I dissent from the very limited interpretation the majority have given to the term “capital case” in Penal Code section 987.9.1 In my view, the Legislature clearly intended to make the benefits of that statute available to individuals charged with murder whenever special circumstances are alleged, whether or not the prosecution is seeking the death penalty.
In restricting section 987.9’s application to “death penalty” cases, the majority ignore several decisions of this court in which such a narrow reading has been expressly rejected. Furthermore, as a practical matter, the majority’s holding will saddle the counties with the financial responsibility for ancillary defense services in special circumstances cases in which the death penalty is not sought. This will create insuperable problems and precipitate the very local financial crises which the Legislature sought to prevent by enacting section 987.9.
The sole question in this case is what the Legislature intended when it accorded the benefits of section 987.92 to indigent defendants “[i]n the trial of a capital case . ...” It is not what the term “capital case” might mean to the populace at large, or even whether that term is synonymous with “capital punishment.” When section 987.9 is viewed in the context of the overall statutory scheme of which it is a part, it becomes clear that the Legislature intended all individuals charged in special circumstances cases to receive the benefits of that statute.
I.
A proper understanding of the connection between section 987.9 and the special circumstances scheme requires a brief review of the history of special circumstances legislation in this state.
*577Our Legislature first enacted special circumstances legislation in 1973 as a response to a United States Supreme Court decision which had declared the Georgia death penalty statute unconstitutional. (See Furman v. Georgia (1972) 408 U.S. 238 [33 L.Ed.2d 346, 92 S.Ct. 2726].) Since the existing California death penalty scheme was substantially the same as the Georgia statute involved in Furman, the 1973 legislation was an attempt to meet the objections raised in that case. (See People v. Frierson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 142, 174 [158 Cal.Rptr. 281, 599 P.2d 587] (lead opn. of Richardson, J.).) Operating under the belief that the Supreme Court required a mandatory death penalty law that would apply to a narrow class of first degree murderers, the Legislature provided for a supplementary finding of “special circumstances” following an individual’s conviction of first degree murder. (See former § 190.2, Stats. 1973, ch. 719, § 5, p. 1299.) In all cases where special circumstances were found true, the penalty was automatically fixed at death. (See former §§ 190, 190.1, 190.2, Stats. 1973, ch. 719, §§ 2, 4, 5, pp. 1297-1300.)
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions invalidated two mandatory death penalty laws which were similar to California’s.3 According to the Supreme Court, the vice of those schemes was a failure to provide the “sentencing authority with the option to impose a sentence other than death, guided by sufficient standards to assure against arbitrariness and discrimination in the application of the death penalty.” (People v. Frierson, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 174 (lead opn.).) Relying on those decisions, this court found the 1973 law unconstitutional. (Rockwell v. Superior Court (1976) 18 Cal.3d 420 [134 Cal.Rptr. 650, 556 P.2d 1101].)
The 1977 Legislature responded to our Rockwell decision by enacting Senate Bill No. 155. (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.; Stats. 1977, ch. 316.) That legislation “adopted an essentially new system whereby the trier of fact, upon proof of certain enumerated ‘special circumstances’ . . . , must determine whether the penalty shall be death or life imprisonment without possibility of parole . . . .” (People v. Frierson, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 175; see former §§ 190, 190.2, 190.3, 190.4, Stats. 1977, ch. 316, §§ 5, 9, 11, 12, pp. 1256-1262.) Although the Legislature reenacted the death penalty in murder-special circumstances cases, the most important aspect of the 1977 legislation was its provision for a penalty alternative to death in such cases.
*578The same Legislature which enacted Senate Bill No. 155 also added section 987.9 to the Penal Code. (Stats. 1977, ch. 1048, § 1, p. 3178.) Indeed, the close connection between the enactments is shown by the fact that the operation of section 987.9 was expressly conditioned on the passage of Senate Bill No. 155. (See id., § 2, p. 3179.)
