*956Opinion
BROWN, J.In this case, we decide whether Penal Code1 section 1166, which governs release of a convicted defendant on bail pending sentencing, applies in the case of a conviction by guilty plea. We conclude that section 1166 does not apply in this context. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
Factual and Procedural Background
A criminal complaint filed on July 30, 1999, charged Seung Hyun Noh (Noh) with seven counts of receiving stolen property. (§ 496, subd. (a).) On September 11, 1999, Seneca Insurance Company (Seneca) posted a bail bond to secure Noh’s release from custody. The bond provided that Noh would “appear ... to answer any [charge] in any accusatory pleading based upon the acts supporting the complaint filed against him . . . and if convicted, [would| appear for pronouncement ofjudgment or grant of probation,” or if Noh failed to appear, Seneca would pay $70,000 to the State of California. On May 23, 2000, Noh entered a guilty plea on five of the seven charged counts. The court ordered Noh to appear on June 21, 2000, for sentencing and permitted him to remain free on bail. Noh failed to appear for sentencing, and the court issued a bench warrant and ordered Seneca’s bail bond forfeited.
On November 15, 2000, Seneca moved to vacate forfeiture and exonerate bail. Seneca argued that, after Noh entered his guilty plea, the trial court should have proceeded in accordance with section 1166 before permitting Noh to remain free on bail. Seneca further asserted that section 1166 required the court to conduct an evidentiary hearing and make findings of fact with respect to five considerations, including public safety and the probability of Noh’s failing to appear for judgment. Seneca argued the court’s failure to comply with section 1166 was a jurisdictional error that exonerated bail by operation of law. In other words, because the court failed to follow the procedures set forth in section 1166—procedures that might have led the court to commit Noh to custody following his plea—Seneca contended it should not be held responsible for Noh’s failure to appear. In opposition, the People claimed Seneca’s reliance on section 1166 was misplaced because the statute governs only bail following a “verdict” in a contested trial and has no application to bail following a plea of guilty.
On December 13, 2000, after hearing argument and considering the legislative history of section 1166, the trial court denied Seneca’s motion to *957vacate forfeiture and exonerate bail. Seneca appealed from that order (see People v. Wilcox (1960) 53 Cal.2d 651, 655 [2 Cal.Rptr. 754, 349 P.2d 522, 78 A.L.R.2d 1174]), and the Court of Appeal reversed. We granted the People’s petition for review. We conclude that section 1166 does not apply where conviction is by guilty plea, and therefore Seneca’s argument based on section 1166 fails. We do not decide whether a trial court’s failure to comply with section 1166 in a case where that provision does apply would have the effect of exonerating bail by operation of law, nor do we decide whether compliance with section 1166 requires an evidentiary hearing with formal findings of fact.
Discussion
Section 1166, as amended in 1999, provides: “If a general verdict is rendered against the defendant, or a special verdict is given, he or she must be remanded, if in custody, or if on bail he or she shall be committed to the proper officer of the county to await the judgment of the court upon the verdict, unless, upon considering [1] the protection of the public, [2] the seriousness of the offense charged and proven, [3] the previous criminal record of the defendant, [4] the probability of the defendant failing to appear for the judgment of the court upon the verdict, and [5] public safety, the court concludes the evidence supports its decision to allow the defendant to remain out on bail. When committed, his or her bail is exonerated, or if money is deposited instead of bail it must be refunded to the defendant or to the person or persons found by the court to have deposited said money on behalf of said defendant.” (Italics added.) Prior to the 1999 amendment, section 1166 stated only that, after conviction by verdict, an on-bail defendant “may be committed to the proper officer of the county.” (Stats. 1935, ch. 657, § 5, p. 1814, italics added.) Thus, the former version of section 1166 gave the trial court unguided discretion as to whether to commit an on-bail defendant to custody or permit him or her to remain free. The 1999 amendment, however, requires the court to commit the defendant to custody unless, after considering five factors, the court concludes the evidence supports a decision to release the defendant on bail.
