dissenting.
The majority’s construction of Oregon Laws 2003, chapter 346, robs the statute of its plain meaning through the guise of creating ambiguity from wordplay. The license revocation sanction only applies to a person “whose third [DUII misdemeanor] conviction * * * occurs on or after” January 1, 2004. Or Laws 2003, ch 346, § 4. The majority reads this limitation to include the exact opposite — that the sanction applies to a person whose third DUII misdemeanor conviction occurs before January 1, 2004. That result is reached through a misapplication of the statutory construction principles set out in PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-12, 859 P2d 1143 (1993). The majority ventures into legislative history of the statute and canons of statutory construction to conclude that the legislature intended a statutory meaning that is completely at odds with the text and context of the enactment. Because that journey is forbidden by the PGE principles, because the proper course compels a different result, and because the legislative intent analysis used by the majority usurps the constitutional prerogative of the legislature, I respectfully dissent.
The substantive questions presented are what “for a third time” means in ORS 809.235(l)(b), as amended by Oregon Laws 2003, chapter 346, section 1, and whether defendant is a person “whose third [DUII misdemeanor] conviction * * * occurs on or after” January 1, 2004, under Oregon Laws 2003, chapter 346, section 4. Before January 1, 2004, the sanction for a third misdemeanor DUII conviction was, at most, a three-year suspension of driving privileges. ORS 813.400(1) (2001), amended by Or Laws 2003, ch 346, § 1; former ORS 809.420(2)(c) (2001), renumbered as ORS 809.428 (2003). At that time, ORS 809.235(l)(b) (2001) required a court to order revocation of a person’s driver’s license only on conviction of a felony DUII. Under ORS 813.010(5), a felony DUII occurred when a defendant had been convicted of DUII at least three times in the 10 years before the current offense.1 Thus, before 2004, only certain *38fourth or greater in number DUII convictions resulted in a revocation of driving privileges, those that occurred within a 10-year period of time.
The 2003 Legislative Assembly adopted House Bill (HB) 2885 and added an additional occasion where a DUII conviction resulted in the permanent loss of driving privileges. Or Laws 2003, ch 346. The law amended ORS 809.235(l)(b) by adding the italicized text:
“The court shall order that a person’s driving privileges be permanently revoked if the person is convicted of felony driving while under the influence of intoxicants under ORS 813.010 or if the person is convicted of misdemeanor driving while under the influence of intoxicants under ORS 813.010 for a third time.”2
The law enacted two other relevant provisions. Section 1 of HB 2885 amended ORS 813.400(2), relating to suspension and revocation of driving privileges by the Department of Transportation, by adding the italicized text:
“A person convicted of felony driving while under the influence of intoxicants, or a person convicted of misdemeanor driving while under the influence of intoxicants for the third time, is subject to revocation of driving privileges as provided in ORS 809.235.”
Or Laws 2003, ch 346, § 1.
Finally, a second related provision of the law set out the class of persons to whom the changes of law applied:
“The amendments to ORS 809.235,811.182 and 813.400 by sections 1 to 3 of this 2003 Act apply to persons whose third conviction of misdemeanor driving while under the *39influence of intoxicants occurs on or after the effective date of this 2003 Act [January 1, 2004].”
Or Laws 2003, ch 346, § 4.
Thus, the 2003 law required a license revocation order on conviction of a DUII misdemeanor “for a third time,” restated the occasion of that penalty as one when the DUII conviction is “for the third time,” and applied that new penalty only to persons “whose third [DUII] conviction * * * occurs on or after” January 1,2004. The issues in this appeal are the meaning of “for a third time” as used in the 2003 amendment to ORS 809.235(l)(b) and the related question of the meaning of “persons whose third conviction * * * occurs on or after [January 1, 2004].”
