(dissenting) — The court's focus in this appeal is not on the merits of conservation. Indeed, conservation is laudable and should be encouraged. However, our duty is to determine what forms of financial assistance a city may use under existing Washington law to encourage conservation. In order to reach a desired result the majority: (a) ignores controlling constitutional and statutory authority dealing specifically with conservation; (b) rejects basic rules of statutory construction; (c) distorts beyond all recognition the language of a statute enacted in 1890; (d) interprets words in that statute to mean something other *706than what is commonly understood by those words; and (e) disregards recent case law. Therefore, I dissent.
Const, art. 8, § 10 and RCW 35.92.360
Determining the propriety of Tacoma's conservation program requires an analysis of Const, art. 8, § 10 and RCW 35.92.360. Const, art. 8, § 7 prohibits gifts or loans of public money, except for the necessary support of the poor or infirm. In 1979, the voters passed an amendment which created an exception to the loan portion of the prohibition. See Const, art. 8, § 10 (amend. 70). The exception created by Const, art. 8, § 10 is limited; it allows municipal utilities to offer loan programs to nonpoor, noninfirm residential customers to assist in the purchase of conservation measures. In each case the utility must take a lien on the benefited residential structure. RCW 35.92.360 is the enabling legislation which implements Const, art. 8, § 10 (amend. 70).
Tacoma's conservation program is inconsistent with Const, art. 8, § 10 (amend. 70) and RCW 35.92.360 in several respects. First, participating customers are neither obligated to repay any of the funds received nor is a lien placed on any benefited structure. Second, the program extends to commercial as well as residential customers. Tacoma argues that its conservation program does not involve grants or loans, but rather authorizes the reacquisition of electricity from one ratepayer to be offered for resale to another. Thus, Tacoma argues that the restrictions imposed by RCW 35.92.360 are inapplicable. I disagree.
Where the language of the constitution is clear, the words used therein should be given their plain meaning. State ex rel. O'Connell v. PUD 1, 79 Wn.2d 237, 240-41, 484 P.2d 393 (1971); State ex rel. State Capitol Comm'n v. Lister, 91 Wash. 9, 156 P. 858 (1916). Const, art. 8, § 7 in express terms prohibits municipal corporations from giving or loaning money to any individual, except for the necessary support of the poor and the infirm. Our constitution directly and unequivocally prohibits all gifts and loans of money in *707aid of individuals, subject to limited exceptions. See State ex rel. O'Connell v. Port of Seattle, 65 Wn.2d 801, 805, 399 P.2d 623 (1965).
One exception, Const, art. 8, § 10 (amend. 70) along with RCW 35.92.360, authorizes municipal utilities to provide financial assistance for conservation programs. RCW 35.92-.360 sets forth explicit preconditions before a municipal utility may commence a conservation financial assistance program. If the preconditions are met, then the financial assistance program is further limited by five specific requirements, such as the payback requirement. See RCW 35.92.360(l)-(5). A significant purpose of RCW 35.92.360 is to insure that municipal utilities will establish well conceived and cost-effective conservation programs. The Legislature has prohibited municipal utilities from providing financial assistance for conservation measures which are not cost effective.
I find it inconceivable that the Legislature intended to condition carefully and limit a municipal corporation's authority to make conservation assistance loans but did not intend to place any conditions on its authority to make conservation assistance grants. A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of the other. Hi-Starr, Inc. v. Liquor Control Bd., 106 Wn.2d 455, 462, 722 P.2d 808 (1986). Here, the enactment of a financial conservation assistance scheme complete on its face, with specific monetary safeguards, denies cities and towns the authority to embark on conservation programs which are inconsistent with RCW 35.92.360.
