Lucido v. Superior Court

MOSK, J.

I dissent. Both the technical prerequisites for application of collateral estoppel and the policies underlying that doctrine mandate dismissal of the criminal charges against this petitioner.

The crucial factor is the People’s exercise of their control over the sequence of probation revocation and criminal proceedings in this case. Thus I would hold that when, as here, the People choose to pursue probation revocation first, and the court finds at the revocation hearing that there is insufficient evidence the probationer committed the alleged crime, collateral estoppel, which precludes relitigation of issues argued and decided in prior proceedings (Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., Ltd. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 601, 604 [25 Cal.Rptr. 559, 375 P.2d 439]), should bar the People from relitigating the identical question of guilt at a subsequent criminal trial. I would, therefore, affirm the order of the Court of Appeal directing respondent superior court to grant petitioner’s motion to dismiss the indecent exposure charge on collateral estoppel grounds.

The facts are not in dispute. At the revocation hearing (1) the only contested issue was the indecent exposure allegation; (2) the district attorney and petitioner both introduced evidence and called witnesses; and (3) the court ruled that revocation was not warranted on the basis of the indecent exposure allegation because no “clear and convincing evidence” to support that charge was produced by the prosecution.

On these facts, I agree with the concession by the majority that the traditional prerequisites for application of collateral estoppel are met. First, the “ultimate issue of fact” to be litigated at the criminal trial is identical to that decided at the revocation proceeding. (See Ashe v. Swenson (1970) 397 U.S. 436, 443 [25 L.Ed.2d 469, 475, 90 S.Ct. 1189]; People v. Sims (1982) 32 Cal.3d 468, 48 [186 Cal.Rptr. 77, 651 P.2d 321]5 [“identical factual allegation”] [hereafter Sims].)1

*354Second, the indecent exposure issue was “actually litigated”: both the district attorney and petitioner availed themselves of the opportunity to present evidence and to argue the merits. Although the People claim they did not present their entire case and, thus, collateral estoppel should not apply, it is enough that the People had “notice of the hearing as well as the opportunity and incentive to present [their] case .... The People cannot now take advantage of the fact that [they] avoided [their] litigation responsibilities and chose not to present evidence at the prior proceeding.” (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at pp. 481-482.)

The majority agree that the relevant issue is “whether the People had the opportunity to present their entire case at the revocation hearing, not whether they availed themselves of the opportunity.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 340, fn. 2, original italics.) Because they do not dispute the governing law, therefore, I question why the majority take note of the People’s failure to call child witnesses. Regardless of the extent to which the People actually presented evidence, they did have the opportunity to present their entire case against petitioner. For collateral estoppel purposes, what is significant is that petitioner, as a result of the choice made by the People, was forced to assume the burdens, psychological and evidentiary, of defending himself against the indecent exposure allegation at the revocation hearing.

Third, the ultimate issue of fact was “necessarily decided,” as that phrase is interpreted in our jurisprudence. (7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Judgment, § 268, p. 710 [issue must not have been “entirely unnecessary” to the judgment].) Even the most cursory examination of the facts shows that a determination of whether petitioner committed the alleged act of indecent exposure was necessary to the court’s decision whether to revoke petitioner’s probation. Although petitioner admitted violating the no-drug-use condition of his probation, the court nevertheless held the revocation hearing; the sole contested issue was the indecent exposure allegation. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court ruled that revocation was warranted “based only upon [petitioner’s] continuing use of marijuana, and not based upon the new indecent exposure charges.” Subsequently, the court filed its formal findings and order, in which it declared that the People had not produced clear and convincing evidence that petitioner committed the alleged violation of Penal Code section 314, subdivision 1: “Accordingly, [petitioner’s] probation is not violated on this ground.”

The fourth requirement, that the decision in the former proceeding be “final” and on the merits, also is satisfied: as the majority recognize, the *355findings of the court at the revocation hearing amounted to final disposition of the indecent exposure allegations on the merits, and the People failed to take any direct action to overturn that judgment. (See Pen. Code, § 1466, subd. (a)(6).)

