(Dissenting).
{19} The Defendant, David Joe, was charged by Criminal Information, San Juan County CR 2001-609-1, with the crimes of: 1. Persons Under the Influence of Intoxicating Liquor or Drugs (fourth or subsequent offense — a fourth degree felony); 2. Open Container (a misdemeanor); 3. Evidence of Financial Responsibility (a misdemeanor); 4. Failure to Use Headlights when Required (a misdemeanor); 5. Improper Registration (a misdemeanor). At a rehearing on Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of the stop on the no-headlights violation, the trial court suppressed the evidence, directed a verdict, and declared a mistrial on the other charges.
{20} I dissent because the trial court incorrectly concluded that Deputy Jiles contradicted himself and should therefore not be believed. The trial court concluded, at an earlier hearing, that the evidence of the no-headlight violation should not be suppressed. The trial court was correct the first time.
{21} The trial court was concerned with how Deputy Jiles could say that even though he could see Defendant’s vehicle up to 500 yards away, it was nevertheless dangerous for Defendant to drive. According to Deputy Jiles, without headlights on, it was not possible to see even 500 feet at the time of this encounter with Defendant. How could the Deputy see three times farther than the Defendant could?
{22} The trial court overlooked two important things. First, the reason Deputy Jiles could see so much farther than Defendant is that his headlights were on while Defendant’s were off. Second, the trial court failed to adequately take into account that Defendant was the only one in traffic whose headlights were off while all the other vehicles had their headlights on.
{23} Furthermore, Deputy Jiles testified that it was already dark, even though it was still close to sundown. Granted, this Court is supposed to indulge all reasonable presumptions in support of the trial court’s ruling. State v. Martinez, 2002-NMCA-043, ¶ 9, 132 N.M. 101, 45 P.3d 41. I am not persuaded, as the majority is, that these presumptions were reasonable.
{24} The trial court correctly concluded that the determination of distances by a police officer is a subjective matter and rightfully so.
{25} I therefore conclude that, considering the totality of the circumstances, Deputy Jiles had reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant’s vehicle. I am also convinced that Deputy Jiles could have stopped Defendant’s vehicle on a community care taking/public safety basis.
{26} Once the stop is proper, there should have been neither a suppression of evidence, nor a mistrial on the other counts. As the majority points out, “we understand the serious nature of Defendant’s charges.” With the evidence of Defendant’s slurred speech, odor of alcohol, bloodshot eyes, a .17 blood alcohol level, and the Defendant’s five prior DWI convictions, I understand the seriousness of Defendant’s charges.
{27} The trial court erred in suppressing the State’s evidence on the no-headlight count, directing a verdict thereon, and declaring a mistrial on the remaining counts.
{28} I therefore respectfully dissent.