We determine the meaning of statutes by applying the statutory construction framework set out in PGE, 317 Or at 610-12. PGE requires a court, in construing a statute, to “discern the intent of the legislature” from the statute’s text and context. At that first level of analysis, “the court considers rules of construction of the statutory text that bear directly on how to read the text.” Id. at 611. If the legislature’s intent is evident from that examination, “further inquiry is unnecessary.” Id. If the intent is not clear, “the court will then move to the second level, which is to consider legislative history to inform the court’s inquiry into legislative intent.” Id. at 611-12. “If, after consideration of text, context, and legislative history, the intent of the legislature remains unclear, then the court may resort to general maxims of statutory construction to aid in resolving the remaining uncertainty.” Id. at 612.
I differ from the majority, not in the exposition of the familiar PGE formula, but in its application to resolve the statutory construction questions raised in this appeal. In my view, the meaning of “third time” and “third conviction” can be determined from the text and context of the statute. Therefore, the court should confine its inquiry to the first level of the PGE analysis. In Bridgeview Vineyards, Inc. v. State Land Board, 211 Or App 251, 262, 154 P3d 734 (2007), we described the “first level” of the PGE analysis as follows:
*40“At the first level of analysis, we do not consider the text in isolation; rather we employ rules of textual construction that bear directly on how to read the text, and we are careful to consider the text in context. Context includes ‘other provisions of the same statute and other related statutes.’ PGE, 317 Or at 611.”
The majority construes the phrase “convicted * * * for a third time” in ORS 809.235(l)(b) as ambiguous, in that it could refer to more than one occasion of conviction. In the majority’s view, a “third time” conviction could occur any number of times, when a person is convicted “for a third time,” “for a fourth time,” “for a fifth time,” and so on. According to the majority, the phrase refers to any one of several convictions. It reaches that conclusion because: “a third time” could plausibly mean one of any number of convictions; the legislative history is not inconsistent with that meaning of the phrase; and the majority’s interpretation of the statute better effectuates a sound public policy about drunk drivers.
I differ with the majority because I do not believe that the phrase can reasonably be construed to refer to more than one particular conviction. In my view, a person can only be “convicted * * * for a third time” once. That understanding of the phrase, to refer to a particular conviction in time, is based on its plain meaning and other portions of the 2003 amendments that refer to that same conviction as a single conviction in time — as being “convicted * * * for the third time” and as the “third conviction” that “occurs on or after” a particular time. The law does not refer to a conviction for “any third time” or the “third convictions” that occur after January 1, 2004. It describes a particular conviction that occurs during a person’s lifetime, the third conviction in time. To read the statute differently — i.e., to cover any number of convictions — distorts its plain meaning.
The words “third time” in ORS 809.235(l)(b) are not defined by statute. Commonly, “third” is a derivative of the root, three, and denotes something that is “being number three in a countable series,” “being next to the second in place or time,” and “ranking next to the second of a grade or degree in authority or precedence.” Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 2377-78 (unabridged ed 2002).
*41The majority asserts that, of those definitions of “third,” the “middle one” is “consistent with defendant’s proposed construction. But the other two are consistent with the state’s.” 217 Or App at 29. The statutory interpretation issue, however, is not the abstract meaning of “third.” It is the meaning of “third time.” The obvious meaning of “third time” is “being next to the second in place or time.” In that context, “third time” does not mean “being number three in a countable series” or “ranking next to the second of a grade or degree in authority or precedence.”
The ordinary meaning of “third time,” as it refers here to the “third conviction,” is the third conviction in time. A person’s fourth marriage to a different person would not qualify that person as being married for “a third time.” “Third base” is the base that must be touched third by a runner in baseball. No one would call home plate the “third base” because you could begin counting at first base. If you tell your child that she may have a “second” cookie, it does not invite a third, fourth, or fifth helping.
I disagree with the premise of the majority that, “[i]n ordinary speech, references to numeric sequences can mean a variety of things.” 217 Or App at 28. A reference to a particular count in a numeric sequence always means the count from the beginning. “The third number” in a sequence is always a single number, the third from the beginning of the sequence. It is only when the reference refers to more than one point in the sequence that “third” pertains to more than one number, such as “every third number.” In ordinary speech, then, a single reference to the “third conviction” of a person or a conviction for “a third time” means the conviction that follows the first and second convictions in time.
