or is adversely affected or aggrieved by its decision.
*595As I understand the majority’s holding, it ultimately reduces to the following conclusion, which epitomizes our disagreement:
“In this case, the only right conferred by ORS 197.830 and ORS 197.850 is the right to seek judicial review of a local government decision without having to establish that the decision will affect the person seeking review. That is nothing more than the conferral of the right to obtain an advisory opinion, which is beyond the authority of the legislature to grant.” 176 Or App at 550.
Petitioner satisfied the requirements to seek review by LUBA of the county’s decision, and to seek judicial review of LUBA’s decision. Petitioner’s interest was recognized by the county and LUBA; it asserted a position on the merits before those bodies. Both the county and LUBA reached a decision contrary to petitioner’s asserted position. There is nothing advisory about the relief petitioner seeks on review. Petitioner lawfully invokes this court’s power — indeed, its obligation — to correct an erroneous agency decision in a proceeding in which it properly was a party. Petitioner was adversely affected or aggrieved and therefore has standing to seek review of that decision. Jefferson Landfill, 297 Or at 284.
Because I agree with the Chief Judge’s view of the merits of the petition, I likewise would remand.
I respectfully dissent.
Wollheim, J., joins in this dissent.I say “appears to decide” because the majority at times refers to “justiciability” without distinguishing among its various categories. For example, it seems to give some weight to cases, such as Oregon Medical Association v. Rawls, 281 Or 293, 574 P2d 1103 (1978), and Oregon Cry. Mfgs. Ass’n v. White, 159 Or 99, 78 P2d 572 (1938), that involve lack of adversity between the parties (Rawls) or lack of a ripe controversy (Oregon Cry. Mfgs. Ass’n) rather than standing. Because in this case it is clear that the parties are adverse to each other and that their dispute is ripe for decision, those cases can have no bearing on our decision. A lack of constitutionally required standing is the only aspect of justiciability that can explain the majority’s decision.
ORS 183.480(1) also permits a person adversely affected or aggrieved by a final order to obtain judicial review. That provision both creates additional grounds for seeking review and makes it clear that a party may obtain review without showing that it was adversely affected or aggrieved by the order. See Brian v. Oregon Government Ethics Commission, 319 Or 151, 874 P2d 1294 (1994).
Article III, section 1, of the Oregon Constitution, provides:
“The powers of the Government shall be divided into three separate departments, the Legislative, the Executive, including the administrative, and the Judicial; and no person charged with official duties under one of these departments, shall exercise any of the functions of another, except as in this Constitution expressly provided.”
Article VII (Amended), section 1, of the Oregon Constitution, provides:
“The judicial power of the state shall be vested in one supreme court and in such other courts as may from time to time be created by law. The judges of the supreme and other courts shall be elected by the legal voters of the state or of their respective districts for a term of six years, and shall receive such compensation as may be provided by law, which compensation shall not be diminished during the term for which they are elected.”
In Jefferson Landfill, no party contended that ORS 183.480(1) confers standing that exceeds the judicial power of the state that Article VII (Amended) of the Oregon Constitution confers on the courts. Because standing is a jurisdictional requirement, by its decision that the petitioner had standing to seek judicial review, the court necessarily held that the statutory grant of standing did not exceed constitutional limits. Otherwise it would have dismissed the petition on its own motion.
Because People for Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) was not a party to the agency proceeding, it had to base its standing on being adversely affected or aggrieved by the agency’s decision.
Once again, if aggrievement required a lesser effect than is necessary to create a justiciable claim, the court sua sponte would be compelled to refuse its claimant standing. See Poddar v. Clatsop County, 167 Or App 162, 164, 2 P3d 929, adhered to 168 Or App 556, 7 P3d 677, rev den 331 Or 193 (2000) (holding that courts must consider the issue of justiciability sua sponte, because it affects the court’s jurisdiction to enter a judgment).