dissenting.
Because I believe that a criminal defendant preparing his or her petition for post-conviction review is entitled to access the Idaho courts for the full statutory amount of time prior to the expiration of the limitations period, I respectfully dissent.
Assuming that Evensiosky understood that his appeal had not been filed on May 15, 1997, the date he received his first response from the Idaho Supreme Court, he was left with approximately seven weeks in which to prepare his appeal. For approximately six of the seven weeks, Evensiosky had access to the Idaho courts. For the final eight days prior to the expiration of the period, Evensiosky did not have realistic access to the Idaho courts, as he had been transferred to a facility in Louisiana.
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s position that the six-week time period in which Evensiosky had access to the Idaho courts was a sufficient amount of time for him to prepare his petition. A defendant should be entitled to access the Idaho courts for the full amount of time provided by statute, regardless of a Court’s subjective interpretation of how much time is needed for a petition to be completed.