That likely meaning is confirmed by the context of the statute. The first contextual guidance to the meaning of ORS 809.235(l)(b) comes from Oregon Laws 2003, chapter 346, section 4. That part of the law sets out the applicability of the changes in consequences of a “third time” DUII conviction. It states that the changes to ORS 809.235 “apply to persons whose third conviction of misdemeanor driving while under the influence of intoxicants occurs on or after [January 1, 2004].”
*42That provision presumably establishes that the new sanction could be applied to conduct before the effective date of the law that results in a conviction afterwards and not just to convictions arising from conduct occurring after January 1, 2004. That presumed intent could be implemented by the stated application of the changes to ORS 809.235 to “persons whose conviction of misdemeanor driving while under the influence of intoxicants occurs on or after [January 1, 2004].” (Emphasis added.) There is no need to refer to “third conviction” at all to make the law applicable to conduct undertaken before the law’s effective date. Instead, the law could have referenced any “conviction.”
The use of “third conviction,” rather than “conviction,” reveals an additional and more particular intent, an intent to limit the application of the law based on the timing of the “third conviction.” Section 4 of HB 2885 precludes the application of ORS 809.235 to a person whose third conviction occurred before January 1, 2004, and allows that application to a person whose third conviction occurred after that time. The phrase “persons whose third conviction * * * occurs on or after [January 1, 2004]” is particular and determinate. It refers to a single, particular conviction in time. It is not the same as “persons whose fourth conviction” occurs at that time. The only reasonable construction of the phrase is to refer to the third-in-time conviction. The intent of section 4 of the law is to confirm the intended effect of the change to ORS 809.235(l)(b), to fortify the intent that “for a third time” means the third-in-time conviction.
The state’s strongest argument that “for a third time” means the third conviction in any sequence of convictions focuses on the use of the indefinite article “a” in the phrase. The use of “a” implies that “third time” is not particular or specific and could be a third time in the sequence of any two previous convictions. In my view, that argument is weak. “A third time” conviction still connotes a specific conviction. If the intent was to refer to more than one conviction, the phrase would be “for any third time” or “for each third time.”
We know that “for a third time” as used in ORS 809.235(l)(b) refers to a single conviction because a companion change to ORS 813.400(2), adopted in Oregon Laws 2003, *43chapter 346, section 1, specifies the conviction to be one for “the third time * * * as provided in ORS 809.235.”3 (Emphases added.) The same “third time” is intended in both parts of the enactment.
The use of the phrase “for the third time” in the changes to ORS 813.400(2), and its equation to the intended meaning of “for a third time” as “provided in ORS 809.235(l)(b),” undercuts the force of the state’s argument that relies on the use of the word “a” in ORS 809.235(l)(b). “The” is defined, in part:
“2 a (1) used as a function word with a noun modified by an adjective or by an attributive noun to limit the application of the modified noun * * * c — used as a function word before a noun to limit its application to that specified by a succeeding element in the sentence, esp. a subordinate clause, prepositional phrase, or infinitive phrase [.]”
Webster’s at 2368-69.
The word “the” in “the third time” in ORS 813.400(2) limits the “time” to the “third time” — a specific and particular conviction. Under the terms of the statute, conviction for “the third time” under ORS 813.400(2) is the same thing as conviction for “a third time” under ORS 809.235(l)(b) (“the third time * * * as provided in ORS 809.235”). In both cases, the conviction is a particular one, the third conviction in time.
