specially concurring.
Like Judge Schwartzman, I concur fully in the majority opinion. I also join in his special concurrence. I write separately only for the purpose of pointing out that invasive, uncompensated takings which entail the construction of public improvements on private property have distinct characteristics which set them apart from both non-invasive and so-called “regulatory” takings. There are sound practical and policy reasons for recognizing these distinctions. This case presents a classic example of these differences and serves to readily explain why the principles set forth in McCuskey v. Canyon County Commissioners, 128 Idaho 213, 912 P.2d 100 (1996) and Tibbs v. City of Sandpoint, 100 Idaho 667, 603 P.2d 1001 (1979) are inappo-site.
First, it should be noted that the Court does not and has not overruled either McCuskey or Tibbs; rather, the Court has distinguished the facts presented here from those presented in McCuskey and Tibbs, and has clarified the types of cases to which McCuskey and Tibbs apply.
In McCuskey the Court determined that actions for inverse condemnation are governed by the four year “catch-all” limitation period set forth in I.C. § 5-224. While § 5-224 provides that actions to which it applies “[MJust be commenced within four (4) years after the cause of action shall have accrued,” it does not specify when “the cause of action shall have accrued” in order to set the statutory period of limitation in motion.
In McCuskey, the court resolved this uncertainty by “borrowing” from its earlier decision in Tibbs. In Tibbs, the Court was called upon to determine the date as of which property which is the subject of an inverse taking should be valued. Unlike the situation presented here, the plaintiffs in Tibbs claimed their property had been taken as a result of increased noise and probable restrictions on the height of construction occasioned by an extension of the runway at the municipal airport which caused aircraft to routinely over-fly their farmstead. Adopting the approach taken by the U.S. Court of Claims in similar proceedings brought against the federal government, the court held that the diminution in value should be determined “[Ajfter the full extent of the impairment of plaintiffs’ use and enjoyment of [the property] become apparent.” 100 Idaho at 671, 603 P.2d 1001 quoting Aaron v. United States, 311 F.2d 798, 802, 160 Ct.Cl. 295 (Ct.Cl.1963).
In McCuskey, the court simply took its holding in Tibbs concerning the date of valuation and pressed it into double-duty to fix the date of accrual for statute-of-limitation purposes in inverse condemnation cases.
In view of this history, several observations seem abundantly fair. First, those who are critical of today’s decision on the basis that it surreptitiously overrules McCuskey and/or Tibbs are to be reminded that while the McCuskey decision can fairly be praised for its singular efficiency in creating a single date for both limitation and valuation purposes, it achieved this administrative symmetry by shortening the time within which governmental authorities can be held responsible for violating the provisions of both the state and federal constitutions which prohibit the taking of private property without just compensation.
Secondly, those who are critical of the majority’s decision to apply the rationale of Farber v. State, 102 Idaho 398, 630 P.2d 685 (1981) on the basis that Farber involved the issue of the time period for the filing of a notice of claim under the Idaho Tort Claims Act, rather than a statute of limitation, should remember that the court in McCuskey premised its holding upon Tibbs, which addressed the issue of the date of valuation, not the date of accrual for limitation purposes. There is at least as much logic in relying upon Farber to determine when a limitation period commences to run.
Third, it is important to note that eases which involve an actual physical invasion like that which occurred here can readily be distinguished from non-invasive takings like *148that involved in Tibbs, and regulatory takings like that involved in McCuskey. If one disregards the fact that Tibbs involved the date of valuation, and instead treats it as if it were intended to establish the date of accrual for limitation purposes, it makes some sense to tie the plaintiffs obligation to file his noninvasive inverse condemnation claim at the point in time when “the full extent of the impairment of plaintiffs use and enjoyment ... became apparent.” 100 Idaho at 671, 603 P.2d 1001. Similarly, in cases like McCuskey, where the “taking” consists of the adoption or enforcement of governmental regulations which preclude the plaintiff from using his land for any economically viable purpose, it makes sense to hold that the claim accrues when the plaintiff “[Bjecame aware of the full extent of the government’s interference ...” 128 Idaho at 218, 912 P.2d 100.