The Tacoma conservation program does not contain the preconditions and safeguards required by RCW 35.92.360.1 cannot agree with the majority that these preconditions and safeguards are not necessary due to the influence of market forces. Such market protection is illusory because the Tacoma conservation program involves direct grants to participating customers. The residential or commercial customer receives conservation measures but gives up nothing. *708Once the money is invested by the municipal utility it is spent whatever the results. Only if sufficient energy is conserved can Tacoma City Light recoup on its investment. After receiving the conservation measures, the participating customer may double or triple energy consumption. Therefore, there is no guaranty of energy savings. Consequently, the market protection relied upon by the majority is no protection at all.
These concerns demonstrate the wisdom of the Legislature in enacting the comprehensive scheme detailed in RCW 35.92.360. The comprehensiveness of RCW 35.92.360 indicates that the Legislature intended to impose sufficient requirements to help insure cost effectiveness as a prerequisite of any conservation program. The majority argues that the protections of RCW 35.92.360 are not necessary because "unless demonstrated as cost effective, Tacoma's direct purchase program would run afoul of the article 8, section 7 gift prohibition." (Italics mine.) Majority opinion, at 690. I reject the majority's inference that the constitutionality of Tacoma's conservation program can only be decided by an after-the-fact assessment of cost effectiveness. Accordingly, I believe that the Legislature intended RCW 35.92.360 to be the exclusive authority for conservation loans and intended to prohibit conservation grants. As such, I would hold that Tacoma's conservation program is not statutorily authorized.
The majority places great emphasis on the n[e]xcept where otherwise authorized" language found in RCW 35.92.360 (majority opinion, at 690) interpreting this language to indicate that other statutes, such as RCW 35.92-.050, may authorize conservation programs. However, from this language it does not logically follow that the Legislature intended RCW 35.92.050 to authorize conservation programs. In fact, the consensus at the time RCW 35.92.360 was passed was that existing constitutional and statutory authority, including RCW 35.92.050, did not authorize any conservation program. This is demonstrated by the legislative history of RCW 35.92.360.
*709In 1979, the Legislature passed Substitute Senate Joint Resolution (SSJR) 120 and Substitute Senate Bill (SSB) 2976 (now Const, art. 8, § 10 (amend. 70) and RCW 35.92-.360). The 1979 Legislative Report, published by the Legislature, contained the following:
Substitute Senate Joint Resolution (SSJR) 120 is a proposed amendment to the Washington State Constitution which . . . would allow various governmental entities to use public moneys or credit, as authorized by the Legislature, to finance energy conservation programs. Existing constitutional language does not allow the use of public moneys or credit for such programs, and it is suggested that this impedes the efforts of public utilities to broaden energy conservation and energy efficiency programs.
(Italics mine.) Final Legislative Report 1979, at 178-79.
Prior to the passage of SSJR 120 the Attorney General opined that loaning public money to utility customers to enable them to acquire and install conservation materials would be unconstitutional. See AGLO 4 (1979). The Attorney General's letter opinion stated that he did not believe a potential public benefit would make an unconstitutional loan acceptable. AGLO 4 (1979), at 4.
SSJR 120 was submitted to the voters on November 6, 1979. The official ballot titled stated: "Shall municipal utilities be permitted by the constitution to assist owners of residences in financing energy conservation measures until 1990?" Voters Pamphlet 16 (1979). The voters pamphlet represented:
The law as it now exists:
Under the state constitution, municipal corporations such as counties, cities, and public utility districts cannot give or lend, or be authorized by the state legislature to give or lend, any of their funds or credit to assist private homeowners ... in financing purchases or services, such as home insulation.
Voters Pamphlet, at 16. The voters ratified SSJR 120. Const, art. 8, § 10 (amend. 70) and its corresponding enabling legislation, RCW 35.92.360, became law.
This history supports the conclusion that RCW 35.92.360 *710is the exclusive method by which a municipal utility may implement a conservation financial assistance program. I recognize that legislative and Attorney General opinions are not definitive on the issue; nevertheless, they do support my conclusion that RCW 35.92.360 is the exclusive authority for conservation loans, and conservation grants are prohibited.