The context, however, that most illuminates the meaning of “third time” and “third conviction” comes from the text of related statutes on DUII sanctions and the regulation of driving privileges. In every other circumstance in ORS chapters 809 and 813, relating to suspension and revocation of driving privileges or the DUII offense, the legislative intent to attach consequences to the second or third “or subsequent” DUII conviction is stated in just those words or in similar fashion. Those statutes relate to the same general subjects as ORS 809.235(l)(b) and are part of its context. See *44ORS 813.010(6)(c) (attaching a $2,000 minimum fine to a person’s “third or subsequent conviction” for a DUII); ORS 809.010(l)(b) (requiring suspension of vehicle registration on a “second or subsequent charge of driving while under the influence of intoxicants”); ORS 813.010(5) (authorizing felony DUII conviction if defendant convicted of DUII “at least three times in the 10 years prior to the date of the current offense”); ORS 809.700(l)(b) (allowing a court to impound or immobilize a motor vehicle based on a conviction for a “second or subsequent” charge of DUII in violation of ORS 813.010).4 In that context, the legislature’s failure to describe the ambit of ORS 809.235(l)(b) as applying to “a third or subsequent conviction,” rather than applying to a conviction “for a third time,” can only be assumed to be a distinguishing and intentional choice.5
*45All of those contextual clues — the text of companion enactments to ORS 809.235(l)(b) and the use of “third or subsequent” to describe a different effect in a number of related statutes — point to a clear conclusion: a person is convicted of a misdemeanor DUII “for a third time” under ORS 809.235(l)(b) when the conviction is the third conviction during the lifetime of the defendant, no more and no less.6 Because the meaning of the statute is clear from its text and context, there is no need to resort to legislative history to inform the analysis. See State v. Rodriguez-Barrera, 213 Or App 56, 62, 159 P3d 1201, rev den, 343 Or 224 (2007) (“If the wording of a statute is truly capable of one, and only one, reasonable construction then, whatever the legislative history may show, it cannot alter the unambiguous meaning of a statute.”).
Nonetheless, and based solely on the shades of the dictionary meaning of “third,” the majority jumps into this second level of the PGE analysis. I believe that the majority sets the bar too low. Relying on Owens v. MVD, 319 Or 259, 268, 875 P2d 463 (1994), and Godfrey v. Fred Meyer Stores, 202 Or App 673, 687, 124 P2d 621 (2005), rev den, 340 Or 672 (2006), the majority contends that reading “third time” to mean “fourth time” and “third conviction [that] * * * occurs on or after [January 1,2004]” to mean “third conviction [that] * * * occurs before [January 1, 2004]” is not “wholly implausible.” The majority reasons that, because “third” can sometimes mean any third in a series, the “third conviction” as used in ORS 809.235(l)(b) could mean something different than the third-in-time conviction. Therefore, the majority looks to legislative history and beyond to determine legislative intent.
*46A stronger case is needed to classify the majority’s construction of “convicted * * * for a third time” as not “wholly implausible” than the vagaries of the dictionary definition of “third.” As the court noted in Steele v. Employment Department, 143 Or App 105, 113-14, 923 P2d 1252 (1996), aff'd, 328 Or 292, 974 P2d 207 (1999):
“[M]any of the words in our language have several meanings or shades of meaning. However, it does not follow from the fact that there are several variations of how a word is defined in the dictionary that all of the variations are pertinent whenever the word is used, or that each variation is an arguably plausible description of what the word means as it is used in a particular statute. The subject and purpose of the statute, together with the statutory language that surrounds the word in question, narrow the array of definitional choices that dictionaries alone afford and go far in identifying the intended meaning of the word as used in the statute.”
Similarly, we observed in DLCD v. Yamhill County, 151 Or App 367, 372-73, 949 P2d 1245 (1997):
“[T]he linguistic tenability of a proffered interpretation of a statutory term does not make the interpretation ‘plausible’ if a different interpretation that is also linguistically supportable is decisively more consistent with the sense and purpose of the statute and its surrounding language.”
