dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority concludes that, because the legislature has not defined the term “offer” in the statute, the statute is ambiguous. Building on this proposition, the majority applies the rules of statutory construction and writes into section 20-259.01 a provision that an insurer explain the nature of underinsured motorist (“UIM”) coverage. According to the majority, the statute should read as follows:
Every insurer writing automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policies ... shall also make available to the named insured thereunder and by written notice offer and explain to the insured the nature of underinsured motorist coverage and at the request of the insured shall include within the policy underinsurance motorist coverage____
I disagree with the majority’s basic proposition that the word “offer” is ambiguous. As our supreme court has stated, “ ‘[tjhere is no magic in statutory construction and no legal legerdemain should be used to change the meaning of simple English words.’ ” St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Gilmore, 168 Ariz. 159, 164, 812 P.2d 977, 982 (1991) (quoting Kilpatrick v. Superior Court, 105 Ariz. 418, 421, 466 P.2d 18, 26 (1970)). Accordingly, courts must refrain from finding “ambiguity in the ordinary words of a statute.” Id. Here, the meaning of the statute is clear: the insurer shall by written notice offer and make available UIM coverage. The plain meaning of the verb “offer” is “[to] bring to or before; to present for acceptance____” Black’s Law Dictionary 1081 (6th ed. 1990). Thus, in the context of section 20-250.01, the word “offer” clearly means to bring to the insured or present for the insured’s acceptance UIM coverage.
Nevertheless, even assuming for the purpose of argument that the word “offer” itself is ambiguous, the history of section 20-259.01 reveals that the legislature did not intend to require insurers to describe UIM coverage to their insureds. In 1972, the statute was amended to provide that the insured “shall also make available to the named insured ... at his option, additional uninsured motorist coverage—” 1972 Ariz.Sess.Laws 157, § 1 (emphasis added). In McCloe v. Utah Home Fire Insurance Co., 121 Ariz. 402, 404, 590 P.2d 941, 943 (App.1978), we held that the language “make available” in section 20-259.01 did not impose “an affirmative obligation upon insurers to give their insureds actual personal knowledge of such an option.” In 1981, the legislature responded to our holding in McCloe. It amended the statute to place an affirmative obligation on the insurer to give written notice to the insured of the availability of uninsured motorist (“UM”) coverage. Stuart v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 152 Ariz. 78, 82, 730 P.2d 255, 259 (App.1986).
The 1981 amendment to the statute, section 20-259.01(0), required that insurers offer additional UM and UIM coverage by written notice. 1981 Ariz.Sess.Laws 224. The legislature retained the original language of the statute (every insurer shall “make available” UM coverage), held by McCloe to be inadequate to establish an obligation on the insurer to give written notice of the availability of UM coverage. The legislature simply added the words “and shall by written notice offer the insured [UM and UIM coverage].” Thus, after amendment, section 20-259.01(0 read as follows: “Every insurer ... shall also make available to the named insured thereunder and shall by written notice offer the insured and at the request of the insured shall include within the policy [UIM] coverage____” 1981 Ariz.Sess. Laws 224. In Stuart, we observed that “the language in question was intended only to require insurers to offer their new automobile liability policy customers, affirmatively and in writing, [UM and UIM] coverage with limits up to those selected for bodily injury liability coverage.” 152 Ariz. at 83, 730 P.2d at 260 (emphasis added). Thus, viewed in light of its history, section 20-259.01(C)’s provision that an insurer “shall by written notice offer the insured ... [UIM] coverage” does not require a description of UIM coverage.
Neither does Giley v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 168 Ariz. 306, 812 P.2d 1124 (App.1991), cited by the majority, imply such a requirement. The issue in Giley was not the sufficiency of the insurer’s written offer of UIM coverage, but whether the insured was misled into thinking she was signing an insurance application rather than a rejection of UIM coverage. There, the insurer handed *312the insured a form that the insured believed to be an application for insurance. The form, however, contained an offer of UIM coverage. The insurer told .the insured to sign the form if she desired coverage. Based on the insurer’s representations, the insured signed the form without reading it. The insured’s bare signature constituted a rejection of UIM coverage.5 At issue, then, was the insurer’s intentional or negligent failure to inform the insured about the true character of the form. Because the insured never read the form, the substance of the offer within the form was not an issue.