It is, therefore, significant that the Legislature did not limit the applicability of section 987.9 to “death penalty” cases, but extended its benefits to “capital” cases. The use of this broader term can only mean that the Legislature intended section 987.9 to apply to the type of cases with which Senate Bill No. 155 was primarily concerned, i.e., special circumstances cases. Since the main feature of these 1977 legislative enactments was the addition of the alternative penalty of life without parole, it follows that the Legislature intended to accord the benefits of section 987.9 to all persons accused of special circumstances crimes, regardless of whether the penalty being sought was death or the newly created alternative of life without parole.4
Several of this court’s decisions regarding other aspects of the special circumstances statutory scheme reinforce the conclusion that the term “capital case,” as it is used in section 987.9, refers to all cases in which special circumstances are alleged.
People v. Davis (1981) 29 Cal.3d 814 [176 Cal.Rptr. 521, 633 P.2d 186] is such a case. There, a 16-year-old minor was convicted under the 1977 law of murder with special circumstances. Since that legislation specifically exempted minors from the death penalty (see former § 190.5, Stats. 1977, ch. 316, § 13, p. 1262), the minor was automatically sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. On appeal, he argued that the Legislature intended the latter penalty to apply only as an alternative in special circumstances cases in which the former penalty could statutorily be imposed. This court agreed and ordered the minor’s sentence reduced to life imprisonment. (Id., at p. 832.)
The analysis in Davis indicates that this court views the 1977 legislation as a system of two alternative penalties which are linked for purposes of statutory interpretation. The conclusion that the Legislature had intended to proscribe life without possibility of parole for minors in special circumstan*579ces cases was a clear recognition that the 1977 law was not merely a “death penalty” statute, but rather a “special circumstances” statute. Because the two penalties were statutorily linked, the statutory prohibition of one necessarily rendered the other inapplicable. Since section 987.9 was part of the same special circumstances scheme at issue in Davis, the Legislature’s decision to confer its benefits on all individuals accused in “capital cases” must be read as intending to apply to individuals subject to either penalty.According the benefits of section 987.9 in all special circumstances cases is thus consistent with the Davis holding.
This court’s analysis in Ramos v. Superior Court (1982) 32 Cal.3d 26 [184 Cal.Rptr. 622, 648 P.2d 589] is similarly illustrative. The trial court there had ruled that a motion to dismiss a special circumstance allegation-made under section 871 in the municipal court and under section 995 in the superior court—did not lie to challenge the evidentiary sufficiency of a special circumstance allegation where the death penalty was not being sought.5 In reversing that ruling, this court rejected the contention that the Legislature sought to distinguish between special circumstances cases involving the death penalty and those limited to life without the possibility of parole. The court noted that “[njothing in either the statutory language or legislative history of either the current death penalty statutes or of section 995 indicates that the Legislature intended to limit the review of special circumstance allegations [to cases in which the death penalty is sought].” (32 Cal.3d at p. 33.)
The majority’s attempt to distinguish this holding by emphasizing that Ramos only dealt with the “context” of review of special circumstances allegations under sections 871 and 995 misses the point. (Maj. opn., ante, pp. 573-574; see Ramos v. Superior Court, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 33.) Ramos is apposite here because it demonstrates this court’s recognition that in yet another situation where special circumstances are involved, the Legislature intended to make no distinction between cases where death is a possibility and those where it is not. It is irrelevant that Ramos arose in the “context” of the review powers provided in sections 871 and 995, since the same overall legislative scheme is involved. If this court is to be consistent with its prior decisions in this area, the conclusion is inevitable that the Legislature intended to draw no distinction among special circumstances cases when it enacted section 987.9.