The actual text of ORS 809.235(l)(b), its “surrounding language” in Oregon Laws 2003, chapter 346, and every other statutory sanction for a DUII offense in ORS chapter 809 point to a certain conclusion that the license revocation sanction applies to only the third conviction in time. If resort to the second and third levels of the PGE analysis is excused here, because “third” can arguably refer to more than one thing in other contexts, then almost every statute can be dissected by a clever linguist to produce some uncertainty of meaning and, thus, to allow inquiry into legislative history. The statutory construction analysis then becomes much less rigorous. Many meanings of a statute can be ascribed to legislative testimony or discovered through canons of construction that often amount to after-the-fact rationales for a judicially preferred policy. The risk of judicial amendment of a *47statute becomes more acute when any uncertainty of meaning justifies application of the second and third tiers of the PGE formula. Instead, that justification should depend on the existence of multiple constructions of the statutory text that are consistent with the sense and purpose of the statute and its surrounding language. That test is not met here.
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that examination of the legislative history of ORS 809.235(l)(b) is justifiable, it has limited relevance in this case. Where one construction of a statute is likely, given its text and context, and another is merely plausible, the likely meaning should be preferred by a court unless the legislative history of the statute clearly shows that the merely plausible meaning was intended. Assuming that the majority’s construction of ORS 809.235(l)(b) is plausible because it is consistent with the sense and purpose of the statute and its surrounding language, the legislative history of the statute does not vindicate that construction. The majority admits that “there is nothing in the legislative history that speaks directly to the specific issue of statutory construction that we confront in this case.” 217 Or App at 31. The obvious legislative intent to increase the penalties for certain DUII repeat offenders and to remove those offenders from the roadways earlier in time is implemented no matter how ORS 809.235(l)(b) is construed. It is speculative to infer any more specific intent and to formulate the meaning of ORS 809.235(l)(b) based on that conjecture. Because the legislative history does not particularly support the majority’s construction of ORS 809.235(l)(b), the statute should be construed to effectuate its likely meaning — that the “third time” conviction occurring “on or after” January 1, 2004, is the third in time conviction occurring on or after that date.
The majority errs in further proceeding to the third level of the PGE analysis. Unless the legislative history sheds doubt on the likely meaning of a statute, an alternative meaning that is merely plausible should not be advanced through application of canons of judicial construction. The canons may be useful to resolve uncertainty among competing constructions of a statute that are merely plausible, but not to overcome the likely meaning of a statute.
*48I do not view the classification made by the legislature in ORS 809.235(l)(b) as absurd or suggestive of constitutional difficulty. The 2003 law does not apply to persons with three or more DUII convictions prior to January 1,2004, because a four-time offender is likely covered by the preexisting DUII felony license revocation penalty. The 2003 law expressly kept the DUII felony license revocation penalty in place. The retention of the preexisting consequences for a DUII felony, a license revocation for only certain four or greater DUII convictions that are proximate in time, perpetuates the policies implemented by the preexisting DUII felony law. As time goes on, permanent revocation of driving privileges for all new third-time offenders would reduce the opportunity to apply the sanction to persons with four or more DUII convictions.
Admittedly, it would have been cleaner had the legislature also imposed the sanction for those four or greater in number DUII conviction offenders who do not qualify as felony offenders. But the retention of the DUII felony text in ORS 809.235(l)(b) and the addition of language referencing only particular third-time convictions plainly express a narrower legislative intent. I see no reason to construe the statute differently than its likely meaning simply because a different construction can be barely squeezed from the words of the statute, and the application of the statute as so construed would be more tidy or harsher to DUII offenders or would better suit the preference of the majority of this court.
Wollheim, J., joins in this dissent.ORS 813.010(5) defined the Class C felony offense of DUII as follows:
“Driving while under the influence of intoxicants is a Class C felony if the defendant has been convicted of driving while under the influence of *38intoxicants in violation of this section or its statutory counterpart in another jurisdiction at least three times in the 10 years prior to the date of the current offense and the current offense was committed in a motor vehicle.”
