dissenting.
The facts before the Commission were not in any substantial dispute. Simply stated, claimant had worked for the assessor’s office for some time and was totally satisfied with that employment. The record does not contain even an inference, much less evidence, that claimant was compelled to leave that employment. Claimant makes no such assertion. Nevertheless, claimant voluntarily terminated his employment, believing he had secured more desirable employment in Spokane where he desired to live.
Hence, the only obligation of the Commission was to apply the pertinent law to those facts. The Commission departed from 40 years of law as established by this Court and held that claimant’s belief that he had secured other employment constituted “good cause” for voluntarily terminating his employment with the assessor’s office and was hence entitled to unemployment compensation benefits. This Court also departs from all its previous decisions in this area of the law, evidently but not expressly relying upon the dissent of Bist*873line and Huntley, J.J., in Carlson v. Center for Resources for Independent People, 109 Idaho 1053, 712 P.2d 1161 (1984).
This Court has continually held that “good cause” for voluntarily terminating employment within the purview of our statute does not extend to purely personal and subjective reasons which are unique to the employee. McMunn v. Department of Public Lands, 94 Idaho 493, 491 P.2d 1265 (1971); Clark v. Bogus Basin Recreation Association, 91 Idaho 916, 435 P.2d 256 (1967); Boodry v. Eddy Bakeries Company, 88 Idaho 165, 397 P.2d 256 (1964). As late as 1983 this Court, in Berger v. Nez Perce Sheriff, 105 Idaho 355, 671 P.2d 468, in an opinion by Huntley, J., held that when claimant and her husband were told that the nepotism policy in the sheriff’s department would prohibit their employment, and they both resigned, such did not constitute good cause in the purview of the statute to justify their voluntary termination of employment and hence unemployment compensation benefits were denied.
Today the majority departs from the Court’s long-established rule that “good cause” for voluntarily terminating employment within the purview of our statute cannot include purely personal and subjective reasons. The Court in the past has obviously believed that broadening the scope of “good cause” to include matters outside the scope of employment would place upon the Commission and this Court an impossible burden of establishing a standard for “good cause.” Hence, the Court in Carlson, supra, held that claimant’s need to move to California to keep her family together did not constitute good cause for a voluntary termination; in Pyeatt v. Idaho State University, 98 Idaho 424, 565 P.2d 1381 (1977), the Court held that claimant’s need to move to Boise to maintain her family unit and avoid divorce did not constitute good cause for voluntary termination; in Clark the Court held that motion sickness of the claimant while riding in employer’s transportation to and from work constituted purely personal and subjective reasons which were unique to the employee and hence were not good cause within the purview of our statute for voluntary termination of employment; in McMunn, supra, the Court held that claimant’s dissatisfaction in living in a barracks atmosphere away from any town was a personal and subjective reason unique to the employee and hence did not constitute good cause for voluntary termination of employment.
In Pyeatt, supra, the Court stated: “Her employment was terminated by her own free act for causes over which her employer obviously had no control and which had nothing to do with the conditions of her employment. They were purely personal and subjective reasons which were unique to the employee.”
The statutory change in 1947 upon which the majority purports to base its rationale was obviously in place at the time of all of the above decisions of this Court. Nevertheless, the Court has continuously held that good cause for voluntary termination so as to permit the award of unemployment benefits must contemplate more than personal and subjective reasons unique to the employee.
In 1935 in enacting Idaho’s Employment Security Law the legislature declared the public policy in I.C. § 72-1302:
As a guide to the interpretation and application of this Act, the public policy of this state is declared to be as follows: economic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious menace to the health morals and welfare of the people of this state. Involuntary unemployment is therefore a subject of national and state interest____ The achievement of social security requires protection against this greatest hazard of our economic life. This can be provided by encouraging employers to provide more stable employment and by the systematic accumulation of funds ... to provide benefits.
Clearly, the legislature was considering involuntary unemployment and to provide for stability of employment. In my view the interpretation of the majority in the instant case runs directly contrary to the *874policy enunciated by the legislature. It will rather encourage voluntary termination of employment and bring about instability of employment. The result today can hardly be said to encourage employers to provide more stable employment.
As stated in Smith v. Department of Employment, 100 Idaho 520, 602 P.2d 18 (1979):
Statutes should be interpreted to mean what the legislature intended them to mean and to accomplish what the legislature sought to achieve by their passage. “Moreover, enactments of the legislature are to be interpreted to accord with common sense and reason.” State ex rel. Newsom v. Alarid, 90 N.M. 790, 794, 568 P.2d 1236, 1240 (1977). When the language of a statute is ambiguous, we must consider the social and economic results which would be effectuated by a decision on the meaning of the statute. Herndon v. West, 87 Idaho 335, 393 P.2d 35 (1964). Policy grounds and reasonableness may also be utilized to determine the meaning of the statute. Summers v. Dooley, 94 Idaho 87, 481 P.2d 318 (1971).
“We are entitled to, and must look to the intention of the legislature as gathered from the whole act, and when a literal reading of a provision will work an unreasonable or absurd result, if a reasonable intent of the legislature can be arrived at, the court should so construe the act to arrive at such intention rather than an absurdity.” Smallwood v. Jeter, 42 Idaho 169, 244 P. 149, 153 (1926).
Until today the Commission has been guided by the decisions of this Court in applying the law regarding good cause for voluntarily terminating employment to the facts in any given case, i.e., that the cause should be related to the employment and could not merely constitute personal and subjective reasons unique to the employee. Following today’s decision the Commission will be free to apply some unknown standard involving the personal and subjective feelings, motivation, or desires unique to the particular employee/claimant. I see no limit to the situations in which the Commission may award benefits, and suggest that such a state of affairs will be completely at odds with, and contrary to, the intent of the legislature in enacting our employment security scheme. The Court today overrules innumerable cases either without understanding it does so, or without caring it does so.
Claimant was not discharged from his employment. He did not terminate his employment because of any dissatisfaction with his job or because of the conditions of employment. He voluntarily quit becausje he wanted another job in another location!, reasons which were subjective, personal and unique to the employee.
I would reverse the decision of the Commission.
BAKES, J., concurs.