dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 22-3609a authorizes an appeal to a district judge of a magistrate’s order revoking a defendant’s probation. I find the statute only authorizes a defendant to appeal a magistrate’s judgment of guilt for a trial de novo in district court.
Much of the majority’s analysis is correct. The right to appeal is entirely statutory and is not contained in the United States or Kansas Constitutions. Wasson v. United Dominion Industries, 266 Kan. 1012, 1018-19, 974 P.2d 578 (1999). K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 22-3609a provides the only authority for Legero to attempt to appeal his probation revocation to a district judge.
I agree that when a statute is plain and unambiguous, the court must give effect to the intention of the legislature as expressed, rather than determine what the law should or should not be. See *903State ex rel. Stovall v. Meneley, 271 Kan. 355, 378, 22 P.3d 124 (2001). Further, in construing statutes and determining legislative intent, several provisions of an act or acts, in pari materia, must be construed together with a view toward reconciling and bringing them into workable harmony if possible. Petty v. City of El Dorado, 270 Kan. 847, 852, 19 P.3d 167 (2001).
The majority focuses on the first subsection of 22-3609a and concludes that a probation revocation is “any judgment” of a magistrate judge which can be appealed to a district judge. The majority states, without citing any specific legal authority, that “[f]rom an appellate perspective, a judgment is usually considered to be the final act or determination by a lower court that disposes of the litigation.” Actually, the term “judgment” has been defined more narrowly. Kansas courts have repeatedly defined a criminal “judgment” as a pronouncement of guilt and the determination of the punishment. State v. Remlinger, 266 Kan. 103, 106, 968 P.2d 671 (1998). This is what separates the term “judgment” from other orders of the court.
The majority correctly notes that Remlinger and State v. Lashley, 233 Kan. 620, 664 P.2d 1358 (1983), are factually distinguishable from the present case. However, both decisions contain language which is noteworthy to the issue before the court.
In Remlinger, the court observed that 22-3609a permits an appeal from any judgment of a magistrate, whereas 22-3609, which applies to municipal courts, permits an appeal from any judgment of guilt. Legero relies on this distinction to support his argument that the legislature did not intend to limit appeals from magistrates to judgments of guilt as it clearly limited appeals from municipal courts. However, the Supreme Court addressed this argument in Remlinger and stated: “We find the different wording of the statutes to be a distinction without a difference.” 266 Kan. at 107. Thus, although factually distinguishable from the present case, Remlinger rejected the argument Legero is now making about comparing the language of 22-3609 and 22-3609a. The Remlinger court attached little importance to the differing language in construing 22-3609a.
*904The Lashley decision contains dicta that is particularly noteworthy. In construing K.S.A. 1982 Supp. 22-3609a, which is substantially similar to the present statutory language, the court stated: “Judgments that can be appealed under K.S.A. 1982 Supp. 22-3609a are convictions in traffic or misdemeanor cases and those convictions rendered pursuant to K.S.A. 1982 Supp. 22-2909(c).” (Emphasis added.) 233 Kan. at 624. Thus, Lashley implied that the term “any judgment” pursuant to 22-3609a includes only convictions. Under this interpretation, “any judgment” would not include an order revoking a defendant’s probation. See State v. Kleen, 257 Kan. 911, 914, 896 P.2d 376 (1995).
This dissent, however, is not based upon the language of Rem-linger or Lashley. I simply believe the majority’s construction of 22-3609a focuses only on the first sentence of the statute and ignores its remaining provisions. The first sentence of 22-3609a allows a defendant to appeal from “any judgment” of a district magistrate judge. Considered in isolation from the remainder of the statute, this language may seem to encompass a probation revocation order. However, construing 22-3609a in its entirety reveals a legislative intent that only convictions or judgments of guilt can be appealed from a magistrate to a district judge. Although 22-3609a(l) refers to “any judgment,” 22-3609a(3) directs the clerk of the district court to “deliver the complaint, warrant and any appearance bond to the district judge” and that the “case shall be tried de novo before the assigned district judge.” K.S.A. 22-3609a(5) directs that “All appeals . . . from a district magistrate judge in misdemeanor cases shall be tried by the court unless a jury trial is requested. . . .’’(Emphasis added.) This language supports an interpretation that the only type of “judgment” the legislature intended to be appealed from a magistrate is a conviction resulting in a trial de novo in district court. Had the legislature intended a broader interpretation of 22-3609a, it could have allowed for an appeal from “any final order” of a magistrate instead of from “any judgment” as the statute provides.
This interpretation of K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 22-3609a also makes that statute harmonious with the language of K.S.A. 22-3610. *905K.S.A. 22-3610, which applies to appeals to district court from both municipal courts and magistrates, provides in part:
“(a) When a case is appealed to the district court, such court shall hear and determine the cause on the original complaint .... The case shall be tried de novo in the district court.”
Again, the statutory language only seems to encompass the appeal of a conviction resulting in a trial de novo in district court.
Construing 22-3609a in its entirety together with 22-3610, and also considering the Supreme Court’s rulings in Lashley and Remlinger, I agree with the district court’s ruling that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the magistrate’s order revoking Legero’s probation. A determination that Legero has no right to appeal a probation revocation to a district judge may seem unfair, especially since a probation revocation by a district judge can be appealed to the Court of Appeals. However, the right to appeal is entirely statutory. I also find it unfair that a defendant cannot appeal a probation revocation from municipal court, but no such right is provided by statute.