concurring.
This case was very difficult for me because it seems obvious that the State should have jurisdiction. Jack concedes that the State has a sufficient interest in this case to allow the exercise of state jurisdiction. The alleged assault and sexual assault took place on an Alaska state ferry and the assaults were committed against an Alaskan resident. Jack's claim is that the legislature did not authorize the exercise of state jurisdiction.
Whether the legislature intended to extend its potential jurisdiction over this case is governed by AS 44.08.010(@2). That statute reads as follows:
The jurisdiction of the state extends to water offshore from the coast of the state as follows:
[[Image here]]
(2) The high seas to the extent that jurisdiction is claimed by the United States of America or to the extent recognized by the usages and customs of international law or by agreement to which the United States of America or the state is a party.
The State argues that we should give this language a broad interpretation, which would allow the State to exercise jurisdiction anywhere on the high seas where the United States of America could exercise jurisdiction if the State of Alaska has demonstrated a sufficient interest to overcome constitutional objections. Under this interpretation of the statute, the legislature in AS 44.08.010(2) expressed its desire to extend its criminal jurisdiction to all offenses that occur offshore from the coast of the state. The only limitation would be that the State could not exercise jurisdiction where the United States of America would not have jurisdiction or where the offense would have insufficient contacts with the state so that it would be unconstitutional for the state to exercise jurisdiction.
The language of AS 44.08.010(2) could support such an interpretation. Subsection two extends jurisdiction to "the high seas to the extent that jurisdiction is claimed by the United States of America. ..." There is support for the argument that the high seas, as understood at the time the statute was passed, begin where territorial waters end.1 *678Indeed, this definition is consistent with the definition used by the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, which defined the "high seas" as "all parts of the sea that are not included in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State" and was the first international convention to define the high seas.2 Moreover, the Second Cireuit Court of Appeals has recently reached a similar conclusion regarding the definition of the "high seas."3 In an appeal from the consolidated cases surrounding the TWA Flight 800 crash, the Second Cireuit had to determine the congressional meaning of "high seas" as the term was used in the Death on the High Seas Act.4 After an exhaustive examination of the relevant cases, the court held that, based on the weight of early decisions that addressed the definition, the "high seas" were those waters beyond the territorial waters of the United States.5 Therefore, the definition of high seas within AS 44.08.010(2) could arguably support extending Alaska's jurisdiction extraterritorially. -
Furthermore, subsection two extends state jurisdiction "to the extent that jurisdiction is claimed by the United States of America or to the extent recognized by usages and customs of international law or by agreement to which the United States of America or the state is a party...." Arguably this section of the statute could incorporate by reference the jurisdiction of the United States over its flag ships. The United States governs its flag ships through the federal special maritime and territorial jurisdiction statute. This jurisdiction is defined under 18 U.S.C. § 7 and includes:
The high seas, any other waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State, and any vessel belonging in whole or in part to the United States or any citizen thereof, or to any corporation created by or under the laws of the United States, or of any State, Territory, District, or possession thereof, when such vessel is within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State.[6]
This statute is the jurisdictional basis for a number of other statutes that invoke the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States. For example, when a sexual assault against a minor occurs on the high seas, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2248, 2244 are applicable, with each section invoking § T's special maritime jurisdiction.
Federal courts in a number of circumstances have extended United States jurisdiction into foreign territorial waters.7 Further, there is no constitutional bar to the extraterritorial application of United States *679penal laws.8 Whether Alaska could exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the United States would be an issue of federal exelusivity-an issue of domestic rather than international law.9 Therefore, the court could interpret the language in AS 44.08.010(2) to incorporate by reference the United States's jurisdiction over its flag ships. Interpreted in this way, subsection two would give the State jurisdiction over an Alaska state ferry.
It also seems logical that the State of Alaska would want to extend its jurisdiction extensively to waters far from its coast. As the decisions in State v. Bundrant10 and Corbin v. State11 make clear, Alaska has substantial interests outside its territorial waters. Alaska has an extensive coastline, and activities far from the Alaska coast have a substantial impact on the fishing industry and other Alaska interests.
