dissenting in part:
Although I agree with Part IV of the majority’s decision, I must respectfully dissent from the remainder of the opinion for two reasons: (1) no substantial controversy exists as to any material fact, and (2) Smith has failed to identify any “clear mandate of public policy” on which to base his wrongful discharge action. Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 770 P.2d 24, 26 (Okla.1989).
First, the facts contained in the record do not conclusively support a finding that Smith was terminated for the town board’s denial of Baker’s requested zoning variance. I acknowledge that this normally is a question of fact properly left for a jury to decide. However, the facts set forth in the depositions taken of the board members and Smith present no connection between the town board’s vote and Smith’s discharge.
I note at the outset that the discharge occurred six to eight months after the zoning variance was denied. This fact alone brings into doubt any relation between the firing and the town board decision. Further evidence comes primarily from Smith’s deposition wherein he testified that he never spoke to any of the board members about his discharge, and really did not know why he was fired. Rather, when asked what he thought was the reason behind his discharge, he testified, “I think it is of the people that just don’t like me, like Melvin Baker and R.B. Shepherd.”
He testified that nothing they had said made him feel that way and he never had cross words with them. Yet, he felt that Baker was upset with him “partly” because of the zoning variance denial. As to Shepherd, Smith once heard him tell Mitchell that he would like to see one of his hired hands get a job with the Coop. After the discharge, Smith got a “feeling” that this expressed desire for another person to have a Coop job was related to his own firing. Ultimately, Smith could not account for any reason why the other three board members would vote for his discharge.
*1329Smith also “felt” that his age had a part in his discharge even though neither of the board members ever discussed it with him. When asked if he thought the whole board used his age as a reason for discharging him, he replied, “Well, I could think so.”
He later admitted that he had no evidence that either age or the zoning variance denial were factors in his discharge. Rather, he felt that they were or thought that they could be factors. He also noted that the fact that a 30 year old man was hired to replace him made him think that age had a part in his discharge.
In detailed questioning about the zoning variance, Smith stated that Baker never made a request before the town board. Rather, Baker mentioned it to him, and he told Baker that he would bring it up at the town board meeting. Baker never requested Smith to do anything; Smith volunteered to bring it before the board. When Smith told Baker that the town board had denied the variance, Baker just said “Okay.” Moreover, Smith said that Baker was not upset about the variance denial. In fact, he did not know if it affected Baker at all. Smith has heard nothing from Baker or anyone else about the zoning variance since he told Baker that it was denied, and as far as he was concerned, the issue laid dead and silent from that time on. Regardless of the lack of any evidence suggesting that the discharge was related to the zoning variance denial, Smith just “felt” that it was a part of the cause of his discharge.
Smith added that six months prior to his discharge, he had a conversation with Darrell Dupree, a former member of the Coop board who was replaced by Defendant Shepherd. According to Smith, Dupree told him that Baker wanted to fire him but not to worry because the rest of the board would not allow it. However, the firing of Smith was by a unanimous vote.
The Coop board members were also deposed, and under oath Baker stated that he never put much effort into getting the zoning variance and that his interest in the variance ended when his attorney advised him not to close the alley or build a barn on the property on which he wanted the variance. He testified that he was merely checking out the possibilities of getting a variance, and if he truly wanted one he would have gone to the town board meeting and formally requested one. Finally, Shepherd testified that he, rather than Baker, formally moved the board to release Smith after Mitchell suggested the board should discharge him.
The majority places emphasis upon the affidavit of Mitchell, the Coop manager, yet fails to note that the Coop board discharged Mitchell two months after terminating Smith’s employment. Moreover, the depositions of each of the board members indicate that it was Mitchell who called for the special meeting for the express purpose of discussing Smith’s performance and possible dismissal. Although some of the board members had observed Smith’s work performance, they primarily took Mitchell’s word that Smith was being abusive to customers and incurring too much overtime even though Mitchell had told him not to do so. They all testified that Mitchell had mentioned Smith’s performance and overtime at numerous board meetings prior to this special one. Mitchell assured the board that he would talk to Smith about the problems. Additionally, Mitchell had the authority to fire Smith without board approval, but called the special meeting to have the board discharge Smith because Smith had threatened to sue Mitchell if Mitchell fired him.
I note that Mitchell’s affidavit and Smith’s testimony differed in terms of what was said regarding overtime, and Smith thought that Mitchell was untruthful with the board about what Mitchell and Smith had discussed concerning overtime and cutting back his hours.
Summary judgment is proper when it appears that there is no substantial controversy as to any material fact and that one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Sellers v. Oklahoma Publishing Co., 687 P.2d 116, 120 (Okla.1984). It is cases like this for which summary judgment was designed. Actions in courts of law should not be based upon “feelings,” and those actions which have no basis in fact or law *1330should be summarily disposed to avoid the expenses of a prolonged jury trial. There is no substantial controversy as to the material facts, and the defendants were entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Moreover, even if the facts were conclusive that his discharge was a direct result of his actions as a member of the town board, he points to no constitutional provision, statute or decision by a court of this state which even suggests that such discharge was contrary to a public policy.
The majority notes that Burk requires the public policy exception to the terminable-at-will doctrine to be “tightly circumscribed.” 770 P.2d at 29. Indeed, this principle was so significant to the Court that Burk went further to explain its application:
‘ “In determining whether a clear mandate of public policy is violated, courts should inquire whether the employer’s conduct contravenes the letter or purpose of a constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provision or scheme. Prior judicial decisions may also establish the relevant public policy. However, courts should proceed cautiously if called upon to declare some public policy absent prior legislative or judicial expression on the subject.”’ 770 P.2d at 29 (quoting Parnar v. Americana Hotels, 65 Hawaii 370, 652 P.2d 625, 631 (1982)).
The majority finds that 11 O.S.1981, § 43-101 is a clear mandate of public policy and that Smith was terminated for acting consistent with it. I agree that the power of municipalities to enact zoning ordinances and grant or deny variances to established zones is important for developing and maintaining a community. However, by Smith’s own testimony, Baker made no formal request for a variance. Smith said that he brought it up at the town board of trustees meeting, and the board “said no before I even got it out of my mouth.” He never testified that he even voted against the variance. Moreover, Smith failed to indicate that any debate on the issue occurred or that an actual vote was taken on the matter.
To establish an action under the public policy exception, Smith must identify either a “well defined public policy” which he refused to violate or a “clear and compelling public policy” with which he acted consistently. The majority finds that the latter policy applies, but the record contains no evidence to conclude that Smith was discharged for acting consistent with a clear and compelling public policy.
Material facts are those which have “legal significance.” Olson v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 696 P.2d 1294, 1300 (Wyo.1985). Although there may be some controversy between the parties as to some of the facts, there exists no substantial controversy as to any material facts because those facts in controversy bear no legal significance on the outcome of this case. Consequently, no material fact issues are left to be resolved, and appellees were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Sellers, supra. The trial court correctly granted summary judgment to the defendants.
I am authorized to state that Justice LAVENDER and Justice HARGRAVE join with me in the views expressed herein.