The majority asserts that Tacoma's conservation program does not purport to offer financing. Majority opinion, at 691. However, that is what Tacoma's program does — the participating consumer receives conservation measures at the municipal utility's expense. The majority fails to see the similarities between the use of public funds to purchase conservation and a grant or loan of public funds made pursuant to an authorized conservation financial assistance program. Merely labeling Tacoma's program as something other than a conservation financial assistance program does not alter the fact that the Legislature intended RCW 35.92.360 to preclude inconsistent conservation schemes.
RCW 35.92.050
Because RCW 35.92.360 precludes Tacoma's conservation program, I do not believe it can be resurrected by reliance on RCW 35.92.050, a general electricity statute. Nonetheless, I will address the majority's argument that RCW 35.92.050 authorizes Tacoma's program.
A city's authority to enact a conservation financial assistance program must be found either in an express grant or by necessary implication from such a grant. See Spokane v. J-R Distribs., Inc., 90 Wn.2d 722, 726, 585 P.2d 784 (1978); 2 E. McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 10.09 (3d ed. 1979). A municipal corporation
is limited in its powers to those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted, and also those essential to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation. ... If there is a doubt as to whether the power is granted, it must be denied.
(Citations omitted. Italics mine.) Port of Seattle v. State *711Utils. & Transp. Comm'n, 92 Wn.2d 789, 794-95, 597 P.2d 383 (1979); accord, Chemical Bank v. WPPSS, 99 Wn.2d 772, 792, 666 P.2d 329 (1983). The majority must ignore controlling constitutional, statutory, and recent common law authority, as well as the above quoted language, to hold that Tacoma's conservation program is authorized by RCW 35.92.050.
RCW 35.92.050 provides:
A city or town may also construct, condemn and purchase, purchase, acquire, add to, alter, maintain and operate works, plants, facilities for the purpose of furnishing the city or town and its inhabitants, and any other persons, with gas, electricity, and other means of power and facilities for lighting, heating, fuel, and power purposes, public and private, with full authority to regulate and control the use, distribution, and price thereof, together with the right to handle and sell or lease, any meters, lamps, motors, transformers, and equipment or accessories of any kind, necessary and convenient for the use, distribution, and sale thereof; authorize the construction of such plant or plants by others for the same purpose, and purchase gas, electricity, or power from either within or without the city or town for its own use and for the purpose of selling to its inhabitants and to other persons doing business within the city or town and regulate and control the use and price thereof.
This statute, originally passed in 1890, is general enabling legislation authorizing a city or town to operate a municipal electric utility. It authorizes the purchase or acquisition of electric generating facilities. It also authorizes the purchase of electricity for a city's use and for resale to other customers. RCW 35.92.050 does not authorize Tacoma's conservation program.
Unambiguous words within a statute which are not defined therein should be given their ordinary meaning. King Cy. Coun. v. Public Disclosure Comm'n, 93 Wn.2d 559, 561, 611 P.2d 1227 (1980). I protest the majority's selective rejection of rules of statutory construction which have been developed to aid courts in ascertaining legislative intent. Majority opinion, at 693. However, I realize that the *712majority must reject these rules to reach the result it desires.
We recently construed RCW 35.92.050 in Chemical Bank v. WPPSS, 99 Wn.2d 772, 666 P.2d 329 (1983). I do not find the majority's distinction between Chemical Bank and this case to be particularly compelling. Here, Tacoma's conservation program will not necessarily result in reduced energy consumption. Thus, the Tacoma program suffers from deficiencies similar to the agreement in Chemical Bank to purchase electricity which may never exist. In Chemical Bank we used an ordinary commonsense reading of the term "electricity". We held that an agreement to purchase project capability did not qualify as the purchase of electricity. Chemical Bank, at 784. Likewise, in the present case, I would find that the purchase of "electricity" and the purchase of "electric generating facilities" as used in RCW 35.92.050 are clear and unambiguous. I would hold that the purchase of conservation does not qualify as the purchase of electricity or as the purchase of an electric generating facility.