In general, a person is convicted either by verdict or by guilty plea, and the term “verdict” refers to a jury verdict. A finding of guilt in a criminal case is made only “by verdict of a jury, . . . by a finding of the court in a case where a jury has been waived, or by a plea of guilty” (§ 689, italics added), and a court’s finding “shall be in substantially the form prescribed for the general verdict of a jury” (§ 1167). Section 1166 states that the section applies only to proceedings after a trial and verdict, not proceedings involving a guilty plea. The section makes no express reference to guilty *958pleas; nor does it use a broad term, such as “conviction,” that would more clearly encompass both guilty pleas and verdicts. Rather, the statute refers only to “general verdict[s]” and “special verdict[s].” (§ 1166.) In the same chapter of the Penal Code, the Legislature explains these terms: “The jury must render a general verdict, except that in a felony case, when they are in doubt as to the legal effect of the facts proved, they may, except upon a trial for libel, find a special verdict.” (§ 1150, italics added.) “A general verdict upon a plea of not guilty is either ‘guilty’ or ‘not guilty,’ which imports a conviction or acquittal of the offense charged in the accusatory pleading.” (§ 1151, italics added.) “A special verdict is that by which the jury find[s] the facts only, leaving the judgment to the Court.” (§ 1152, italics added.) These specific descriptions of general and special verdicts simply do not encompass guilty pleas; rather, they refer to the findings of fact after a contested trial. Moreover, the organization of the Penal Code and the placement of section 1166 within that code strongly suggest that section 1166 does not apply in the case of a guilty plea.
Part 2 of the Penal Code, which begins at section 681, relates to criminal procedure. The statutes proceed in a logical, consecutive fashion through the stages of a typical criminal case, starting with the indictment (§ 940 et seq.) and then addressing pleadings (§ 948 et seq.), arraignment (§ 976 et seq.), pretrial matters (§ 995 et seq.), plea (§ 1016 et seq.), trial (§ 1065 et seq.), verdict (§ 1147 et seq.), sentencing (§ 1170 et seq.), judgment (§ 1191 et seq.), and appeals (§ 1235 et seq.). The provisions governing Noh’s guilty plea appear in part 2, title 6, which relates to pretrial matters. In contrast, section 1166 appears in part 2, title 7, which relates to matters that arise after the start of trial and before judgment. Within title 7, chapter 1 governs challenges to the jury, chapter 2 governs the trial itself, chapter 3 governs the conduct of the jury after the cause is submitted to them, and chapter 4—which includes section 1166—governs the jury’s verdict or findings. Chapter 4 first addresses the two types of verdict, general and special (§ 1150 et seq.), and explains what the trial court should do in the case of an ambiguous verdict (§§ 1161, 1162) or an acquittal (§ 1165). Then, in section 1166, chapter 4 describes what the court should do when the jury returns a “verdict . . . against the defendant.”
This context clearly indicates that section 1166 refers to proceedings following a contested trial and verdict. When the drafters of the Penal Code reached the chapter in which section 1166 appears, they simply were not talking about pleas—they were talking about posttrial verdicts—and we would need to distort the logical structure of the Penal Code to relate section 1166 to pleas. Moreover, section 1166 works in tandem with section 1129, which appears in chapter 2 of the same title. Under section 1129, a trial court *959“may, in its discretion,” commit an on-bail defendant to custody “at any time after his appearance for trial.” (Italics added.) Under section 1166, that discretion becomes a presumption once the jury renders a verdict against the defendant; the court, then, must commit the defendant to custody, unless it finds the statute’s five-part test satisfied. Viewed together, sections 1129 and 1166 have little to do with guilty pleas; they have to do with an on-bail defendant’s custody status after the defendant appears for trial and before judgment.
From its context, section 1166 clearly relates to convictions by verdict, not guilty pleas. Seneca, however, argues that section 1166 is ambiguous because of the frequency with which criminal cases are now resolved by guilty plea. Seneca reasons that, with so many cases resulting in guilty pleas and comparatively few cases reaching the verdict stage, the Legislature could not reasonably have enacted a provision governing custody following a verdict and not have enacted a comparable provision governing custody following a guilty plea.
