(dissenting)—I disagree with the majority for two reasons. First, the majority resolves questions of fact already resolved, differently, by the Commissioner. We cannot do this, but must defer to administrative findings. See Franklin Cy. Sheriffs Office v. Sellers, 97 Wn.2d 317, *89325, 646 P.2d 113 (1982) (substitution of appellate court's judgment for that of the administrative agency in factual matters is not authorized by the APA), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1106 (1983).
Here, the Commissioner's delegate specifically found persuasive evidence5 that, had Forsman and Morris so requested, their employer would have increased their hours. The majority says that the finding does not state that the hours would have "returned to, or have even approached 40 hours per week." The issue, however, is whether the claimants had exhausted reasonable alternatives to quitting. By failing to request additional hours, they did not exhaust these alternatives, and we will never know how many additional hours the employer would have allowed. The finding that persuasive evidence showed a request for more hours would have been granted is tantamount to a finding that such a request would not have been futile. The majority's different interpretation amounts to impermissible fact finding.
Second, the claimants' terminations plainly were voluntary. While there may be two lines of cases on the subject of whether an agreement between a union and an employer binds each union member, Washington is firmly aligned with those cases holding that the union is the members' agent in employment matters. In re Employees of Buffelen Lumber & Mfg. Co., 32 Wn.2d 205, 201 P.2d 194 (1948). Buffelen held that, under the terms of a union negotiated vacation agreement, claimants were voluntarily unemployed during a plant-wide vacation closure. As the concurring Justice pointed out:
*90The union spoke for the employees; it was their voice. In reality, the employees themselves, speaking through the union, made the agreement.
Buffelen, 32 Wn.2d at 211 (Schwellenbach, J., concurring). The Legislature's enactment of a later statute providing that unemployment during required vacations is not voluntary speaks to that issue alone; it cannot be construed as legislative disapproval of the overriding principle that a union is the voice of its members in employment matters.
As the majority points out, union bargaining is aimed at obtaining the best contract for the most workers. The union protects the employee from dismissal for lack of work. Annot., Termination of Employment as a Result of Union Action or Pursuant to Union Contract as "Voluntary" for Purposes of Unemployment Compensation Benefits, 90 A.L.R.2d 835, 846 (1963) (considering general rule that employee who quits in refusing lower paying job when there is no longer work in his regular classification is voluntarily unemployed). It cannot be said that an employee who, despite this union protection, elects to take a chance on finding a better position elsewhere is without fault in the termination of the employment.
The union's negotiating role here also undercuts the majority's holding that the reduction in pay and benefits constituted "good cause" for quitting. The majority cites two cases for this proposition. Grier v. Department of Empl. Sec., 43 Wn. App. 92, 715 P.2d 534, review denied, 106 Wn.2d 1003 (1986), and Cowles Pub'g Co. v. Department of Empl. Sec., 15 Wn. App. 590, 550 P.2d 712 (1976), review denied, 88 Wn.2d 1001 (1977). In neither Grier nor Cowles, however, was there a union negotiating on behalf of the employees. As the majority points out, fault for unemployment will generally lie with the employer, with a third party, or with the employee. Cowles, 43 Wn. App. at 593.6 *91In Grier, the employer reduced the employee's hours and benefits, and the court found that Grier had good cause to quit. Here, however, the employer negotiated with the claimants' representative; there was no unilateral imposition of reductions. There can be no fault on the part of an employer who negotiates with the employee's representative as required by labor law. Further, as the Cowles court noted, " [U]nemployment arising from personal dissatisfaction with low wages ... is voluntary idleness". Cowles, 15 Wn. App. at 596.
Forsman and Morris were union members. Speaking for them, the union negotiated a contract; the union membership ratified the contract. That contract was binding on all members, including those like Forsman and Morris who had not voted for it. To allow members who are dissatisfied with the contract to walk away from it, unemployment benefits intact, undercuts the force of union membership, violates the purpose of the Employment Security Act (to assist those unemployed "through no fault of their own"), and goes against the settled law of this state. Therefore, I dissent.
Review denied at 116 Wn.2d 1005 (1991).
Part of the Commissioner's conclusion of law 4 states: "We find the evidence persuasive that petitioner [Hancock Fabrics] would have attempted to provide claimant additional hours of employment had such been requested in lieu of her tender of her resignation." This finding, although denominated a conclusion of law, is reviewed as a finding of fact. Western Ag Land Partners v. Department of Rev., 43 Wn. App. 167, 172, 716 P.2d 310 (1986).
The Cowles court found the claimant's reasons for voluntarily quitting, "low wages and lack of promotional opportunity", to be "nothing more than personal dissatisfaction" so that the facts presented an instance of "employee fault". The court noted, "Human ambition for greater material wealth has produced both *91industry and misery, but seems a characteristic inherent in us all. If fault must be levied, it lies with the claimant and her own internal humanity." Cowles, 15 Wn. App. at 595.