By comparison, a case which instead entails an actual physical invasion of private property produces two related, but distinct forms of harm. The first, and most obvious, is the deprivation of the fair market value of the land actually consumed by the public improvement. The second, less-obvious but equally important element of loss is the economic injury inflicted upon any adjoining property which is not actually invaded, and which remains in the plaintiffs ownership. It is a well-established principle that where the public’s use of the condemned land diminishes the value of other adjoining, untaken property, the owner is entitled to recover this loss (typically referred to as “severance damage”) in addition to the value of the invaded land. I.C. § 7-711(2). See, e.g., Canyon View Irr. Co. v. Twin Falls Canal Co., 101 Idaho 604, 614, 619 P.2d 122 (1980); State ex. rel. Symms v. City of Mountain Home, 94 Idaho 528, 532, 493 P.2d 387 (1972).
It is frequently the case that while the value of land actually occupied by the public improvement is relatively minor, the severance damage to the remaining property caused by the public use is substantial, and exceeds the value of the occupied land itself by magnitudes. It may well be that if the loss were limited to the value of the occupied land, the nominal amount at stake would not, as a practical matter, justify the commencement of a full-blown inverse condemnation action, including the associated cost of employing valuation experts, surveyors and able counsel. The potential for recovery of substantial compensation for additional severance damage can entirely change this calculus.
Such seems to be the case here. At oral argument, counsel noted that while the jury awarded damages totaling $212,000, C & G’s own evidence concerning the value of the relatively small amount of land actually occupied by the roadbed had a fair market value of approximately, $12,000. The remaining $200,000, attributable to the severance loss suffered to the remainder of C & G’s farmland represented more than 94% of the verdict.
The difficulty is that, even under the rationale of Tibbs and McCuskey, the “full extent of the impairment” associated with severance damage to the remainder ordinarily will not be ascertainable until the public project is completed and its use begins. To compel the landowner to produce evidence which is unnecessarily conjectural in an attempt to predict his loss before either its existence can be confirmed or its amount can be measured represents a result which is neither just to the landowner who has wrongfully been deprived of his property nor the public which must pay the just compensation required by the taking. It is not unreasonable to require a governmental entity which has violated a citizen’s basic constitutional right to remain subject to suit until the occurrence of actual loss attributable to its wrongful conduct can be verified and valued. Adopting the time of project-completion as the date of accrual of a claim for inverse condemnation which involves a physical invasion accomplishes this simple goal.
Finally, the vast majority of other states which have been faced with the same issue, including our sister western states, have elected to fix the date of project completion as the date of accrual for limitation purposes. See, e.g., DeAlfy Properties v. Pima County, 195 Ariz. 37, 985 P.2d 522, 524 (Ariz.App.1998); Pierpont Inn, Inc. v. State, 70 Cal.2d *149282, 74 Cal.Rptr. 521, 449 P.2d 737, 744-45 (1969) (overruled in part on other grounds); Shockley v. Public Serv. Co. of Colorado, 525 P.2d 1183, 1184 (Colo.App.1974)(cert. den.); Maragos v. City of Minot, 191 N.W.2d 570, 572 (N.D.1971); Gillam v. City of Centralia, 14 Wash.2d 523, 128 P.2d 661, 663-64 (1942) (overruled in part on other grounds); Wyoming State Hwy. Dept. v. Napolitano, 578 P.2d 1342, 1350-51 (Wyo.1978). Today’s decision brings Idaho into line with this well-established majority rule.
For these reasons, and those set forth in the majority opinion and Judge Schwartz-man’s special concurrence, I join in the decision to affirm the district court’s holding that C & G’s inverse condemnation claim was not barred by the statute of limitation.