with whom MATTHEWS, Justice, joins, concurring in part, and dissenting in part.
Although I agree that the default judgment must be set aside and the case remanded for a determination of damages, I disagree with the majority's holding today that Cook's peremptory challenge of Judge Cutler was timely. In my view, this case should be remanded for a trial on damages before Judge Cutler, the originally assigned trial judge.
Rule 42(c)(8) prevents a party from exercising a peremptory challenge against the assigned trial judge after a default judgment has been entered. That rule provides that a notice of change of judge is timely "if filed by the party before the commencement of tri*272al." 1 I believe that the term "trial" must be interpreted to encompass the concept of final resolution of the case, including a default judgment.2
Moreover, in many default cases, the judge holds a damages hearing prior to entry of a default judgment, a proceeding that is tantamount to a "trial" on the issue of damages.3 And if either party has requested a jury trial prior to entry of default, the issue of damages must be tried to a jury, despite one party's absence at trial.4 If Judge Cutler had held a damages hearing, listening to the same witness who prepared the damages affidavit in this case, Cook's peremptory challenge would not have been timely filed as it would have occurred after "trial." The right to file a peremptory challenge after a default judgment should not depend on whether the trial court has determined the amount of damages based on the testimony in an affidavit or that of a live witness.
As a result of the court's decision today, careful practitioners will request a damages hearing or "trial" in every future default case, to avoid the possibility that a defendant, unhappy with the result of the case, will enter an appearance, preempt the judge, and move to set aside the default judgment. This will result in time-consuming and unnecessary hearings in cases where the amount of damages is easily ascertainable from documentary evidence.
For these reasons, I respectfully disagree with the majority's view that Cook's peremptory challenge was timely and should be given effect. I would remand for a damages trial before Judge Cutler.
. Alaska Civil Rule 42(c)(3) states:
Timeliness. Failure to file a timely notice precludes change of judge as a matter of right. Notice of change of judge is timely if filed before the commencement of trial and within five days after notice that the case has been assigned to a specific judge. Where a party has been served or enters an action after the case has been assigned to a specific judge, a notice of change of judge shall also be timely if filed by the party before the commencement of trial and within five days after a party appears or files a pleading in the action.
. A default judgment is a final judgment that terminates litigation and decides a dispute. Hertz v. Berzanske, 704 P.2d 767, 770 (Alaska 1985). See also Calhoun v. Greening, 636 P.2d 69, 72 (Alaska 1981) (holding that a default judgment and subsequent motion to set aside constitute a final judgment for purposes of res judica-ta).
. Alaska Civil Rule 55(c)(1) provides in part:
If, in order to enable the court to enter a judgment or to carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account or to determine the amount of damages or to establish the truth of any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any other matter, the court may conduct such hearings or order such references as it deems necessary and proper.
. Hall v. Morozewych, 686 P.2d 708, 711-12 Alaska 1984).