dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The Idaho legislature has entrusted to law enforcement, prosecutors, the courts, the Department of Corrections, and the Parole Commission the responsibility to protect the citizens of the state. This solemn duty so entrusted extends to future potential victims. Repeat habitual violent offenders who cannot conform their conduct to society should not be set free to prey upon it. To this end, the legislature has provided the courts with a statute designed to address the problem presented by those individuals who persist in engaging in behavior detrimental to society. Idaho Code Section 19-2514, the persistent violator statute, allows Idaho courts the necessary discretion for crafting a sentence appropriate for repeat offenders and provides:
Any person convicted for the third time of the commission of a felony, whether the previous convictions were had within the state of Idaho or were had outside the state of Idaho, shall be considered a persistent violator of law, and on such third conviction shall be sentenced to a term in the custody of the state board of correction which term shall be for not less than five (5) years and said term may extend to life.
Before the district court below, and before this Court now, is Helms, a sexual predator and a repeat violent offender. As a persistent violator, Helms is exactly the type of individual I.C. § 19-2514 was intended to deal with.
The majority attempts to justify its arbitrary reduction of Helms’s sentence to fifteen years fixed for two reasons. First, the majority downplays the instant offense and Helms’s substantial criminal record. Second, the majority expresses the view that this Court has never considered a case where a fixed life sentence was imposed solely on the character of the offender and therefore it will always be, in every case, improper. I find neither of these to be persuasive in the particular situation of Helms who pled guilty to not only the underlying crime, but also admitted to being a persistent violator, subject to a fixed life sentence.1
An appellate review of a sentence is based on an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 276, 1 P.3d 299, 304 (Ct.App.2000). Where a sentence is not illegal, the appellant has the burden to show that it is unreasonable and, thus, a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 393, 825 P.2d 482, 490 (1992). A sentence may represent such an abuse of discretion if it is shown to be unreasonable upon the facts of the case. State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982). Upon review of a sentence the issue is not whether the sentence is one that this Court would have imposed, but whether the sentence is plainly excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct.App.1982). If reasonable minds might differ as to whether the sentence is excessive, we are not free to substitute our view for that of the district *85court. Id. We must defer to the discretion of the district court so long as that discretion was not abused. See Burdett, 134 Idaho at 276, 1 P.3d at 304.
Where an appellant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, we conduct an independent review of the record, having regard for the nature of the offense, the character of the offender and the protection of the public interest. State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 772, 653 P.2d 1183, 1184 (Ct.App.1982). However, a fixed life sentence may be held reasonable if the nature of the offense is so egregious that it warrants an exceptionally severe retribution or the character of the offender utterly lacks rehabilitative potential, making life imprisonment the only reasonable means of protecting society. State v. Eubank, 114 Idaho 635, 638, 759 P.2d 926, 929 (Ct.App.1988). The four, well-established objectives of criminal punishment in Idaho are: the protection of society; deterrence of the individual and the public generally; the possibility of rehabilitation; and punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 933, 104 P.3d 969, 975 (2005); Toohill, 103 Idaho at 568, 650 P.2d at 710. However, as a matter of policy, the primary consideration in sentencing must always be the protection of society. State v. Hunnel, 125 Idaho 623, 627, 873 P.2d 877, 881 (1994). All other purposes and objectives of sentencing must be subservient to this cause. Id. Given these objectives, when sentencing under the persistent violator statute, even if the instant crime is not so egregious that it would, by itself, support a fixed life sentence, the sentencing court must still review the character of the offender and make a decision that primarily serves to protect society above all else. See Eubank, 114 Idaho at 638-39, 759 P.2d at 929-30. A fixed life sentence based primarily upon an evaluation of character is acceptable only if the sentencing court can determine, with a high degree of certainty, that the perpetrator can never be safely released into society. Id. at 638, 759 P.2d at 929. Considering the above criteria, I conclude the majority’s opinion today is directly contrary to this Court’s opinion in Eubank when the majority suggests that imposing a life sentence under the persistent violator statute based on the character of the offender alone is improper.
The question before this Court in the instant case is whether the sentencing court could reasonably find with a high degree of certainty that Helms, as a persistent violator, could never be safely released into society, regardless of the nature of the instant crime before the court. Therefore, I believe it is important to review the entire picture of Helms’s character as placed before the district court. Only then can we consider whether its exercise of discretion was reasonable.
