(dissenting).
This case presents an issue of statutory construction. The problem posed, when properly analyzed, calls for our determination of this question: Where notice of appeal by a legislator-lawyer or litigant, who avails himself of the benefits of 12 O.S.1961 § 667, is given while the Legislature remains in session, when do the terms of that statute interpose themselves to suspend the running of all such time limits prescribed by law for perfecting an appeal as would expire during the legislative session?
In its pertinent part Section 667 provides :
“ * * * And when any litigant has given notice of appeal from any judgment of any court of record in this State to the Supreme Court or Criminal Court of Appeals and the time for doing any act to perfect such appeal has, or does hereafter lapse during the session of the Legislature, whether regular or special, and the said litigant is a member of the Senate or House of Representatives, of the State of Oklahoma, in such session, or his attorney of record is such member, such litigant or attorney shall have such time after the adjournment of the session of the Legislature to perform such act and complete his appeal as he had at the commencement of the session of the Legislature * * * ”. (Emphasis supplied.)
The cited statute spells out with all necessary particularity the benefits conferred thereby on legislator-lawyers and litigants-who give notice of appeal before commencement of the legislative session. It makes no specific provisions for cases where notice is given after the Legislature has convened. There exists no sound reason of policy for according to a legislator who gives notice of appeal before the session a treatment substantially different from that accorded to one who gives such-notice during the session. The language-of the statute under consideration evinces no intent to exclude the latter class of appeals from the benefits of section 667.. In the absence of any restrictive provisions,, we will presume that like benefits were contemplated in both classes of appeals and that the Legislature did intend to apply these benefits to both classes in a nondiscriminatory manner. Letteer v. Conservancy District No. 30, Okl., 385 P.2d 976, 802.
I therefore concur in that part of the-opinion which holds that the benefits of section 667 must be extended to both classes of appeals. My disagreement with the majority concerns the manner in which the plain terms of section 667 are construed in their application to situations, where notice of appeal is given after commencement of the legislative session.
*663By unmistakably plain terms of the quoted statute one who may benefit therefrom is allowed “such time after the adjournment of the session” as such party “had at the commencement of the session” to perform any necessary act in perfecting an appeal for which act the then existing time limit would expire while the Legislature remains in session. How much time did the appellant here have at the commencement of the session to serve the case-made poses a crucial point under inquiry because she had exactly the same length of time to complete that very act after adjournment.
Had notice of appeal been -given here before the Legislature convened, appellant would have had at the commencement of the session such time to serve case-made as did then remain unexpired either under the law or under the last prior extension order. This is because section 667 operates to interrupt and suspend at the commencement of the session the running of the time limits which would expire during the session and the entire unexpired portion of time inures to appellant’s benefit following the adjournment of the Legislature. Warren v. State, Okl.Cr., 325 P.2d 752, 753.
The benefits of section 667 are manifestly self-executing. They will apply without any judicial action. The statute need not be expressly or directly invoked. Its terms operate by their own force to arrest and suspend all such time limits for perfecting an appeal as would expire while the Legislature remains in session. This period of suspension attaches by direct force of law. Its length stands fixed by the statutory language. The period commences to run when the Legislature convenes and the time which then remains unexpired is allowed to run from the date the Legislature adjourns. The precise point of time at which the statute may be invoiced by an affirmative act of the legislator is wholly immaterial. Such act neither adds to nor detracts from the length of the statutory suspension period.
Once so fixed by statute as of the time the Legislature convenes, the statutory suspension period cannot be altered or disturbed by an order of the trial judge made during the session unless the intent to procure and effect not an extension of time but one reaching beyond the length of the statutory benefits under section 667 is clearly and explicitly expressed. In the absence of a clear indication, any time extended during the session by order of the trial judge must be deemed to run concurrently with the session instead of extending beyond it. This is so because the very act of procuring an extension during the session is utterly incompatible with a claim of benefits under section 667 unless it clearly appear that the length of the suspension period rather than a statutory time limit which is about to expire is sought to be enlarged. In this case it is clear that the order of extension procured by appellant was intended to enlarge merely the current statutory time limit which was about to expire.
In the case at bar, notice of appeal was given after the Legislature had convened. Strictly speaking, there was hence at the commencement of the session no current time period yet in existence the running of which would be interrupted so that the unexpired remainder might be saved and be added after the adjournment. The only time appellant may be deemed to have had at the commencement of the session for service of case-made is that which stood fixed by the general appellate procedure then in force. This time limit, prescribed by 12 O.S.1961 § 958, was fifteen days. Therefore, the time granted appellant under section 667 to serve case-made expired 15 days after the Legislature adjourned June 14, 1963. She did not procure an extension until August 13, 1963. Neither the order of that date nor any subsequent order can operate as a valid retroactive extension so as to fill the time gap left by the belated extension of August 13, 1963. None of these orders was made in compliance with *664the procedure prescribed by 12 O.S.1961 § 962, for granting a retroactive extension of time. See, De Wees v. Cedarbaum, Okl., 381 P.2d 830.
The course taken by the majority utterly disregards the plain language of the statute which allows a suspension period whose point of beginning stands fixed as the day the Legislature convenes. No special treatment is accorded to legislators who give notice of appeal after commencement of the session. The statute does not say that a legislator who gives notice of appeal after the Legislature convenes has such time beyond adjournment as he may procure from the trial judge from time to time to enlarge current statutory time limits. The court’s decision, while saving one legislator’s appeal, introduced into the decisional law a patently faulty construction of the statute. If the statute, as we hold, applies to cases where notice of appeal is given before as well as after the adjournment, the benefits should be measured by the strict language of the statute in both classes of cases. These benefits must be deemed to stand fixed as of the time the Legislature convenes. Their enlargement should not be allowed by an order of the trial judge made during the session unless such order clearly shows that it operates to extend the statutory suspension period rather than the current time limits which are about to expire.
At the time the legislative session commenced appellant had only IS days to serve case-made. This time was extended prospectively during the session by an order which discloses no intent other than to enlarge the 15 day limit. The order could not therefore alter the length of the suspension period already fixed by force of section 667.
I dissent.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice JACKSON concurs in the views herein expressed.