The gap that Seneca identifies in the statutory scheme may be because the Penal Code was first enacted at a time when guilty pleas were less common than they are today. Nevertheless, as early as 1930, the Court of Appeal held that, despite the absence of a specific statute on point, trial courts may in their discretion allow an on-bail defendant who pleads guilty to remain free on bail pending sentencing and judgment. In People v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. (1930) 107 Cal.App. 160 [290 P. 59] (Fidelity), the court found this discretion implicit in section 1278, which sets forth the statutory form for bail bonds. This form requires the surety to undertake, among other things, that the defendant “if convicted, will appear for pronouncement of judgment or grant of probation.” (§ 1278.) The Fidelity court concluded, from the text of this form, that the Legislature must have contemplated the possibility of defendants sometimes remaining free on bail following conviction, and that conviction in this context might include conviction by way of guilty plea. (Fidelity, at p. 163.) In support of its conclusion, the court also noted other Penal Code provisions, including section 1166, that contemplate a convicted defendant remaining free on bail pending judgment. (Fidelity, at p. 164.) Seneca is therefore correct that the Penal Code does not expressly address release on bail following a guilty plea, but in light of the holding in Fidelity, the Legislature may have concluded that no specific statute was needed.
Both Seneca and the dissent interpret Fidelity as expressly holding that guilty pleas fall within the scope of section 1166. They also cite People v. Scott (1960) 184 Cal.App.2d 792 [7 Cal.Rptr. 755], in which the court found section 1166 applicable to a case involving conviction by a judge at a bench *960trial. They reason from these cases that courts have historically understood section 1166 to encompass all convictions, and that only now, after the 1999 amendment limited trial court discretion under section 1166, are the People attempting to give it a narrower scope. (See dis. opn., post, at pp. 970-973.)
We agree that the 1999 amendment to section 1166 gave new significance to the issue presented here, but we do not think section 1166 has historically applied to guilty pleas. The Fidelity court did not hold that guilty pleas fall within the scope of section 1166, and that holding would have made little sense in light of the plain language of section 1166 and its placement in the chapter of the Penal Code governing verdicts. Instead, the Fidelity court cited section 1166 as an example of an analogous situation in which a convicted defendant remains free on bail pending sentencing and judgment. We think Seneca and the dissent err in reading the Fidelity decision more broadly. As for People v. Scott, supra, 184 Cal.App.2d 792, we find no suggestion in that opinion that section 1166 applies to a case involving a guilty plea, and we have no reason to decide here whether the court was correct to apply section 1166 to a case involving a bench trial instead of a jury trial.
The Court of Appeal found section 1166 to be ambiguous, warranting consideration of legislative history, because a guilty plea is generally equivalent to a guilty verdict. The court reasoned, in light of this general equivalence, that “the absence of any reference to guilty pleas in section 1166 creates an ambiguity.” We find no ambiguity when the context of the statute is considered. The absence of any reference to guilty pleas in section 1166 merely reflects that section’s placement in the Penal Code chapter governing verdicts, not pleas. Of course, a defendant can plead guilty after a trial has begun, but the logical place in the Penal Code for the Legislature to have addressed release on bail following a guilty plea is in the section governing pleas, not in the section governing the jury’s verdict at the close of trial. Hence, we see no ambiguity inherent in the Legislature’s failing to discuss guilty pleas in section 1166.
Moreover, the equivalence of guilty pleas and guilty verdicts relates to their legal effect, and our statements finding them to be equivalent are therefore contextual. (See, e.g., People v. Valladoli (1996) 13 Cal.4th 590, 601 [54 Cal.Rptr.2d 695, 918 P.2d 999] (Valladoli).) Here, we are more concerned -with procedure than substantive legal effect, and procedurally, a guilty plea is quite different from a guilty verdict. In the case of a guilty plea, for example, the defendant accepts responsibility for his crime, often in hopes of minimizing his or her punishment. The Legislature may have concluded that, in that circumstance, where the defendant may be cooperating at least to some extent with prosecutorial authorities, he or she is less *961likely to pose a flight risk or a danger to public safety. Though, as this case attests, some defendants plead guilty and then fail to appear for sentencing and judgment—and therefore the Legislature might reasonably have opted to extend the procedures set forth in section 1166 to defendants who plead guilty—many defendants who plead guilty manifest a desire to resolve the matter on relatively favorable terms, and the Legislature may have reasoned that these defendants would not want to jeopardize that favorable resolution by committing new crimes or failing to appear. In short, the distinction the Legislature drew between guilty pleas and convictions by verdict is not completely baseless, and we reject Seneca’s argument that section 1166 must apply to guilty pleas in order to avoid absurd results.
