I dissent.
There can be no quarrel with the conclusion that section 36 of the Civil Code, as amended in 1927 (Stats. 1927, p. 1917), is constitutional and withdraws the right of disaffirmance as to a judicially approved contract to perform dramatic services entered into by a minor; but I cannot agree with the conclusion that by the language of that section in 1927 the Legislature accomplished what it belatedly and twenty years later (Stats. 1947, p. 1518) said it intended by the earlier act.
Section 34 of the Civil Code permits a minor to make a contract to perform personal services (as limited by specified laws not involved), subject to his power of disaffirmance under other provisions. Section 35 confers the right of disaffirmance by the minor either before his majority or within a reasonable time afterwards, except as otherwise specified in section 36. The pertinent language of the latter section as it read at the time here involved is: “A minor can not disaffirm a contract, otherwise valid, to perform or render services as actor, actress, or other dramatic services . . . where such contract has been approved by the superior court of the county where such minor resides or is employed. Such approval may be given on the petition of either party to the contract after such reasonable notice to the other party thereto as may be fixed by said court, with opportunity to such other party to appear and be heard.”
Joan Brodel, when 17 years of age, executed a contract whereby she agreed to perform dramatic services exclusively for Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., as producer, “for and during the term of this agreement.” The “term of this agreement” *779was specified to commence on the 30th day of March, 1942, and to continue for a period of 52 weeks, at a salary of $600 per week. By the same instrument she granted to the producer six separate “rights or options to extend the term of employment” for additional successive periods of 52 weeks each at progressively higher weekly salaries. The contract, after notice and hearing, was approved by the court. In due time the producer elected to exercise the first, second and third options, and the artist performed thereunder. On January 26, 1946, the artist arrived at her majority. On February 13, 1946, within the time stated in the contract, the producer gave notice of its election to exercise the fourth option. On February 20, 1946, the artist gave written notice of disaffirmance and declined to render services pursuant to any purported exercise of the fourth and further options.
The foregoing comprises the substance of the allegations of the complaint. The order sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the action was based upon the .trial court’s determination that section 36 vested in the court the power to approve only contracts to perform or render dramatic services; that since the grant of a right or option to extend the term of the agreement was not such a contract, the right of disaffirmance as to such right or option was not taken away.
By section 36, as it read at the time here involved, the right was withdrawn as to a minor’s contract to perform or render dramatic services, where “such contract” had been approved by the superior court. ‘ ‘Such approval” might be given upon petition, notice and hearing. The court’s power was thus expressly limited to approval of a minor’s contract to perform or render dramatic services. Approval of anything beyond that was outside of or in excess of the authority vested in the court. Since upon approval disaffirmance was prohibited only as to contracts to perform dramatic services, approval of anything further would accomplish nothing. It would be purely gratuitous, and could not deprive the minor of the right of disaffirmance otherwise conferred by law. Language extending the expressed deprivation should not be judicially supplied.
The specification of a contract to perform dramatic services refers to an accepted offer, a present binding obligation to perform those services. A valid option is not an accepted *780offer, but merely binds the optioner to keep open an offer. It is the sale of a present right to create a future obligation to perform.. (Hicks v. Christeson, 174 Cal. 712, 716, 718 [164 P. 395]; Seeburg v. El Royale Corp., 54 Cal.App.2d 1, 4 [128 P.2d 362]; Brickell v. Atlas Assurance Co., Ltd, 10 Cal.App. 17, 22 [101 P. 16], citing Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law; Cline v. Hall, 107 Okla. 218 [232 P. 31, 33]; Restatement of the Law of Contracts, § 47.) There is no obligation to perform until the option is exercised, and conceivably the offer may never ripen into an obligation to perform.
The plaintiff objected to this- construction and application of the language employed by the Legislature, but did not question the fact that the words of the contract appeared to limit the employment and the promise to perform dramatic services to a term of one year from March 30,1942. It argued that the purpose of the enactment would be obviated unless the several options to extend the term for the successive periods be included within the present obligation to perform dramatic services. To the possible answer that it could have written a contract for a straight seven-year term the plaintiff replied that the executed contract had been the standard in form for many years.
The plaintiff invoked the rule of contemporaneous construction. The construction asserted was not express but tacit; that is, it was inferred from a consistent failure by minor artists for about 20 years or since 1927 to attempt disaffirmance of judicially approved contracts, or to request limited approval by the court, on the ground that disaffirmance was not withdrawn as to the option features included within a contract to perform dramatic services. This failure, however, may also be noted as evidence of satisfaction by the minors with their contracts. But assuming that such failure could create a contemporaneous construction, the rule is nevertheless inapplicable when the statute calls for a different construction. (Johnston v. Board of Supervisors, ante, pp. 66, 74 [187 P.2d 686], citing California Drive-In Restaurant Ass’n v. Clark, 22 Cal.2d 287, 294 [140 P.2d 657, 147 A.L.R. 1028].)
The plaintiff also relied on the act of 1947 {supra, Stats. 1947, p. 1518) which amended the language of section 36 regarding the contract as to which the minor’s right of disaffirmance was withdrawn upon approval by the court. That section now contains the following relating to the contract *781and the authority of the court; “A contract or agreement employing such person as, or wherein such person agrees to perform or render services as, an actor, actress, or other dramatic performer, . . . where such contract or agreement has been approved by the superior court . . . and said court shall have jurisdiction to approve, and its approval when given shall extend to the whole of said contract or agreement, and all of the terms and provisions thereof, including, but without being limited to, any option or conditional provisions contained therein for extension, prolongation or termination of the term thereof.” Section 2 of the 1947 act states that the amendment does not constitute a change in, but is declaratory of, the preexisting law.
Without such a legislative declaration a later amendment may be taken as stating the intended meaning of a statute before amendment. (De Haviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 67 Cal.App.2d 225, 232-233 [153 P.2d 983].) The addition of the legislative declaration is not a matter of judicial inquiry unless it has some weight in determining prior legislative meaning. It can have no weight where the declaration is diametrically opposed to the fact. (California Emp. etc. Com. v. Payne, ante, pp. 210, 213-214 [187 P.2d 702].) Without that declaration the conclusion is irresistible that the change in wording of section 36 was intended as a change in meaning. In truth the later inclusion of matters not theretofore mentioned would be taken as a legislative admission that at the time of the prior statute they were either overlooked or were not intended to be included. Inasmuch as the 1927 and 1947 amendments to section 36 provide the express exceptions to the exercise of the power of disaffirmance conferred by section 35, the courts should confine the exceptions within the bounds of the plain language employed by the Legislature. It does not appear whether the claimed standard form of contract for employment of actors in motion picture production was in use in 1927. If so, the Legislature by the amendment to section 36 in that year did not indicate awareness thereof so as clearly to authorize approval of the entire contract. From the clear language of the 1947 amendment expressing such intent, it becomes obvious that the Legislature was made aware of the facts at least since the commencement of the present action. I see no justification for employing the expedient of interpretation in accord with the 1947 legislative declaration to countenance a statutory deprivation of *782the defendant’s right of disaffirmance of which she was not thus clearly deprived under the applicable preexisting law. In such case the later amendment becomes a rule for the future only. (Matter of Coburn, 165 Cal. 202, 209-210 [131 P. 352]; Clayton v. Schultz, 4 Cal.2d 425, 430 [50 P.2d 446].)
In my opinion the trial court correctly ruled that the facts stated in the complaint did not constitute a cause of action, and I would affirm the judgment.
Carter, J., concurred.
Respondent’s petition for a rehearing was denied May 27, 1948. Shenk, J., and Carter, J., voted for a rehearing.