Finally, it is patently obvious that the parties in the criminal trial are the same as in the revocation hearing: the district attorney sought revocation of petitioner’s probation and now is seeking to prosecute him in the criminal trial. In sum, all the prerequisites for application of collateral estoppel are satisfied in this case.

The majority are correct, however, that fulfillment of the technical requirements does not invariably guarantee that a subsequent proceeding should be barred: we also must examine whether application of collateral estoppel to the facts before us will further the policies underlying that doctrine. As will appear, I conclude those policies, as they are identified by the majority and by this court in previous cases, also demand that the criminal charges against petitioner be dismissed.

I begin with the settled rule that in deciding whether a proceeding is precluded by collateral estoppel, we must “balance the need to limit litigation against the right of a fair adversary proceeding in which a party may fully present his case.” (People v. Taylor (1974) 12 Cal.3d 686, 695 [117 Cal.Rptr. 70, 527 P.2d 622] [hereafter Taylor].) In this regard, there is no question the People availed themselves of their opportunity to present their case against petitioner by calling witnesses and presenting facts at the probation revocation hearing. In so doing, the district attorney litigated only one issue: the alleged incident of indecent exposure. Collateral estoppel demands that the People not be given two such opportunities at the expense of the rights of a criminal defendant. (See Ashe v. Swenson, supra, 397 U.S. at pp. 445-446 [25 L.Ed.2d at pp. 476-477] [“For whatever else [collateral estoppel] may embrace, [citation], it surely protects a man who has been acquitted from having to ‘run the gauntlet’ a second time.”].)

We traditionally recognize three public policies underlying collateral estoppel, and each favors its application here. First, public confidence in the integrity of the judicial system is threatened when two tribunals render inconsistent judgments on the same facts involving the same parties. (Taylor, supra, 12 Cal.3d at pp. 695-696.) When decisions are inconsistent, individuals have little incentive to rely on judicial action. (See Allen v. McCurry (1980) 449 U.S. 90, 94 [66 L.Ed.2d 308, 313, 101 S.Ct. 411].) Unfortunately, the majority discourage such reliance by refusing to apply collateral estoppel to the facts of this case.

*356The majority claim that removing full determination of factual issues from the criminal trial setting would equally undermine public confidence in the criminal justice system. As I demonstrate below, however, such a claim accords insufficient deference to the due process rights of criminal defendants. In Sims, we were concerned that if a criminal trial were allowed to proceed and were ultimately to result in the welfare fraud conviction of an individual who had been proved innocent at an earlier Department of Social Services fair hearing, “not only the integrity of the judicial system, but also the integrity of the fair hearing process will be called into question.” (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 488.)

Surely concern for the integrity of the judicial system is even greater in the case at bar: whereas the first hearing in Sims was merely an administrative “fair hearing,” here both the revocation hearing and the criminal trial are court proceedings brought by the prosecutor. Regardless of the difference in function between a revocation proceeding and a criminal trial, the People undeniably litigated the sole disputed issue at the former. Collateral estoppel is intended to prevent just such repetition, which not only results in inconsistent judgments but allows the People, through sheer perseverance, to litigate and litigate until they, in their view, “get it right.”

The second policy underlying collateral estoppel, interest in judicial economy, also is furthered when we forbid repetitive prosecution of a criminal defendant for the same alleged crime. This is true especially when, as here, the People fail at a revocation hearing to produce even “clear and convincing evidence” that the probationer violated the terms of his probation, yet then seek to demonstrate his guilt at trial under the stricter “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard. The prosecution must be held to its failure to successfully prove its case against a probationer under the more lenient standard.