In addition, as a practical matter, the disparate treatment of persons who plead guilty as compared to persons convicted by verdict is not as pronounced as Seneca suggests. The factors listed in section 1166 replicate, almost verbatim, the factors that apply, under section 1275, subdivision (a), when a judge or magistrate initially sets bail, and in fact, the Legislature appears to have modeled the 1999 amendment to section 1166 on section 1275, subdivision (a). Specifically, section 1275, subdivision (a), provides: “In setting, reducing, or denying bail, the judge or magistrate shall take into consideration [1] the protection of the public, [2] the seriousness of the offense charged, [3] the previous criminal record of the defendant, and [4] the probability of his or her appearing at trial or hearing of the case. [5] The public safety shall be the primary consideration.” Therefore, in the case of all on-bail defendants, including an on-bail defendant who pleads guilty, the factors listed in section 1166 were already considered at the time bail was initially set, and they were found to weigh in favor of release. The only new factor after the defendant pleads guilty is the fact of the conviction itself, and it is that factor, considered in light of the others, that the court must evaluate when deciding whether the defendant should remain free on bail. But section 1166 does not have to apply in order for a court to take the defendant’s conviction into account when exercising its discretion.
The dissent asserts, based in large part on our holding in People v. Statum (2002) 28 Cal.4th 682 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 572, 50 P.3d 355] (Statum), that the term “verdict” in statutes governing criminal procedure encompasses convictions by guilty plea. (See dis. opn., post, at pp. 965-966.) In Statum, we recently concluded that a trial court’s order reducing a felony conviction to a misdemeanor is an “order modifying the verdict’ for purposes of appeal under section 1238, subdivision (a)(6), even if the conviction is by way of a guilty plea, not a trial, and therefore no jury verdict is at issue. (Statum, at p. 688, italics added.) We reaffirmed in this regard that a guilty plea is the legal equivalent of a verdict, citing Valladoli, supra, 13 Cal.4th 590. (Statum, at p. 688, fn. 2.)
*962We concede that, in many contexts, a guilty plea is not different from a guilty verdict, and where the procedural distinctions between guilty pleas and guilty verdicts are not legally significant, the Legislature might use the term “verdict” broadly to include guilty pleas. But, as discussed, we can think of several plausible reasons why the Legislature might treat a guilty plea differently from a guilty verdict for purposes of custody status pending judgment. Therefore, we must assume in that context that the Legislature chose its words carefully and intended a special rule to apply in the case of a guilty verdict after a contested trial, because otherwise we would nullify the presumptively intentional distinction the Legislature drew.
Moreover, unlike section 1166, the statute that was at issue in Statum (§ 1238, subd. (a)(6)) does not fall in a chapter of the Penal Code that (1) specifically focuses on the verdict or finding after a contested trial and addresses no other subjects; (2) carefully delineates the various types of verdict a jury might render after completing its deliberations (§§ 1150, 1151, 1152, 1153, 1154, 1158, 1158a, 1160); and then (3) describes what should follow in the case of each type of jury verdict (§§ 1155, 1156, 1157, 1161, 1162, 1163, 1164, 1165, 1166, 1168), expressly distinguishing jury verdicts from other ways a defendant might be convicted, such as findings by the court. (§§ 1165, 1167.) While the use of the term “verdict” in other places in the Penal Code might suggest a broad interpretation that would reasonably include guilty pleas, its use in the context of part 2, title 7, chapter 4 of that code can only reasonably mean one thing: a verdict given at the conclusion of a contested trial.