Like the Legislature in enacting section 987.9, this court itself has used the term “capital case” to include more than “death penalty cases.” A *580perfect example is our decision in People v. Chadd (1981) 28 Cal.3d 739 [170 Cal.Rptr. 798, 621 P.2d 837]. The issue in Chadd was whether the trial court erred in accepting, without the consent of counsel, an accused’s plea to first degree murder with special circumstances. On appeal, this court held the plea was invalid in view of the provision in section 1018 that “[n]o plea of guilty of a felony for which the maximum punishment is death, or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, shall be received from a defendant who does not appear with counsel, nor shall any such plea be received without the consent of the defendant’s counsel.”6
Writing for this court, Justice Mosk analyzed the requirements of section 1018, noting that “it is difficult to conceive of a plainer statement of law than the rule of section 1018 that no guilty plea to a capital offense shall be received ‘without the consent of the defendant’s counsel.’ ” (Id., at p. 746, italics added.) Acknowledging that another provision of section 1018 permits “noncapital defendants” to plead guilty without counsel, Justice Mosk reasoned that “to permit a capital defendant [to do so] . . . would thus obliterate the Legislature’s careful distinction between capital and non-capital cases, and render largely superfluous its special provision for the former.” (Id., at p. 747, last italics added.) Later in the opinion, Justice Mosk discussed whether Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [45 L.Ed.2d 562, 95 S.Ct. 2525] was inconsistent with the counsel requirement in section 1018, and stated that Faretta “did not strip our Legislature of the authority to condition guilty pleas in capital cases on the consent of defense counsel.” (28 Cal.3d at p. 750, italics added.) Since section 1018 proscribes counselless pleas not only in “death penalty” cases, but in all cases where death or life without the possibility of parole is a potential punishment, the Chadd court’s repeated characterization of such cases as “capital” demonstrates how that term can embrace nondeath penalty cases. Further, that definition is entirely consistent with the meaning the Legislature intended to give that term in section 987.9.7
*581II.
When a trial court awards funds pursuant to section 987.9, the state reimburses the counties for the expenditures. (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 575; Rev. & Tax. Code, § 2231;8 Keenan v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 424, 429 [180 Cal.Rptr. 489, 640 P.2d 108].) Expenditures for ancillary defense services in cases where an award has not been made pursuant to' section 987.9 are borne by the county. Thus, the practical effect of today’s decision is to place the financial burden for ancillary defense services in nondeath penalty special circumstances cases on the counties. Because the counties already bear the major burden for the cost of appointed counsel in all criminal cases (see § 987.6; Keenan, supra, 31 Cal.3d at pp. 429-430), the effect of today’s decision is potentially devastating.
Assuming, as the majority do, that an accused in a nondeath penalty special circumstances case is entitled to ancillary defense services equivalent to those contemplated by section 987.9 (see maj. opn., ante, at p. 575, and fns. 3 & 4), the payment for such services will be dependent upon the ability of a county government to authorize the expenditure of its resources. Because the cost of those services can be quite high, in less-populated counties with relatively small budgets there will be an inevitable tug-of-war between the accused’s right to such services and the county’s desire to keep itself solvent.
For example, it is not at all inconceivable that a county which has been ordered to pay for an accused’s ancillary defense services will refuse to do so on the ground that the expenditure would bankrupt its treasury. This could result in a stalemate between the local judiciary and county officials, thereby requiring a special legislative appropriation or a resolution by the appellate courts. If the counties are saddled with the expense of ancillary defense services in nondeath penalty special circumstances trials, and if, as the majority hold, individuals so charged are entitled to such services, then such a scenario is likely to become commonplace. I cannot concur in an interpretation of section 987.9 which will encourage such a result.
No local official should be placed in a position of having the responsibility or the power to condition an accused’s right to a full and fair defense on the size of the county fisc. In enacting section 987.9, the Legislature ob*582viously considered this problem and resolved it by an annual appropriation9 for defense services in special circumstances trials. Those monies should be available to any individual charged with murder where special circumstances are alleged. Today’s decision only assures that the practical problems associated with county funding of special circumstances trials will occur with increasing regularity.
III.
