dissenting.
Because I would hold that no legal duty existed, I would reverse the judgment entered in plaintiffs favor. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
In this case, no proceedings occurred in Colorado courts. The relinquishment and adoption of plaintiffs' child occurred in Kansas pursuant to the provisions of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children. Sections 24-60-1801, et seq., C.R.8.1999 and K.S.A. §§ 38-1201, et seq. (1999).
According to the Compact, Kansas was the receiving state. As such, Kansas law, not Colorado law, controlled. Section 24-60-1802(III)(a), C.R.S8.1999.
Kansas law did not require relinquishment counseling at the time of the events here. Instead, it only required that the birth parents give free and voluntary consent to the adoption before either a judge or a notary public. K.S.A. § 59-2114 (1999).
Moreover, plaintiffs did not offer any evidence that the attorney standard of practice in Kansas would dictate relinquishment counseling discussions. Thus, even if we assume that expert testimony can somehow create a duty (a proposition which I do not accept, see Hines v. Denver & Rio Grande Western *1165R.R., 829 P.2d 419 (Colo.App.1991)), the testimony of Colorado attorneys regarding Colorado practices was wholly irrelevant to the issues here.
The Kansas district court approved the direct placement of the child with her adoptive parents in Kansas; found that plaintiffs had "freely and voluntarily consented" to the. adoption, that this consent had been properly completed; and entered a final decree of adoption. These findings and decree have never been appealed.
Because under the applicable Kansas law the attorney had no duty to recommend that plaintiffs receive relinquishment counseling, the judgment here, entered against her based on her failure to recommend such counseling, cannot stand.
One of plaintiffs' experts testified that, while no Colorado statutory or decisional an-thority existed, prudent Colorado lawyers would discuss relinquishment counseling with their clients. I disagree with the majority's determinations that this equivocal testimony, even if relevant, created a duty.
The trial court's refusal to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint for lack of duty violated the full faith and credit doctrine set out in U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1. Plaintiffs were aware of the Kansas proceedings, had the benefit of independent advice of counsel, and elected not to contest these proceedings or to appeal the Kansas district court's findings and orders. Those orders are entitled, at a minimum, to res judicata effect. Braselton v. Clearfield State Bank, 606 F.2d 285 (10th Cir.1979). Consequently, they should have been given full faith and credit. See Department of Social Services v. District Court, 742 P.2d 339 (Colo.1987). Plaintiffs' attempt to undercut both the effect of those orders and the integrity of the Interstate Compact by filing a Colorado lawsuit should not have been condoned. See In re Custody of K.R., 897 P.2d 896 (Colo.App.1995).
Consequently, because the attorney had no duty to plaintiffs, the judgment against her should be reversed.