The Moore-Brown-Roberti Family Rights Act (Gov. Code, §§ 12945.1, 12945.2; CFRA) gives a full-time employee the right to a medical leave of absence for a “serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the position of that employee . . . .” (Id., § 12945.2, subd. (c)(3)(C).) I agree with the lead opinion that an employer’s failure to invoke the CFRA’s dispute-resolution mechanism of having a health care provider determine the employee’s entitlement to medical leave does not bar the employer from asserting that the employee did not suffer from a health condition that rendered her incapable of performing her job.
I do not agree with the lead opinion, however, that an employee who claims to suffer from a serious health condition may apply for medical leave under the CFRA while she is successfully performing the essential functions of an identical job for a similar employer, on a part-time basis. An employee *218who is successfully performing an identical job is obviously quite able to perform that job’s function. The lead opinion’s statutory interpretation encourages employees to take advantage of a system that was intended to assist them in difficult times, and ignores the needs of employers and fellow employees who participate in the system.
I agree with the Court of Appeal that the CFRA was intended to balance the demands of the workplace with the needs of the employee. As that court observed, the CFRA “was not intended to shift the balance of power to a capable but unwilling employee. That is apparent from the incorporation of the ‘essential functions’ standard applicable to discrimination cases. Under this standard, an employee who is able to perform the essential functions of his or her position is not entitled to medical leave regardless of the assertion of a selective disability.”
The CFRA applies to companies with 50 or more employees and allows up to 12 weeks of unpaid “family care and medical leave” if “an employee’s own serious health condition . . . makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the position of that employee.” (Gov. Code, § 12945.2, subd. (c)(3)(C).) Under the applicable regulations, a “serious health condition” is defined as a physical or mental condition that involves continuing treatment by a health care provider. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 7297.0, subd. (o).) As the Court of Appeal also observed, the Department of Fair Employment and Housing has provided that an employee who suffers from a “serious health condition” under the statute is one who is either “unable to work at all or unable to perform any one or more of the essential functions of the position of that employee.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 7297.0, subd. (k).) The regulation specifies that it uses the term “essential functions” as that term is defined under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.), which states: “ ‘Essential functions’ means the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires. ‘Essential functions’ does not include the marginal functions of the position.” (Gov. Code, § 12926, subd. (f).)
The Court of Appeal observed that under the statute, the “essential functions” formulation in subdivision (f) of section 12926 of the Government Code “was adopted in the statutory scheme that prohibits employment discrimination against persons with disabilities. ([Gov. Code,] § 12940, subd. (a).) ... [1] The obvious purpose of the ‘essential functions’ formulation is to prevent an employer from discriminating by adopting an expansive definition of the duties of the job.” As the Court of Appeal aptly noted, “[t]he words ‘unable to perform the functions of the position of that employee,’ [citation], are words of restriction, not expansion. The standard requires that an employee be unable to perform, rather than merely limited or inhibited; and it *219requires that the inability relate to the essential functions of the job. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 7297.0, subd. (k).)” As the court emphasized, the “essential functions” standard “can only have been adopted to prevent employees from abusing the right to medical leave by asserting some broad, amorphous, and perhaps subjective need or desire for leave.” Indeed, “[h]ad the Legislature intended to confer an expansive right to medical leave, it could have used language far more conducive to such a goal.”
The Court of Appeal correctly understood that the CFRA’s requirement that an employer must grant the leave request of an employee whose serious health condition makes the employee “unable to perform the functions of the position of that employee,” refers to the “essential job functions” generally. (Gov. Code, § 12945.2, subd. (c)(3)(C).) The CFRA does not contemplate that an employee with an alleged “serious health condition” would remain employed and receive health insurance benefits under a group health plan from one employer while on medical leave, at the same time that the employee is apparently working in a comparable position for a different employer. The lead opinion’s belief that the CFRA did not intend to refer to the general functions of the job is simply unpersuasive in light of the legislative intent and common understanding of that term.