This is not a recent development, and therefore, in interpreting any statute, it seems reasonable to conclude that the legislature was aware of Alaska's substantial offshore interests and would want to make sure that Alaska could enforce its jurisdiction to the maximum extent possible. The Alaska Ferry System, connecting Alaska by a marine highway to the lower forty-eight states, is simply a more recent example of Alaska's interests and the State's need to extend its jurisdiction to waters offshore of the Alaska coast.
The federal government has limited resources. It might not have an interest in prosecuting any but the most major crimes that occur aboard the Alaska Ferry System. If the State of Alaska does not have jurisdiction in this case, a serious assault might go unremedied.12 The present case is but one example of a kind of case that occurs outside of Alaska's territorial waters where Alaska has a substantial interest in extending jurisdiction. The facts of Corbin present another example.
Corbin involved the theft of crab pots outside of Alaska territorial waters.13 As Jack points out, Corbin is of limited legal value in this case because in Corbin the defendant did not even think to contest Alaska's jurisdiction sixteen miles from the nearest point of land.14 But Corbin does illustrate the type of relatively small offense that can occur outside of Alaska's territorial waters in which Alaska has a substantial interest. If Alaska could not prosecute such crimes, it appears likely that the federal government might have little interest in prosecuting relatively minor offenses. Many activities vital to Alaska have historically occurred outside of Alaska's territorial waters and continue to occur. Therefore, it seems reasonable that the Alaska Legislature would want to extend Alaska's jurisdiction to these activities.
Therefore, there are substantial grounds to support the State's contention that AS 44.03.010(2) provides the State with jurisdiction over this case. The argument that it does not is already set out by Judges Stewart and Mannheimer, and I will not repeat those arguments. But for me, the argument that the legislature intended to extend state jurisdiction offshore from the coast of Alaska to the maximum extent possible breaks down because there does not appear to be any precedent for this interpretation. Many states in the United States border the ocean. And activities that occur far from these *680states' coastlines could have a substantial impact on these states. But we have been unable to find any statute or authority by which a state has attempted to exert jurisdiction as broadly as the State claims that the State of Alaska intended to exert its jurisdiction in AS 44.08.010(2). And, in fact, where coastal states have exerted jurisdiction over crimes that occurred on the high seas, the states have asserted this jurisdiction based on specific narrow statutes addressing particular conduct.
For instance, in Bundrant, the Alaska Supreme Court relied on a specific statute that granted the State jurisdiction to regulate the crabbing industry outside Alaska's territorial waters.15 Similarly, in Skiriotes v. Florida,16 the United States Supreme Court upheld Florida's enforcement of a statute that prohibited the use of diving equipment to take sponges from the Gulf of Mexico off the coast of Florida.17 And, in Florida v. Stepansky,18 the Supreme Court of Florida held that Florida could prosecute a burglary and attempted sexual battery that occurred approximately 100 nautical miles from the coast of Florida. But the prosecution of Stepansky was upheld under a narrow Florida statute that applied to voyages "on which over half of the revenue passengers on board the ship originally embarked and planned to finally disembark in [Florida].19
The fact that other states with offshore interests similar to Alaska's do not appear to have broad statutes asserting extensive jurisdiction causes me to conclude that the Alaska Legislature did not intend for AS 44.03.010(2) to be interpreted as broadly as the State suggests. It appears that, after examining how other states assert jurisdiction offshore from their coastlines, such an assertion of jurisdiction would be unprecedented. If the legislature intended such a broad and unprecedented assertion of jurisdiction, I am confident that some legislative history would exist that would clarify the legislature's intent. I therefore conclude that AS 44.08.010(2) must be interpreted, as the lead opinion suggests, to exclude the exercise of the State's jurisdiction in this case.