In Giley, Division Two held that, by misleading the insured about the true content of the form, the insurer failed to satisfy section 20-259.01’s requirement that the insurer make UIM coverage available to the insured. The court stated that “the phrase ‘make available’ requires that the insurer offer such coverage in a way reasonably calculated to bring to the insured’s attention that which is being offered.” Id. Both the majority and the trial court rely on this statement, but in context, the statement does not support the proposition that section 20-259.01(0 requires that an offer of UIM coverage must be accompanied by an explanation of such coverage.
The majority also relies on the 1992 amendment to section 20-259.01(0). This amendment states: “The selection of limits or rejection of coverage on a form approved by the director, by a named insured or applicant shall be valid for all insureds under the policy____” 1992 Ariz.Sess.Laws 147. The majority notes that the director has, pursuant to this statute, adopted a form that contains an explanation of UIM coverage. According to the majority, the 1992 amendment to section 20-259.01(0 indicates that “more than an abbreviated form is needed to effectively offer UIM coverage.” I respectfully disagree. The statutory amendment contains no requirement that an offer of UIM coverage contain an explanation of such coverage. The fact that the director has explained UIM coverage in the form adopted by him adds nothing to the discussion.
Finally, the majority argues that State Farm Automobile Insurance Co. v. Ash, 181 Ariz. 167, 888 P.2d 1354 (App.1994), supports the view that the legislature intended that all offers of UIM coverage contain a description of such coverage. Again, I disagree. In Ash, the insurer both urged this court to adopt the Hastings6 test and argued that its offer of UIM coverage satisfied that test. The Ash court, however, refrained from adopting the Hastings test. Although the court eventually applied the Hastings test to the insurer’s offer, it may have done so for reasons of expediency. But regardless of the Ash court’s rationale for applying the Hastings test, the fact remains that the court did not even suggest that the legislature intended to adopt that test.
In fact, the Ash court suggested the opposite. The offer given by the insurer in Ash was nearly identical to the offer at issue here. The offer in Ash stated: “ ‘IF YOU WOULD LIKE [UM AND UIM] COVERAGE EQUAL TO YOUR BODILY INJURY LIABILITY LIMITS OF XXX/XXX, CHECK HERE _ AND PAY $XXXX.XX.’ ” 181 Ariz. at 175, 888 P.2d at 1362. As was the case here, this offer did not describe UIM coverage. Yet, the Ash court stated, “This language was clearly an offer.” Id. (emphasis added). Because section 20-259.01(0 requires insurers to merely “offer” UIM coverage, Ash implies that the legislature did not intend that an insurer’s offer of UIM coverage contain an explanation of such coverage.
In sum, because the language and history of section 20-259.01(0 clearly reflect no legislative requirement that the insurer give a written explanation of UIM coverage, the adoption of the Hastings rule is, in my view, not appropriate. Although “typical insureds may lack an understanding of UIM coverage,” it does not follow that the legislature intended to invalidate an offer of UIM cover*313age that does not explain such coverage, Nor should we. I would conclude that National’s offer of UIM coverage to the Tallents complied with the statute.
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. The Giley court did not expressly discuss what constituted the insured’s rejection of UIM coverage, but the court stated that the insured signed a form that contained an offer for UIM coverage. We infer from these facts that to accept UIM coverage, the insured had to do more than just sign the form. On forms commonly used in the industry, the insured, to purchase UIM coverage, must check a box for the amount of UIM coverage desired.
. Hastings v. United Pacific Ins. Co., 318 N.W.2d 849 (Minn. 1982).