Helms was identified in kindergarten as having behavioral management problems. By the age of twelve, Helms had a history of lying, stealing, and fire-starting. He had also undergone psychiatric treatment, including inpatient treatment at a hospital for the mentally ill. The last time he attended a public school (middle school), he was caught stealing supplies and selling marijuana. By 1989, Helms had juvenile dispositions for criminal trespass, theft, and taking a motor vehicle without permission. His parents could no longer control him and arranged for fourteen-year-old Helms to live with a private foster care family.
Within a few months of staying with the foster care family, Helms sexually violated their six-year-old daughter (who was also his half-sister) and coerced her nine-year-old brother (who was Helms’s half brother as well) to also sexually molest her. When confronted with his actions, Helms readily admitted the conduct, showed no remorse, and stated: “I did it. So what?” While investigating this crime, authorities discovered Helms had previously sexually molested his younger brother who still lived with his parents. He had also threatened his brother with a knife.
Helms pled guilty to three counts of child rape and was placed in the custody of a juvenile detention/therapy facility. While in detention, psychologists diagnosed Helms for the first time as a sexual predator with a high likelihood of reoffending, although it would not be the last time. During his first stay in detention, Helms frequently made *86sexually inappropriate remarks to female detainees and staff, often acted aggressively or disruptively, and was disciplined on a regular basis. Helms also began a pattern of threatening to injure himself to gain the total attention of the staff. Helms underwent sexual offender treatment but, even at the time of his parole in 1991, his discharge summary indicated he would likely reoffend.
Understandably, once paroled, Helms’s parents would not allow him to live with them as his younger brother, and former sexual assault victim, was living in the household. Helms was admitted to the Therapeutic Adolescent Program (TAP), a specialized foster home for troubled youth. While in TAP, Helms violated his parole by running away on three occasions and stealing money from the foster home, a crime for which he was later adjudicated. Because of this behavior he was asked to leave TAP. In 1992, Helms returned to his parents’ home where he continued to lie, steal, and emotionally manipulate those around him. Shortly after his return, Helms attempted to burn down the garage. He was adjudicated for first degree reckless burning and put into another juvenile detention facility. Helms was paroled again in 1993. He violated his parole by having unsupervised contact with a minor child. At this time his parole officer stated in a written report that Helms was “a very cold individual who has absolutely no conscience and does not care what he does to others.”
In 1994, Helms failed to register as a sex offender and committed criminal trespass in Washington. While those cases were pending, he drifted to Idaho where he committed grand and petit theft. He pled guilty to the Idaho crimes. A pre-sentence investigation report showed that Helms’s parents felt he had no remorse or conscience. Helms was incarcerated on the theft charges.
Even within the highly-structured environment of the prison system, Helms’s criminal behavior not only continued unabated but increased. In 1995, Helms attempted to slash the throat of another inmate but did not seriously injure the victim. Helms was found guilty and sentenced for felony possession of a weapon by an inmate. In 1998, Helms and an accomplice devised a plan to murder another inmate. Helms and his partner ambushed the victim in his cell and began beating him. Helms pulled out a razor and slashed the victim’s face, arms, body, and neck in an attempt to murder him by slitting his throat. Correctional officers intervened before the victim was killed. By his own admission after the incident, Helms described to the investigating officer how, if the attack had not been stopped, he had planned to eviscerate the victim, pulling out his internal organs, cutting them up, spreading them around the cell and eating some of them. According to Helms, these actions would have been undertaken in order to make the murder scene as grisly as possible so as to emulate the gruesomeness of the scene of the “Manson murders” in Helter Skelter. Helms was found guilty of this crime and sentenced to a fifteen-year fixed term to be served consecutive to his other sentences. In 2003, Helms destroyed his cell toilet and sink. He was charged with felony injury to jails and received a five-year consecutive sentence. While waiting in a courthouse transport holding room, Helms slipped out of his belly chain and physically assaulted another inmate.
In addition to the notable crimes above, Helms’s history of incarceration is replete with other incidents of severe disruptive and violent behavior. He has engaged in self-mutilation numerous times, including carving phrases like “bug for life” and “Helter Skelter Manson” into his own flesh. Helms has engaged in a seemingly unending series of institutional violations including: flooding his cell, destroying cell door windows, shattering food trays, masturbating while in view of correctional officers, and repeatedly disobeying orders and verbally abusing or threatening staff. In the course of his prison career, Helms has also assaulted correctional officers with urine, feces, a piece of broken toilet porcelain, fists and toilet water, including the instant offense. Altogether, Helms has received a total of fifty-four disciplinary offense reports while in prison.