. See, eg., Maul v. United States, 274 U.S. 501, 511, 47 S.Ct. 735, 739, 71 L.Ed. 1171 (1927) (stating that the "high seas" are "common to all nations and foreign to none"); Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 123, 43 S.Ct. 504, 507, 67 L.Ed. 894 (1923) (stating that on the "high seas" "'there is no territorial sovereign"); Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 355, 29 S.Ct. 511, 512, 53 L.Ed. 826 (1909) (defining "high seas" as a region "subject to no sovereign"); Deslions v. La Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 210 U.S. 95, 115, 28 S.Ct. 664, 670, 52 L.Ed. 973 (1908) (using the definition of the high seas from The Scotland court); Old Dominion S.S. Co. v. Gilmore, 207 U.S. 398, 403, 28 S.Ct. 133, 134, 52 L.Ed. 264 (1907) (defining "high seas" as an area "outside the territory, in a place belonging to no other sovereign"); The Scotland, 105 U.S. 24, 29, 26 L.Ed. 1001 (1881) (defining "high seas" as those waters "where the law of no particular State has exclusive force, but all are equal"); see also United States v. Romero-Galue, 757 F.2d 1147, 1149 n. 1 (11th Cir.1985) (concluding that the "high seas" "lie seaward of a nation's territorial sea, which is the *678band of water that extends up to three miles out from the coast").
. Law of the Sea: Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, art. 1, 13 U.S.T. 2312.
. In re Air Crash Off Long Island, N.Y. on July 17, 1996, 209 F.3d 200, 207 (2d. Cir.2000).
. Id. at 201-02.
. Id. at 206-07; see also. In re Air Crash Disaster Near Peggy's Cove, Nova Scotia on Sept. 2, 1998, 210 F.Supp.2d 570, 580 (E.D.Pa.2002).
. 18 U.S.C. § 7(1).
. See United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 150-59, 53 S.Ct. 580, 582-86, 77 L.Ed. 1086 (1933) (extending jurisdiction to a United States citizen charged with the murder of another United States citizen aboard an American ship in the port of the Belgian Congo 250 miles up the Congo River); United States v. Rodgers, 150 U.S. 249, 266, 14 S.Ct. 109, 116, 37 L.Ed. 1071 (1893) (extending jurisdiction to a defendant charged with assaulting another person with a deadly weapon aboard a United States vessel in Canadian territorial waters); United States v. Neil, 312 F.3d 419, 421-23 (9th Cir.2002) (extending jurisdiction to a foreign national charged with sexually molesting a United States minor on-board a foreign cruise ship while in Mexican territorial waters); United States v. Reagan, 453 F.2d 165, 169-71 (6th Cir.1971) (extending jurisdiction to a United States citizen charged with homicide aboard an American vessel while in a German harbor); United States v. Ross, 439 F.2d 1355, 1357-59 (9th Cir.1971) (extending jurisdiction to an assault committed on an American flagged vessel in a harbor of Nha Trang in South Vietnam); see also In re Air Crash Disaster Near Peggy's Cove, 210 F.Supp.2d at 586 (concluding that "high seas," as used in the federal Death on the High Seas Act, included foreign territorial waters); Jennings v. Boeing Co., 660 F.Supp. 796, 803-04 (E.D.Pa.1987) (reaching same conclusion as the Peggy's Cove court).
. See, eg., Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 436-38, 52 S.Ct. 252, 254-55, 76 L.Ed. 375 (1932); Chua Han Mow v. United States, 730 F.2d 1308, 1311 (9th Cir.1984).
. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 402 cmt. k (1987) ("Whether a State [of the United States] may exercise jurisdiction that the United States is entitled to exercise under international law is ... generally a question only of United States law.").
. 546 P.2d 530 (Alaska 1976).
. 672 P.2d 156 (Alaska App.1983).
. Apparently in response to this and similar cases, the legislature recently passed AS 12.05.020, making it clear that Alaska's jurisdiction does extend to the Alaska Ferry System. Alaska Statute 12.05.020 states: "A person may be prosecuted under the laws of this state for an offense committed on or against ... a ferry or other water craft owned or operated by the state, even if the ... ferry ... is in ... water outside the state when the offense is alleged to have occurred."
. Corbin, 672 P.2d at 157.
. Id.
. Bundrant, 546 P.2d at 533 (outlining the Bering Sea Shellfish Area Regulations).
. 313 U.S. 69, 61 S.Ct. 924, 85 LEd. 1193 (1941).
. Id. at 77-79, 61 S.Ct. at 929-30.
. 761 So.2d 1027 (Fla.2000).
. Id. at 1029 n. 1.