concurring:
I join the majority in its opinion and its judgment. I write separately, however, to emphasize that when police inquiry fails to corroborate objective facts alleged by a first-time anonymous informant but, in fact, refutes conclusions of the informant necessary to establish a nexus between the purported illegal activity and a suspect’s residence, probable cause does not exist to support the issue of a warrant permitting a governmental intrusion into a home.
I
The facts are sufficiently set forth in the majority opinion. It is fairly well-established that the existence of probable cause must be made -from the four corners of the affidavit. People v. Lindholm, 197 Colo. 270, 273, 591 P.2d 1032, 1034 (1979). As the reviewing court, we must determine whether, based upon the assertions of fact in the affidavit, there is probable cause to issue a warrant to search Titus’ residence. People v. Pannebaker, 714 P.2d 904 (Colo.1986) (adopting the totality-of-the-circumstances test set forth in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)). An “informant’s reliability, veracity, and basis of knowledge are still important factors to be considered in determining whether probable cause exists.” People v. Diaz, 793 P.2d 1181, 1183 (Colo.1990); People v. Contreras, 780 P.2d 552, 556 (Colo.1989). When relying upon an anonymous informant, corroboration of factual assertions combined with specific details not easily obtained will support a finding of probable cause. People v. Leftwich, 869 P.2d 1260 (Colo.1994). Mere suspicion, falling short of probable cause, is not sufficient without more to support the issue of a warrant. Police corroboration of significant aspects of an informant’s assertions of fact is important in resolving whether or not probable cause to issue a warrant exists. People v. Turcotte-Schaeffer, 843 P.2d 658, 660-61 (Colo.1993).
II
The affidavit of Detective Richter begins and ends our review, confirming the propriety of the trial court’s ruling. In his affidavit, Detective Richter stated that “Crime Stopper # 1789E believed [the defendant was] selling large amounts of marijuana from [his] home, based on the amount of traffic going to and from the residence, and that most of the traffic going to that address only stayed a short period of time.” However, based on his experience and training as a member of the Colorado Springs Police Department Metro Vice/Narcotics Division, Richter was unable to corroborate or confirm the existence of traffic of a sufficient nature to surmise that, in fact, Titus’ residence was being used for the sale of drugs. In his affidavit, Richter stated:
[y]our affiant, between August 1,1993, and August 30, 1993, did conduct surveillance on the address of 716 Arcadia Place, three times, each time for approximately thirty minutes to one hour in the evening. Your affiant notes that no activity was seen as far os possible marijuana customers going in and out of the residence was concerned.
Apparently, Richter was unable, on three occasions, to corroborate a very important and presumably verifiable objective fact supporting the conclusions of his first-time informant, i.e., criminal activity evinced by the “amount of traffic ... to and from the residence.” Instead, Richter’s efforts to corroborate the unknown informant’s assertions substantially nullify and refute any inference of illegal conduct — drug trafficking. This is the only reasonable conclusion that remains when the affidavit is reviewed within its four corners and the various assertions contained therein are taken as a whole.
As a consequence, the affidavit setting forth the informant’s assertions as to the nature of the traffic, when weighed against the results of Detective Richter’s subsequent police inquiry does not provide a substantial *154basis for concluding that there was probable cause to believe that the defendant’s residence was being utilized for the sale of “large amounts of marijuana ... based on the amount of traffic.”
Moreover, because Crime Stopper # 1789E was a first-time informant unknown to Detective Richter, it is impossible to determine the informant’s veracity or reliability. However, we do know that the informant has not provided information in the past and, as set forth above, that the assumptions made by the first-time informant were, in fact, refuted in at least one material respect, i.e., that the nature of the traffic did not reflect “possible marijuana customers.”1 This past experience deficiency is exacerbated by the fact, clearly set’ forth in the affidavit of Detective Richter, that on three occasions Richter, trained in detecting drug traffic of the type alleged, saw “no activity [of] possible marijuana customers going in and out of the residence.”
In my view, because the nexus between the residence and the suspected illegal activity was in fact refuted, and because of the absence of other more specific detailed information that Titus was engaged in illicit drug trafficking from his home, the affidavit does not support a finding of probable cause. Where information cannot be corroborated and specific details otherwise verifiable are not provided, mere suspicion will not rise to probable cause. People v. Leftwich, 869 P.2d 1260 (Colo.1994) (holding that when police can corroborate non-criminal activity and the informant provides details not easily obtained, probable cause will support issuance of a search warrant); see People v. Pate, 878 P.2d 685 (Colo.1994) (concluding that information provided by an anonymous informant that is specific and detailed and corroborated by the police will support finding of probable cause); People v. McCoy, 870 P.2d 1231 (Colo.1994) (Scott, J., specially concurring) (positing that while “common rumor or report, suspicion, or even ‘strong reason to suspect’ was not adequate,” probable cause does exist when, in addition, “officers would have seen enough to permit them to believe that [the defendant] was violating or had violated the law”) (quoting Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 101-02, 80 S.Ct. 168, 170-71, 4 L.Ed.2d 134 (1959)); People v. Abeyta, 795 P.2d 1324 (Colo.1990) (police corroboration of information provided by an anonymous informant regarding criminal activity may support probable cause).
Ill
Accordingly, I join the majority and also would affirm the ruling of the trial court suppressing the admission of evidence obtained through a warrant issued without probable cause.
. The affidavit, on its face, suggests a basis for the high volume of traffic at Titus' home: “Crime Stopper # 1789E told your affiant that they [sic] believe Tom Titus has a telephone repair business which is run from Titus' residence, and that to their [sic] knowledge Titus is not employed anywhere else." The nature of a telephone repair business also explains, perhaps, why the same vehicles would be seen more than once— presumably to both deliver and pick up telephones being repaired. It may also explain why three or four visits are made by some of the same vehicles on occasion. Items being repaired are not always completed when promised, requiring customers to make more than two visits. In his affidavit, Detective Richter did not state that he did not witness traffic. He only averred that there was “no activity [that evinced] possible marijuana customers going in and out.” Finally, conspicuously absent from the affidavit is a description of the conduct of persons visiting the residence. Apparently, the first-time informant did not notice whether visitors did or did not carry telephone equipment, which might infer traffic for purposes related or unrelated to the business being conducted in Titus' home.