The majority, however, conclude that any interests in judicial efficiency “pale before the importance of preserving the criminal trial process as the exclusive forum for determining guilt or innocence as to new crimes.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 351.) While one cannot dispute the importance of criminal trials for determining guilt or innocence, I believe the majority needlessly threaten the due process rights of criminal defendants. If preserving the criminal trial as the exclusive forum for determining guilt or innocence is of transcendent importance—and often it is—the district attorney should proceed to such trial first, before he compels a defendant to defend himself against precisely the same factual allegations at an earlier revocation hearing. Once the People unilaterally decide to seek probation revocation on the *357criminal allegations before proceeding to trial, however, they should be bound by their failure to prove their allegations.2

Finally, consistent with our third traditional policy interest, application of collateral estoppel in this case would undeniably “provide repose by preventing a person from being harassed by vexatious litigation.” (Taylor, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 695; Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 489.) The majority claim that the “essence of vexatiousness” is “harassment through institution of baseless or unjustified litigation.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 351.) In a similar context, however, we concluded that a person faced with consecutive major criminal trials for the same alleged act is “likely to suffer unnecessary anxiety and expense whether his plight is caused by intentional harassment by the district attorney’s office or by its inadvertent failure to coordinate its prosecutorial efforts.” (In re Dennis B. (1976) 18 Cal.3d 687, 694 [135 Cal.Rptr. 82, 557 P.2d 514].) Subsequently, in Sims we noted that the district attorney had an adequate opportunity at an administrative fair hearing, but failed to prove the defendant had fraudulently obtained welfare benefits. Accordingly, we held, to subject the defendant to a criminal proceeding “in which she must defend herself against the very same charges of misconduct would be manifestly unfair.” (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 489.) While I do not suggest the district attorney’s effort to relitigate the indecent exposure charge here is an attempt to “harass” petitioner, the repetitive nature of the criminal trial in this case is no less unfair than in Sims.

The majority choose not to follow Sims in the context of this issue because they “decline to attribute as much weight in this case as we did in Sims to a need to prevent inconsistent judicial determinations.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 350.) I cannot agree with that curious conclusion. It is paradoxical that the majority thus limit Sims, and ignore its result, while claiming to affirm its vitality.

While the collateral estoppel doctrine applies equally in the civil and criminal contexts, the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy demonstrates that we accord even greater protection against repetitive prosecution to criminal defendants. (See Harris v. Washington (1971) 404 U.S. 55, 56 [30 L.Ed.2d 212, 214-215, 92 S.Ct. 183] [collateral estoppel in *358criminal trials is an integral part of the protection against double jeopardy guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment]; Benton v. Maryland (1969) 395 U.S. 784 [23 L.Ed.2d 707, 89 S.Ct. 2056] [Fifth Amendment guaranty against double jeopardy enforceable against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment]; see also United States v. Oppenheimer (1916) 242 U.S. 85, 87 [61 L.Ed. 161, 164, 37 S.Ct. 68, 3 A.L.R. 516] [doctrine of res judicata applicable in criminal cases; “It cannot be that the safeguards of the person, so often and so rightly mentioned with solemn reverence, are less than those that protect from a liability in debt.”].)

Although revocation hearings do not per se place a probationer in jeopardy, the policies underlying the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy, just as those underlying collateral estoppel (see Note, Statutory Implementation of Double Jeopardy Clauses: New Life for a Moribund Constitutional Guarantee (1956) 65 Yale L.J. 339, 340, fn. 7), demand that we do not compel petitioner to establish his innocence only by disproving the same allegations in two successive proceedings. “The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him ... to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.” (Green v. United States (1957) 355 U.S. 184, 187-188 [2 L.Ed.2d 199, 204, 78 S.Ct. 221, 61 A.L.R.2d 1119].)

Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has recently expanded the protection accorded by the double jeopardy clause. In Grady v. Corbin (1990) 495 U.S. _, _ [109 L.Ed.2d 548, 564, 110 S.Ct. 2084], the court held that the double jeopardy clause bars “subsequent prosecution if, to establish an essential element of an offense charged in that prosecution, the government will prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already been prosecuted.” In so holding, the court rejected the state’s contention that to determine whether a subsequent prosecution is barred by the double jeopardy clause a court must be concerned only with whether each statute under which the defendant is to be prosecuted in successive proceedings requires “proof of a fact which the other does not.” (Blockburger v. United States (1932) 284 U.S. 299, 304 [76 L.Ed. 306, 309, 52 S.Ct. 180].) The court refused to rely solely on the Blockburger rule because it addresses only one of the three protections embodied in the double jeopardy clause: protection against multiple punishments for the same offense. It does not, the court explained, adequately protect defendants from the burdens of successive prosecutions following acquittals or convictions. A court that is asked to rule on the applicability of the double jeopardy clause, the court concluded, should also be concerned with *359whether multiple prosecutions will cause the defendant to suffer undue embarrassment, expense, or psychological insecurity, or afford the state, already possessed of superior resources, an opportunity to rehearse its presentation of proof, “thus increasing the risk of an erroneous conviction for one or more of the offenses charged.” (Grady v. Corbin, supra, 495 U.S._ at p. _ [109 L.Ed.2d at p. 562]; see also United States v. Di Francesco (1980) 449 U.S. 117, 128 [66 L.Ed.2d 328, 340, 101 S.Ct. 426] [“Implicit in [the prohibition against double jeopardy] is the thought that if the Government may reprosecute, it gains an advantage from what it learns at the first trial about the strengths of the defense case and the weaknesses of its own.”].) Accordingly, the court held the “critical inquiry” is “what conduct the state will prove” in the second prosecution. (Grady v. Corbin, supra, 495 U.S. _ at p. _ [109 L.Ed.2d at p. 564].) The Grady court’s concerns about the burdens imposed on defendants by multiple trials and the advantage garnered by the People when they repeatedly prosecute a defendant for the same conduct mirror the policies underlying the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The conclusion compelled by Grady, therefore, is that the People should not be allowed to relitigate the allegations of indecent exposure in this case.

Finally, application of collateral estoppel in the case at bar is consistent with the nature of the probation system. Probation is intended to protect society by reforming and rehabilitating convicted criminals. (People v. Hainline (1933) 219 Cal. 532, 534 [28 P.2d 16]; United States v. Allen (N.D.Cal. 1972) 349 F.Supp. 749, 753; Comment, Revocation of Conditional Liberty—California and the Federal System (1955) 28 So.Cal.L.Rev. 158, 158-160.) Revocation of probation similarly functions to protect society: if it is apparent that a rehabilitative effort is “imprudently prejudicing the safety of the community,” probation may be revoked. (See Gagnon v. Scarpelli (1973) 411 U.S. 778, 785 [36 L.Ed.2d 656, 664, 93 S.Ct. 1756]; Standlee v. Rhay (9th Cir. 1977) 557 F.2d 1303, 1306; In re Coughlin, supra, 16 Cal.3d 52, 59.) In more basic terms, probation revocation functions to take a probationer “off the streets” once the People show he does not deserve the clemency offered by probation, i.e., probation revocation “protect[s] society from the backsliding criminal[;] to this end [Congress] gave the courts of the United States broad powers to cause him to be retaken and resentenced as if the boon of probation had never been offered to him.” (United States v. Smith (E.D.Pa. 1943) 50 F.Supp. 464, 468.)

As we recognized in our unanimous opinion in People v. Coleman (1975) 13 Cal.3d 867 [120 Cal.Rptr. 384, 533 P.2d 1024] (hereafter Coleman), however, probation revocation is not necessary to keep a probationer “off the streets” prior to his criminal trial: “Where pretrial custody is required of one accused of crime, the state has available to it procedures for requiring *360bail or otherwise restraining conduct which would render unnecessary immediate resort to the machinery of probation revocation in those instances where the accused happens to be a probationer.” (Id. at p. 896.) On this basis, and because subjecting a defendant to successive probation revocation and criminal proceedings endangers his privilege against self-incrimination (ibid.), we adopted two courses of action in Coleman: (1) we implemented a conditional exclusionary rule to discourage the state from scheduling revocation hearings in advance of trial out of the “illegitimate desire” to gain an unfair advantage at trial, and (2) we advised trial courts that the “most desirable method of handling the problems of concurrent criminal and probation revocation proceedings may well be for revocation proceedings not even to be initiated until after disposition of the related criminal proceedings.” (Ibid.)