Indeed, the legislative history shows that the Legislature implicitly contemplated that an employee who requested leave due to a serious health condition would not be able to perform similar job duties while on medical leave. This is especially apparent in several documents found in the legislative history that explain the application of the CFRA amendments to the existing law. (Stats. 1993, ch. 827, p. 4466.) The CFRA permits employers’ “requests for 2nd and 3rd opinions regarding the validity of the certification with respect to the employee’s own serious health condition.” (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Assem. Bill No. 1460 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) 5 Stats. 1993, Summary Dig., p. 339.) In addition, the CFRA “permit[s] an employer, as a condition of an employee’s return from leave taken because of the employee’s own serious health condition, to require the employee to obtain certification from his or her health care provider that the employee is able to resume work.” (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Assem. Bill No. 1460 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) as amended in Sen. Aug. 19, 1993.)
The legislative history also indicates the CFRA did not consider that an employee would take leave from one job in order to work at a second job while also taking the employer’s benefits from the first job. For example, the CFRA “require[s] an employer, during any period that an eligible employee takes family care and medical leave, or takes leave that qualifies as leave under the FMLA, to maintain and pay for the employee’s medical coverage under a group health plan, as specified.” (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Assem. Bill *220No. 1460 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) 5 Stats. 1993, Summary Dig., p. 339; see Dept, of Fair Employment & Housing, Enrolled Bill Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 1460 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) Aug. 26, 1993, p. 1.) The CFRA also expands coverage to the employee’s own illness and permits the employee to use accrued sick leave for her illness. (Assem. Com. on Ways & Means, Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 1460 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 3, 1993, p. 1.) Clearly, the legislation contemplates that the employee who is on leave is incapacitated to the extent that she cannot work a second substantially identical job.
The lead opinion relies on one case it claims supports plaintiff’s position, but in fact the case is not persuasive. (See Stekloff v. St. John’s Mercy Health Systems (8th Cir. 2000) 218 F.3d 858.) In discussing the “serious health condition” requirement, Stekloff simply noted that whether the employee could perform the functions of the same job for another employer was not material to her request for medical leave under the federal Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.; FMLA), an act that closely parallels the CFRA. (Stekloff, supra, at pp. 861-862.) Stekloff focused the inquiry on the employee’s current job with the current employer and that whether the employee could perform the same job for another employer was immaterial to the employee’s FMLA eligibility. (218 F.3d at p. 862.) As the Court of Appeal observed, Stekloff provided no reasoning for its conclusion, and chose to improperly shift the balance of the FMLA in the employee’s favor without statutory support.
The lead opinion also misuses a comment made in the employment law practice guide that I co-authored, which cited to Stekloff and Hurlbert v. St. Mary’s Health Care System, Inc. (11th Cir. 2006) 439 F.3d 1286, 1295-1296, another federal case that adopts the Stekloff holding. (Chin et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Employment Litigation (The Rutter Group 2006) Leaves of Absence, 1 12:266, p. 12-28 (rev. # 1, 2006).) The practice guide simply cites Stekloff and Hurlbert as cases interpreting application of comparable provisions in the FMLA. A general observation in a practice guide as to the state of the law in other jurisdictions is not persuasive authority in this case.
The words of the CFRA and the legislative history support the view that the Legislature did not intend an employee to be able to take advantage of the medical leave policy in order to further her own employment goals. As amici curiae Employers Group and the California Employment Law Council recognize, in order to maintain the statute’s balance between the needs of employers and employees, and to serve the statute’s purpose to promote stable workplace relationships, common sense dictates that an employee is not entitled to leave under the CFRA and to continuing benefits and job preservation with one employer while she demonstrates she is fully capable *221of performing a job with the same “essential functions” for a second employer. The Court of Appeal correctly observed that the evidence is undisputed, as plaintiff testified in her deposition, “that she did not have a problem with work and thought she could have returned to work for [defendant] if it had changed the working conditions to suit her.” Summary judgment on the issue was therefore proper. If the Legislature intends to permit employees to take identical second jobs while claiming a “serious health condition” at the expense of employers, it can specifically so state. In the meantime, we should not penalize employers that follow the law and assist their employees who are in serious need of medical leave.
Baxter, J., and Corrigan, J., concurred.