I realize that some electrical utility professionals view conservation as the "functional equivalent" of purchasing electricity. But this view is by no means universal. For example, Donald Caha, power manager of Tacoma City Light, testified as follows:
Q Now, I believe, Mr. Caha, that you testified that you are responsible for purchasing power for the Tacoma Light Division? A Yes, sir. Q And I take it your Department also constructs or acquires electrical generation facilities? A Yes, that is correct. Q Now, conservation is not the purchase of electricity as you commonly use that term, is it, Mr. Caha? A Yes, that is correct. Q And conservation is not an electric generation facility as you commonly use that term? A That is true.
(Italics mine.) Report of Proceedings vol. 2, at 41.
Undoubtedly, the Legislature was aware of the conflicting opinions of utility professionals when it passed the carefully detailed conservation program described in RCW 35.92.360. However, neither at that time nor at any subsequent time *713has it authorized the purchase of functional equivalents of electricity. Moreover, if RCW 35.92.050 authorized a program like Tacoma's, RCW 35.92.360 would not have been necessary.
The court's role is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature. Service Employees, Local 6 v. Superintendent of Pub. Instruction, 104 Wn.2d 344, 348, 705 P.2d 776 (1985). The majority abdicates its responsibility of interpreting RCW 35.92.050 by its total reliance on the views of some utility professionals. The majority would have us rely on electric utility professionals and recent conservation statutes enacted elsewhere to turn the general RCW 35.92.050 into a conservation statute, despite legislative intent to the contrary. In my view, nothing in the legislative history or the plain language of RCW 35.92.050 suggests that the Legislature has ever intended to authorize a conservation grant program by enactment or amendment of RCW 35.92.050. To hold that it did requires a distorted reading of the language of RCW 35.92.050. Furthermore, under the majority's analysis almost any program whose intent is conservation and which remotely results in some savings of electricity would be authorized — surely the Legislature's grant of authority under RCW 35.92.050 is not that broad.
It is not the judiciary's role to expand the scope of statutory authority. See Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 617, 88 L. Ed. 1488, 64 S. Ct. 1215, 153 A.L.R. 1007 (1944). Never before have we stretched statutory interpretation to authorize the purchase of functional equivalents. Absent any indication that the Legislature intended otherwise, I would hold that RCW 35.92.050 does not authorize the purchase of functional equivalents. See Port of Seattle, at 794-95.
The majority's interpretation of RCW 35.92.050 also ignores other basic rules of statutory construction. In particular, it ignores the rule that a specific statute will control a statute of general application which seemingly conflicts. Sim v. State Parks & Rec. Comm'n, 90 Wn.2d 378, 382, 583 P.2d 1193 (1978). RCW 35.92.050 is a statute of general *714authority. RCW 35.92.360 is a specific and comprehensive statute dealing with the financing of conservation programs. Accordingly, I would find that the specific statute, RCW 35.92.360, controls. Further, the majority ignores that in addition to being more specific, RCW 35.92.360 is more clearly worded than is RCW 35.92.050, and later in time. See State ex rel. Graham v. San Juan Cy., 102 Wn.2d 311, 320, 686 P.2d 1073 (1984).
The majority's judicial transformation of RCW 35.92.050 into a statute which authorizes Tacoma's conservation program thwarts the process of responsible legislative deliberation and decisionmaking. Accordingly, I would hold that the Tacoma conservation program is beyond the authority granted by RCW 35.92.050; moreover, I would hold that it is precluded by RCW 35.92.360. I would affirm the trial court, but on statutory rather than constitutional grounds. See Senear v. Daily Journal-American, 97 Wn.2d 148, 152, 641 P.2d 1180 (1982).
Dolliver, Andersen, and Callow, JJ., concur with Goodloe, J.Reconsideration denied November 6, 1987.