Given that the Coleman court felt compelled to encourage the People to pursue criminal conviction before holding a revocation hearing, it obviously doubted the prophylactic effect of the exclusionary rule it introduced. In fact, while the majority conclude that the Coleman exclusionary rule “guarantees the probationer the ability to present a full case at the [revocation] hearing without running the risk of prejudicing his defense at a subsequent trial” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 351), there can be no explanation why we continue to urge trial courts to hold criminal trials before the revocation hearing (see People v. Belleci (1979) 24 Cal.3d 879, 888, fn. 7 [157 Cal.Rptr. 503, 598 P.2d 473]; People v. Jasper (1983) 33 Cal.3d 931, 935 [191 Cal.Rptr. 648, 663 P.2d 206]) except that we cannot ignore the basic unfairness of a contrary practice. Because there are other methods for placing a probationer in pretrial custody, and, thus, probation revocation before trial is unnecessary for the protection of society, I conclude there is little or no justification for allowing the People to continue to hold revocation hearings based on criminal offenses before related criminal trials at the risk of the due process rights of criminal defendants.

In Coleman, supra, 13 Cal.3d 867, however, rather than requiring that trial courts hold revocation hearings after related criminal trials, we left it to their discretion. Not surprisingly, as noted in People v. Sharp (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 126, 129 [129 Cal.Rptr. 476], “This statement is of little, if any, consequence, since the court declined to fashion a judicial rule requiring that revocation be postponed until after trial.”3 Thus in part, I dissent for this reason: so long as our admonition in Coleman is often repeated but rarely obeyed, our decisions should be guided by the concern we expressed in Coleman for the due process rights of criminal defendants.

*361Finally, it cannot be denied that the People control the sequence of proceedings. They alone determine what appears to be in the best interest of society and public safety. They should be bound by the procedural choice they make.

Rather than suggesting we exercise our supervisory powers to hold that revocation proceedings must be held after trial, however, a suggestion this court has repeatedly declined to accept (see People v. Jasper, supra, 33 Cal.3d 931, 935; People v. Weaver (1985) 39 Cal.3d 654, 659 [217 Cal.Rptr. 245, 703 P.2d 1139]), I would simply hold that if the People seek to revoke probation on an allegation of a subsequent crime before bringing a probationer to trial on that crime they will be bound by the decision reached by the revocation hearing judge.

At a very minimum, this court should not reach out to deny proper application of collateral estoppel, as the majority do, when precedent, policy, and equity all dictate otherwise. For this reason, I would affirm the order of the Court of Appeal.

I take this opportunity to note that the majority read Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d 468, in an unreasonably narrow manner. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 345, 349-350.) We stated in Sims that our conclusion was warranted by three factors: (1) the technical prerequisites for applying collateral estoppel to the fair hearing decision were satisfied; (2) the traditional policies underlying application of the doctrine would be furthered by its application; and (3) the unique statutory scheme in that case called for resolution outside the criminal justice system. We did not rely *354on the uniqueness of the statutory scheme to the extent the majority suggest. (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at pp. 488, 490.) Although the majority claim they do not question the continuing vitality of Sims, I do not believe they can hold as they do without openly rejecting the stare decisis effect of Sims.

In so concluding, I note that acquittal of a probationer at his criminal trial does not preclude later probation revocation. (See In re Coughlin (1976) 16 Cal.3d 52, 57-59 [127 Cal.Rptr. 337, 545 P.2d 249].) Probation revocation after acquittal at a criminal trial is acceptable because it lacks the repetitiveness I find so troubling in this case. First, the People must satisfy a relatively easier burden of proof at the revocation proceeding. Second, an individual’s probation may be revoked even if he has not been found to have committed a crime. For example, a defendant may be acquitted of assault committed in a bar on the ground of self-defense, yet he may have violated terms of his probation by simply being in the bar.

Indeed, the majority fail to examine whether in the present case the trial court even exercised its discretion in this regard, much less exercised it properly.