Helms has repeatedly displayed a fascination with death and ideation of homicide and cannibalism. In 2000, Helms told an investí*87gator that in 1994 he had helped commit the murder of a female African-American prostitute and subsequently ate her heart after assisting in cutting her body into pieces. He also confessed to the murder of another man during this same period. Admittedly, there exists no evidence to corroborate any of Helms’s frightening claims. Even the investigator commented that these were either fantasies Helms would act out upon release, fabrications, or the truth. However, when asked in 2003 about these previous admissions, Helms again affirmed they were true, that he was part of a satanic cult at that time, and had engaged in murder and cannibalism.
Helms has also idolized Charles Manson and has in the past expressed a desire to gain a similar level of notoriety as well by committing an act that would give him a life sentence or the death penalty. This desire was at least partially the motivation for the attempted murder in 1998. Regarding this earlier crime, Helms later remarked that the victim was chosen essentially because he was simply there and if Helms was going to kill someone the chosen victim was sufficient.
Though never conclusively diagnosed as being a sociopath, Helms has a long history of mental illness and treatment. In 1993, Helms was diagnosed with the genetic disorder, Klinefelter’s syndrome. As the majority has already pointed out, this condition has burdened Helms with several physical and mental problems. Throughout his life, Helms has also shown various symptoms of, or has been diagnosed with, a wide variety of mental disorders over the course of his life, starting at an early age, including: borderline schizophrenia, attention deficit disorder, antisocial tendencies, visual and audio hallucinations, pyromania, depression, hyper-sexuality, delusions of grandeur, aggressive behavior and basic learning disabilities. There has never been a definite finding what, if any, connection exits between his genetic condition and his criminal behavior.
The record reveals a history of some form of medication for Helms’s multitude of deficiencies off and on since 1987. Most recently Helms has been actively prescribed Prosac and Thorazine, which are an anti-depressant and anti-psychotic respectively. Additionally, he has undergone intermittent testosterone replacement therapy for his genetic condition. However, Helms has demonstrated a propensity to agree to take or undergo various treatments or therapy plans for his mental and physical problems, and then refusing to follow through, often fabricating excuses when confronted.
Throughout his life, Helms has shown a cycle of unpredictable behavior and is unable to act in a responsible manner for longer then six months at a time. Helms has been found to be highly suggestible and impulsive. He has demonstrated the capacity to behave with intense violence when acting on his impulses, none of which appear to have any pattern other than a propensity for destructive behavior. He has never demonstrated any remorse for the victims of any of his crimes nor does he appeal' to understand or care how his actions affect the lives of his victims.
Despite repeated, extraordinary attempts to treat him, Helms has shown little or no progress at being in any way rehabilitated. The only time it has been reported that Helms has made any headway in modifying his behavior is in the context of highly controlled environments and even this improvement has been minimal. Helms remains unrepentant in his behavior and attitude. Virtually every mental health or law enforcement authority that has dealt with Helms after his 1989 child rape dispositions has continually described him as a predator without a conscience who is at high risk to reoffend if released into an unsuspecting public. His most recent treating psychologist summed up Helms’s situation best by stating: “I think [Helms] is always going to be dangerous for the rest of his life. He is unpredictable. Hard to read, He doesn’t care.”
One cannot be without some sympathy for someone in Helms’s situation. Indeed, some persons in the penal system find themselves there because of an utter lack of resources in the mental health arena. It is unfortunate that, in perhaps too many cases, the judicial and penal system are called upon to protect society in ways better suited, but not avail*88able. Idaho’s Supreme Court and legislature are currently on the cutting edge of estabhshing special mental health and drug courts, recognizing that, for some, these types of alternative disposition of their eases may prevent long-term incarceration in favor of treatment. Helms, however, is not in this position. The existence of shortcomings in the public mental health system does not absolve us of our duty to protect society, above all else, when considering an offender’s sentence.
After reviewing Helms’s lengthy history of brutal, unpredictable and predacious criminal behavior, it is unclear how the district court could have possibly had a higher degree of certainty that Helms is now, and will ever remain, a danger to society if released.2 Helms is a sexual predator, a repeat violent offender, and an admitted persistent violator of the law. Based on the circumstances presented, I conclude that Helms has failed to demonstrate the district court abused its discretion in fashioning his sentence. The only thing I find “unreasonable” in Helms’s sentence is the majority’s modification of it to a fifteen-year fixed sentence. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
. The majority does not hold that, if a fixed life sentence was permissible for this offense, the district court would have acted outside its discretion in imposing it upon Helms.
. Although it is possible the Parole Board may deny Helms parole in the future, that is not a factor for our consideration. The issue before this Court is whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Helms the ability to become parole eligible.