The Court of Appeal also relied on the oft-repeated rule that, because the law disfavors forfeitures, courts interpret bail forfeiture laws in favor of the surety. (See, e.g., People v. United Bonding Ins. Co. (1971) 5 Cal.3d 898, 906 [98 Cal.Rptr. 57, 489 P.2d 1385]; People v. Ranger Ins. Co. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1302, 1305 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 343]; County of Los Angeles v. Surety Ins. Co. (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 58, 62 [208 Cal.Rptr. 263]; People v. Surety Ins. Co. (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 556, 561 [186 Cal.Rptr. 385].) Here, however, we are not construing a bail forfeiture law; we are construing a rule of criminal procedure governing release on bail after a verdict. Seneca contends that failure to comply with this rule of criminal procedure has the effect of exonerating bail, but we do not decide that issue. The rule of interpretation on which the Court of Appeal relied simply does not apply here.
In conclusion, we find no ambiguity in section 1166 in light of the context in which the provision appears. To concede that meaning must be determined from context does not indicate that a provision is ambiguous. Many *963words have a wide range of possible meanings, but context eliminates that ambiguity, leaving the intended meaning clear. That is the case here. Section 1166 governs proceedings following a trial verdict; it does not govern guilty pleas. Accordingly, we need not consider legislative history. (See, e.g., Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1036, 1055 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 828, 968 P.2d 539].)
But even were resort to legislative history justified, we must be careful not to misuse it. It is notoriously easy to support any number of conflicting propositions by selectively quoting legislative history. To be persuasive, such an exercise must offer something more compelling than, as one critical jurist describes it, “ ‘looking over a crowd and picking out your friends.’ ” (Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term (1983) 68 Iowa L.Rev. 195, quoting a conversation with Judge Harold Leventhal.) But this pick-out-your-friends strategy is the best the dissent offers. The two obscure references to guilty pleas on which the dissent relies (see dis. opn., post, at pp. 967-968) occur on page 4 of two nearly identical committee reports, in a section of the reports quoting background provided by the bill’s author. Moreover, these two reports are among a collection of nearly a dozen that otherwise make no mention of guilty pleas, and several of the reports, including the two the dissent relies on, describe the scope of section 1166 as applying to defendants “convicted after a trial” or “found guilty after trial.” (See, e.g., Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 476 (Reg. Sess. 1999-2000) Mar. 23, 1999, p. 1; Assem. Republican Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 476 (Reg. Sess. 1999-2000) as amended Aug. 17, 1999, p. 1; Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 476 (Reg. Sess. 1999-2000) as amended July 13, 1999, p. 2; Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 476 (Reg. Sess. 1999-2000) as amended Aug. 17, 1999, p. 2.) Therefore, the only significance of the legislative history is that it is inconclusive.
The dissent complains that interpreting the statute as we do is bad public policy because the bail requests of those defendants who plead guilty will not be subject to the requirements of section 1166. We are not prepared to say, as the dissent does (dis. opn., post, at pp. 974-976), that judicial discretion in this context is bad policy.
Accordingly, we conclude section 1166 does not apply where the defendant’s conviction is by guilty plea. Because section 1166 does not apply, Seneca’s arguments—that the trial court should have proceeded in accordance with that section and that its failure to do so exonerated bail as a matter of law—are without merit. Seneca’s bail bond constitutes a contract *964with the State of California. (See Fidelity, supra, 107 Cal.App. at p. 164.) Pursuant to that contract, Seneca expressly guaranteed Noh’s appearance at judgment following conviction, and in the event Noh failed to appear, Seneca promised to pay $70,000. Nothing in section 1166 abrogates Seneca’s contractual obligation. The trial court had discretion to allow Noh to remain free on bail pending sentencing, and it acted in accordance with that discretion.
Conclusion
The Court of Appeal erred in finding section 1166 applicable where a defendant’s conviction is based on a guilty plea rather than a verdict. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand with instructions to affirm the trial court’s order denying Seneca’s motion to vacate forfeiture and exonerate bail.
George, C. J., Kennard, J., Baxter, J., Werdegar, J., and Moreno, J., concurred.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.