ORS 809.235(l)(b) was amended in 2005 in two respects, Or Laws 2005, ch 436, § 1, neither of which is relevant to this appeal. In its current version, the statute reads, in part, as follows:
“The court shall order that a person’s driving privileges be permanently revoked * * * if the person is convicted of misdemeanor driving while under the influence of intoxicants in violation of ORS 813.010 or its statutory counterpart in any other jurisdiction for a third or subsequent time.”
(Emphasis added.)
See Carroll and Murphy, 186 Or App 59, 68, 61 P3d 964 (2003) (using “a” as an indefinite article to distinguish an unidentified, undetermined, or unspecified noun and use of “the” indicates the intention to refer to a definite noun, rather than any unspecified noun); Steelman-Duff, Inc. v. Dept. of Transportation, 323 Or 220, 227, 915 P2d 958 (1996) (identifying “a” as an indefinite article and “the” as a definite article).
See also ORS 809.120(l)(b) (allowing a court to recommend suspension of driving privileges of a “second or subsequent” violation of ORS 818.040 relating to weight limitations); ORS 809.280(7)(b) (imposing a one-year suspension by the Department of Transportation on receipt of a “second or subsequent” order denying driving privileges for a convicted juvenile under ORS 809.260); ORS 809.407(2)(e) (one-year suspension of commercial driver’s license for railroad crossing violations if a “third or subsequent” offense occurs within three years of two or more convictions for separate offenses); ORS 809.413(6)(b) (imposing a 120-day suspension for a “third or subsequent” conviction of a serious traffic violation if convictions arose out of separate incidents within three years); ORS 809.428(l)(c) (imposing a three-year suspension under Schedule I for a “third or subsequent offense” where the present offense plus two convictions for separate offenses occurs within five years); ORS 809.428(2)(c) (imposing a three-year suspension for a “third or subsequent” offense where that offense and a conviction for a separate offense occurs within a five-year period); ORS 809.600(1) (revoking driving privileges for habitual offenders when a person is convicted of “three or more” listed offenses within five years); ORS 809.600(2) (revoking driving privileges for habitual offenders who are convicted of “20 or more” listed offenses within a five-year period).
The majority incorrectly asserts that “the legislature employs references to ordinal numbers” in any number of ways. 217 Or App at 29. I am not aware of, nor does the majority point to, any instance where the bare statutory reference to a “first,” “second,” or “third” occurrence means the “first or more,” “second or subsequent,” or “third or greater number” occurrence. The majority notes the references to the enhanced fines for a “second conviction” in ORS 468.939(3) (crime of unlawful air pollution in first degree) and ORS 468.946(3) (crime of unlawful water pollution in first degree) to not limit the additional fine to “the second — and only the second — conviction.” 217 Or App at 29. The enhanced penalty in both statutes applies to “a second conviction * * * within a five year period.” The plain reading of the statutes is to augment the penalty for a second or greater in number conviction in time, but only if the conviction occurs within five years of an earlier conviction. That enhancement would occur whether or not predicate convictions existed before the five-year period. The “second conviction” could be the third conviction in time. But those statutes do not state or imply that the phrase “second conviction” *45includes the third, fourth, or any greater in number conviction by the mere use of the word “second,” the proposition advanced by the majority in this case.
The contextual analysis of the meaning of ORS 809.235(l)(b) is particular to its statutory setting and cases from other jurisdictions are of limited guidance. That guidance, however, supports my reading of ORS 809.235(l)(b). In Calhoun v. State, 46 Md App 478, 418 A2d 1241 (1980), aff'd, 290 Md 1, 425 A2d 1361 (1981), the Maryland Court of Special Appeals held that, where a statute prescribed an enhanced penalty for a “third” conviction, as opposed to a “second or subsequent conviction,” the law allowed the penalty only for the one conviction that constituted the third conviction and not on any conviction beyond the second. There, as here, the drafting of the statute was “patently inartful” but capable of only one interpretation. Id. at 489-90, 418 A2d at 1249.