Finally, I find the majority’s disposition in this case very puzzling. As noted, the majority observe that petitioner may be able to secure “by alter nate means” relief equivalent to that claimed under section 987.9. Those means, according to the majority, emanate from petitioner’s “statutory right to legal assistance” (§§ 987, subd. (a); 987.8) and his rights to counsel and due process. (In re Ketchel (1968) 68 Cal.2d 397, 399-400 [66 Cal.Rptr. 881, 438 P.2d 625]; People v. Faxel (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 327, 330 [154 Cal.Rptr. 132]; maj. opn., ante, at p. 575, and fns. 3 & 4.) However reassuring that dicta may be in other cases, the majority do not grant peti tioner such funds by these “alternate means.” That result is curious, given this court’s recent decision in Keenan v. Superior Court, supra, 31 Cal.3d 424.
In Keenan, the indigent petitioner applied to the superior court for funds under section 987.9 to hire a second counsel. The trial court denied his request. This court held that petitioner had made a sufficient showing to support his claim (id., at p. 427), but found section 987.9 inapplicable on the ground that the statute is intended to provide only for ancillary defense services, not counsel.10 Holding that the funds could be awarded pursuant *583to other statutes,11 this court then ordered that a peremptory writ issue directing the trial court to grant petitioner’s request under the alternate statutory provisions. (Id., at p. 434.)
The instant case is in a posture identical to that of Keenan. Petitioner has sought funds under section 987.9. According to the majority, those funds are not available under that statute, but petitioner is said to be entitled to equivalent relief under “alternate means.” Why, then, is this petitioner not granted relief in the same manner as in Keenan, i.e., under these “alternate means”?
IV.
As this court has recently recognized, “[rjepresentation of an accused murderer is a mammoth responsibility.” (In re Hall (1981) 30 Cal.3d 408, 434 [179 Cal.Rptr. 223, 637 P.2d 690].) While a special circumstances case in which the death penalty is no longer a possibility may be less of a “mammoth responsibility” than one in which it is, the difference may be negligible. A denial of state-provided ancillary defense funds in nondeath penalty special circumstances cases may deprive the accused of the tools necessary for a full and complete defense. Since the majority’s result is contrary to the Legislature’s provision, and since the practical problems associated with burdening the counties with the expense of such cases are potentially devastating, I must respectfully dissent.
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
Section 987.9 provides: “In the trial of a capital case the indigent defendant, through his counsel, may request the court for funds for the specific payment of investigators, experts, and others for the preparation or presentation of the defense. The application for such funds shall be by affidavit and shall specify that the funds are reasonably necessary for the preparation or presentation of the defense. The fact that such an application has been made shall be confidential and the contents of the application shall be confidential. Upon receipt of such application, a judge of the court, other than the trial judge presiding over the capital case in question, shall rule on the reasonableness of the request and shall disburse an appropriate amount of money to defendant’s attorney. The ruling on the reasonableness of the request shall be made at an in camera hearing. In making such a ruling, the court shall be guided by the need to provide a complete and full defense for the defendant. [1] At the termination of the proceedings, the attorney shall furnish to the court a complete accounting of all moneys received and disbursed pursuant to this section.”
The high court struck down the laws of North Carolina and Louisiana (Woodson v. North Carolina (1976) 428 U.S. 280 [49 L.Ed.2d 944, 96 S.Ct. 2978]; Roberts v. Louisiana (1976) 428 U.S. 325 [49 L.Ed.2d 974, 96 S.Ct. 3001]), and upheld the discretionary death penalty statutes of Georgia, Florida, and Texas (Gregg v. Georgia (1976) 428 U.S. 153 [49 L.Ed.2d 859, 96 S.Ct. 2909]; Proffitt v. Florida (1976) 428 U.S. 242 [49 L.Ed.2d 913, 96 S.Ct. 2960]; Jurek v. Texas (1976) 428 U.S. 262 [49 L.Ed.2d 929, 96 S.Ct. 2950]).
