concurring:
I disagree with the reasoning of both the majority opinion and the dissent written by my brother Springer, but for reasons which I shall hereafter explain, I am forced to agree with the majority in concluding that the order entered by the district court must be reversed.
The Commission found that Mr. Lucchesi did not use his position as a faculty member at UNLV to secure an unwarranted advantage for JMA/Lucchesi (“JMAL”) in violation of NRS 281.481(2). This finding is supported by substantial evidence and is not implicated in the resolution of this appeal.
The State Public Works Board (“SPWB”) decided to award the design contract for the architectural building at UNLV (“the building”) to JMAL, and there is no evidence suggesting that JMAL’s selection was based on any improper factor. The Commission, however, concluded that JMAL, though innocent, violated NRS 281.481(3),1 thus precluding its right to compete for the design contract on the building.
The prohibitory first sentence of NRS 281.481(3) is not an issue in this appeal for JMAL did not “participate as an agent of government” in the negotiation or execution of any contract. Indeed, the Commission alluded to no violation attributable to that provision. The Commission’s ruling against JMAL was *12based entirely on the Commission’s interpretation of the second sentence of NRS 281.481(3), which provides:
Unless specifically prohibited by law, a public officer or employee, as such, is not precluded from making a bid on a government contract if the contracting process is controlled by rules of open competitive bidding, the sources of supply are limited, he has not taken part in developing the contract plans or specifications and he will not be personally involved in opening, considering or accepting offers.
(Emphasis mine.)
In my view, the highlighted segments of the quoted provision make it apparent that the provision relates only to the process of formal bidding where, in response to invitations to bid, a bidder submits a sealed offer capable of creating a binding contract upon acceptance by the cognizant government contracting authority. The thrust of this provision is that a public officer or employee may not bid on government contracts unless (1) the contracting process is controlled by rules of open competitive bidding; (2) the sources of supply are limited; (3) he [or she] has not taken part in developing the contract plans or specifications; and (4) he [or she] will not be personally involved in opening, considering, or accepting offers.
NRS 281.481(3) thus prohibits public officers and employees from contracting with the government except in limited-source, open competition procurements where the public officer or employee who bids has not participated in developing the plans and specifications upon which the bids will be based. Additionally, the public officer or employee must not participate in opening, considering or accepting the offers submitted by the bidders. All of these conditions are descriptive of a formal, open bidding process where the offeror submits an offer that is sufficiently complete and responsive to create a binding contract upon acceptance by the government. Of necessity, one of the bid components would have to be price.
NRS 625.530(3)2 precludes architects from submitting bids for government service contracts based upon fees or price. Since NRS 281.481(3) inferentially allows public officers and employees to contract with the government only under the limited *13conditions specified in that provision, and since architects are precluded by NRS 625.530(3) from participating in the submission of bids conforming to the requirements of NRS 281.481(3), JMAL was ineligible for the building contract.3
The Commission broadly interpreted NRS 281.481(3) to include architects where the process of selecting the architect is “entirely competitive in every respect except as to ‘fees’.” In construing the statute as it did, the Commission sought to avoid the disincentive to serve as faculty or State licensing board members, where such public employee-architects would otherwise be ineligible to bid on state-owned building projects.
There are two reasons why the position taken by the Commission is unsound. First, the interpretation of the statute is in reality an amendment designed to avoid what the Commission understandably considers to be a public detriment if the statutory language is given “absolute” effect. Even the courts are enjoined from rewriting the plain language of a statute in order to supply a more reasonable effect. Second, the Commission’s construction modifies the terms of NRS 625.530(3). The latter statute mandates the selection of an architect on the basis of competence and qualifications rather than “competition in every respect other than fees.” Indeed, the statute specifically allows the public agency to simply “select” another architect if the one first selected is unable to agree with the government agency on the amount of fees to be charged. The Commission, in expanding the meaning and scope of NRS 281.481(3), has necessarily contracted the meaning and scope of NRS 625.530(3) at least insofar as it applies to architects who are public employees. Such powers are not accorded to the Commission.
After construing NRS 281.481(3) to include architects competing in all respects other than fees, the Commission concluded that the contracting process utilized in selecting an architect for the building was controlled by the referenced statute and that Luc-chesi violated, albeit innocently, the terms of the statute by participating in the development of the contract plans and specifications, thereby gaining an advantage for JMAL. The evidence of record does not support the finding. A reasonable reading of NRS 281.481(3) disqualifies a public-employee architect who participates in creating the plans and specifications contained in the request for bids. Since there were no requests for bids under the meaning of the statute, there were no plans or specifications developed in whole or in part by Lucchesi as a basis for “bidding” on the services contract.
*14Moreover, even under the statutory construction supplied by the Commission, there was no bidding process for the building that was “entirely competitive in every respect except as to ‘fees’.” The Commission noted that before the design competition was extended to four firms, the SPWB considered a larger number of firms and evaluated their “professional qualifications, strengths and abilities to design this particular building” before reducing the number of participants to four. This evaluation process was based upon judgment rather than competition. In short, NRS 281.481(3) was simply not implicated in the process utilized by the SPWB in selecting an architect for the building.4
I have reluctantly decided to concur with the majority opinion because of what I perceive to be the only reasonable interpretation of the constrictive language of NRS 281.481(3). I therefore urge the Legislature to seriously consider the consequences of the existing statute as it applies to architects and other professionals, in order to assure the right of the State to secure professional services in accordance with the best interests of the State.
NRS 281.481(3) provides:
A public officer or employee shall not participate as an agent of government in the negotiation or execution of a contract between the government and any private business in which he has a significant pecuniary interest. Unless specifically prohibited by law, a public officer or employee, as such, is not precluded from making a bid on a government contract if the contracting process is controlled by rules of open competitive bidding, the sources of supply are limited, he has not taken part in developing the contract plans or specifications and he will not be personally involved in opening, considering or accepting offers.
In pertinent part, NRS 625.530(3) provides:
The selection of a . . . registered architect to perform services . . . must be made on the basis of the competence and qualifications of the . . . architect for the type of services to be performed, and not on the basis of competitive fees. If, after selection of the . . . architect, an agreement upon a fair and reasonable fee cannot be reached with him, the public agency may terminate negotiations and select another . . . architect.
The Commission found, without apparent dispute, that both Lucchesi and Carr, principals in JMAL, were public employees by reason of their positions as faculty members at UNLV.
There is no indication in the Commission’s opinion that the Commission would have denied the power of the SPWB to have selected an architect other than the “winner” of the design competition had the SPWB determined that other factors involving competence and qualifications were of greater importance to the project. Indeed, I found it somewhat strange that the Commission expressly limited its “reconciliation” of NRS 281.481(3) and NRS 625.530(3) to the facts of this particular case, and did not attempt to construe and reconcile “those provisions where the State contracts with the architect for services without any competitive process of selection, as distinct from that which occurred in this matter.” Since the Commission found JMAL’s conduct innocent, and the record supports such a finding, I would have difficulty voting to deprive JMAL of its contract were it not for what appears to be a clear, if not wise, prohibition in NRS 281.481(3).