*100OPINION
CHAPEL, Judge.T1 Candice Marie Crowley and Lindsay Anne Hall were charged with Furnishing Alcoholic Beverages to Minors in violation of 37 0.8.2001, $ 587(A)(1), in the District Court of Rogers County, Case Nos. CF-O06-69 and CF-O06-78.1 After a joint Preliminary Hearing Crowley and Hall were bound over for trial. They filed a Motion to Suppress and Brief in Support, the State responded, and a hearing was held on March 15, 2007. By written Order filed January 18, 2008, the Honorable J. Dwayne Steidley sustained the Motion to Suppress and the charges against Crowley and Hall were dismissed. The State appeals.2
€ 2 Highway Patrol Trooper McMillan was asked by the Catoosa Campus Police to go to a house located in the City of Catoosa and investigate a report of underage drinking. He drove by the house, heard loud music, saw several parked cars, and saw two women of indeterminate age sitting on the porch holding cups. At that point he had observed no crimes in progress. McMillan asked the Catoosa Campus Police for help. Campus Police officers and Rogers County Sheriffs Department deputies joined him at the house. Through the windows the officers saw at least one juvenile drinking from an opaque cup, and saw open bottles of liquor in the house. McMillan ultimately made initial entry into the house. Crowley and Hall were arrested.
3 Crowley and Hall claimed that Trooper McMillan had no authority or jurisdiction to investigate these crimes or arrest them, while the State argues on appeal that McMillan did have that authority. This is an issue of first impression. The jurisdiction of Oklahoma Highway Patrol troopers is governed by 47 § 2-117. The first, more general, section of this statute designates Highway Patrol troopers as peace officers, vests in them the powers of search and seizure, and to investigate and prevent erime and enforce the criminal laws of Oklahoma.3 The second section enumerates twenty-two specific duties troopers are authorized to perform. Among them is the power "to arrest without writ, rule, order or process any person detected by them in the act of violating any law of the state."4 The Attorney General, asked to interpret the authority granted troopers under this statute, concluded that it provides limited authority for troopers to initiate criminal investigations, and that they may initiate general criminal investigations at the request of another law enforcement authority which would have the power to conduct the investigation itself.5
The Attorney General Opinion, which is not binding on this Court, fails to take into account the § 2-117(B)(2) language quoted above. This language appears to authorize Oklahoma Highway Patrol troopers to arrest persons committing crimes they themselves witness. When faced with conflicting general and specific statutory language we will, if possible, reconcile the provisions to give them each effect.6 In keeping with this principle, the specific provisions of § 2-117(B)(2) must control over the general authorization of responsibility described in $ 2-117(A). The specific language of § 2-117(B)(2) authorizes Oklahoma Highway Patrol troopers to arrest persons they see committing crimes, even if those crimes are general in nature and not confined to enforcement of the laws relating to the operation and use of vehicles on the state highway system.
{5 However, the plain language of the statute does not confer the authority to initiate investigation into crimes a trooper has not yet witnessed. There is a significant *101difference between the power to arrest and the power to investigate crimes. The Legislature was clearly aware of this distinction. The language of § 2-117 reflects this, granting troopers power to investigate some specific crimes and enforce others. Had the Legislature wished in § 2-117(B)(2) to authorize troopers to investigate crimes, it could have done so explicitly, as it did in other provisions of the statute. As it did not, we conclude that the Legislature did not intend to confer on Oklahoma Highway Patrol troopers the broad power to investigate any crime.
16 The Attorney General concluded that a trooper could initiate a criminal investigation at the request of another law enforcement agency with the jurisdiction to investigate the crime in question.7 We agree. However, the trial court found and there seems to be no dispute that the Catoo-sa Campus Police Department had no interdepartmental agreement for assistance with the Oklahoma Highway Patrol. The trial court also found that, under the terms of agreement between the City of Catoosa and the Catoosa Campus Police, the latter had no jurisdiction over the location. That conclusion is the only reasonable interpretation of the agreement's language. That being the case, this Court agrees with the trial court's conclusion that the Catoosa Campus Police had no authority to investigate this criminal activity to begin with, and had no authority to ask Trooper McMillan to investigate it for them. Consequently Trooper McMillan could not rely on the request from the Campus Police for authority to initiate this erimi-nal investigation.
T7 Trooper McMillan had no authority to initiate an investigation in this case. He began investigating a report of a crime long before he saw anything to indicate that a crime might be occurring; he could not confirm that teenagers were drinking alcohol at the party until officers entered the house. This is significantly beyond the scope of any powers authorized under § 2-117(B)(2).
T8 The trial court's decision to suppress the information Trooper McMillan gave the Catoosa Campus Police was correct. Trooper McMillan was not authorized under the Highway Patrol statute to investigate this type of crime. The Catoosa Campus Police had no interdepartmental agreement for assistance with the Oklahoma Highway Patrol, and had no authority to investigate the crime themselves. One might argue that, given McMillan's prior knowledge of the area and the information from the Catoosa Campus Police, he had probable cause to believe a crime was in progress. That is irrelevant to the legal question of whether Trooper McMillan had the authority to act on that information and investigate a possible crime. He did not.
T 9 We do not hold by this Opinion that a Highway Patrol Trooper may never have jurisdiction to investigate crimes under similar circumstances. We hold that, under the legislation as it currently stands, troopers do not have that authority. The Legislature has the power to grant such authority by statute. We hold that, in the absence of a statutory grant of authority, Trooper McMillan did not have the authority to investigate the crimes charged under the circumstances of this case.
Decision
€ 10 The ruling of the District Court sustaining the Defendants' Motion to Suppress is AFFIRMED. Pursuant to Rule 8.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch.18, App. (2009), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision.
C. JOHNSON, P.J., and LEWIS, J., coneur. A. JOHNSON, V.P.J., and LUMPKIN, J., dissent.. These appeals were filed separately. As the claim of error, facts and circumstances are the same, and Crowley and Hall are represented by the same counsel, the cases have been combined on appeal.
. 22 0.$.2001, § 1089.1.
. 47 0.$8.8upp.2005, § 2-117(A).
. 47 0.$.Supp.2005, § 2117(B)(2).
. Question Submitted by: Director DeWade Langley, Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation, 2006 OK AG 14, { 11 (April 21, 2006).
. King v. State, 2008 OK CR 13, 182 P.3d 842, 844.
. Question Submitted by: Director DeWade Langley, Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation, 2006 OK AG 14, 1 11 (April 21, 2006).