The majority fear that individuals charged with aggravated kidnaping (§ 209, subd. (a))— who face a term of life without possibility of parole—would be entitled to the benefits of section 987.9. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 576, fn. 2.) This belief is unfounded. Under a proper construction of the statute, “capital case” refers to a special circumstance case. Since aggravated kidnaping is not such a case, there is no possibility that the state will be financially liable for ancillary defense services when that crime is charged.
At the time of the trial proceedings in Ramos, it was clear that the sufficiency of evidence to support a special circumstance allegation in death penalty cases could be tested under section 995. (See Ramos, supra, 32 Cal.3d at pp. 29-30, 32-33; Ghent v. Superior Court (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 944, 953-954 [153 Cal.Rptr. 720].)
The provision requiring counsel’s consent was added in 1973. (Stats. 1973, ch. 719, § 11, p. 1301.) Although section 1018 was amended in other respects in the 1977 legislation which added the life without parole penalty to the special circumstances scheme (Stats. 1977, ch. 316, § 17, p. 1263), the language quoted in the text remained intact.
Even assuming the majority are correct in asserting that the term “capital case” in section 987.9 is ambiguous (see maj. opn., ante, at p. 570), it is difficult to justify the conclusion it reaches.
It is a well established principle of statutory construction that “ ‘[t]he defendant is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt, whether it arise out of a question of fact, or as to the true interpretation of words or the construction of language used in a statute. ’ ” (People v. Davis, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 828, quoting In re Tartar (1959) 52 Cal.2d 250, 256-257 [339 P.2d 553].)
Thus, if, as the majority believe, the term “capital case” is reasonably susceptible to two constructions, then the definition which favors petitioner must be adopted. (Ibid.) This principle compels the conclusion that the benefits of state funding and confidentiality which the Legislature provided for in section 987.9 must be extended to all individuals charged with special circumstances, whether or not the death penalty will be sought.
Subdivision (a) of Revenue and Taxation Code section 2231 provides in relevant part:
“The state shall reimburse each local agency for all ‘costs mandated by the state,’ as defined in section 2207.” Section 2207 states in relevant part: “ ‘Costs mandated by the state’ means any increased costs which a local agency is required to incur as a result of the following: [D] (a) Any law enacted after January 1, 1973, which mandates a new program or an increased level of service of an existing program. ...”
Appropriations for section 987.9 monies have increased over the last few budget years, which may indicate that the Legislature recognizes the important function that the availability of these fhnds serves. The 1980 Budget Act appropriated $1 million for disbursement under section 987.9. (Stats. 1980, ch. 510, p. 1237.) The same sum was appropriated in the 1981 Budget Act (Stats. 1981, ch. 99, p. 540), but proved to be insufficient for fiscal year 1981-1982, and a supplemental appropriation of $1.19 million was made (Stats. 1982, ch. 1586, § 5(k), p. 6267). That sum still fell short of actual expenditures by some $800,000. (See Legis. Analyst’s Rep., 1983 Budget, Item No. 8160, pp. 1783-1784.) The sum of $1 million was again appropriated in the 1982 Budget Act (Stats. 1982, ch. 326, p. 1043), but a supplemental appropriation of $2.47 million appears necessary to cover actual expenses for fiscal year 1982-1983. (See Legis. Analyst’s Rep., supra, at p. 1784.)
The majority make the surprisingly inaccurate assertion that this court in Keenan “im plicitly construed . . . section 987.9 ... to apply to cases involving the death penalty.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 575.) As the Keenan opinion indicates, the petitioner applied for funds for a second counsel under section 987.9. This court found section 987.9 inapplicable, because the statute provides only for funds for services ancillary to those of counsel, not for counsel itself. (See id., at p. 430.) Thus, this court neither explicitly nor implicitly construed that statute to be inapplicable in nondeath penalty cases.
The statutes referred to (§§ 987, subd. (b), 987.2-987.8; Keenan, supra, 31 Cal.3d at pp. 429-430) provide for payment of counsel for indigent persons accused of a crime or detained under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5000 et seq.). In such cases, the state reimburses the counties for 10 percent of such costs. (See § 987.6.)